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Foreword 
The MONIT project was endorsed by the TIP working party in December 2002. Building on 
the results of the TIP NIS project, its main objective is to generate knowledge on how to 
improve innovation policy governance and create a more coherent and comprehensive 
innovation policy. The focus is on how to achieve a more horizontal innovation policy 
through co-ordination with non-core policy areas, vertical integration and coherence, and new 
forms of governance and policy making processes. More specifically it studies the 
foundations for innovation policy governance by highlighting issues such as political 
leadership, building effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foundations for 
information exchange and policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems and related 
sources for coherent policy making.  
The MONIT network consists of 13 countries, all devoted to generate knowledge to be shared 
by the others. The MONIT project is organized in 3 work packages (WP):  
• WP1 consists of a broad analysis and assessment of the national policy profiles and 
challenges, as well as of key governance issues;  
• WP2 includes policy case studies in the areas of information society, sustainable 
development and transport, and regional policy;  
• WP3 will synthesize the results from WP1 and WP2 and draw the policy implications. 
STEP is in MONIT studying the Norwegian innovation policy system through several inter-
linked studies. A main focus is to better understand the underlying logic of the Norwegian 
system, its roots in terms of cultural traditions and the main priorities coming out of it. Both 
mapping studies and more detailed studies of parts of the innovation policy system are 
therefore covered in the project. 
 
Norway is the lead country in this network, while Austria, Finland and Netherlands are co-
leads. The Norwegian part of the project is commissioned by the Research Council of Norway 
(RCN), and funded by this council and the ministries of Science and Education, Trade and 
Industry and Regional Affairs. The project also consists of a learning arena organized by the 
users through which results and perspectives generated by MONIT is disseminated and 
discussed.  
 
 
 
 
Svend Otto Remøe 
 
Project responsible 
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Executive summary 
 
This report contains an analysis of the foundations for a horizontal, coherent innovation 
policy in Norway spanning the range of governmental boundaries. It is part of a wider OECD 
study to investigate lessons and models for the renewal of institutions and practices of policy 
making in OECD countries as the innovation driven economy makes a more effective policy 
co-ordination necessary.  
 
The main results in this study of Norwegian governance are highlighted as following: 
 
a) The Norwegian governance system has in general changed since the years after the 
IIWW from a more interventionist and strategic role played by the government to a 
model based on New Public Management. This development has led to increasing 
state fragmentation and segmentation, less strategic policy making and more attention 
to a balanced but restricted use of state budget surpluses.  
b) Although innovation policy has been on the agenda for some time, it has still a weak 
position in the overall policy system. In particular, there is a weak link between 
economic policy and innovation policy, leading to a weak strategic framework for 
innovation policy. This is most evident in the current attempt by the government to 
launch a coherent innovation policy plan (HIP).  
c) The Norwegian governance structure is ill fitted for the challenges posed by the need 
to generate more coherence. The ministries are by tradition strongly autonomuous, and 
the co-ordination mechanisms in place, like RFU, GFU and more recently RUI, are 
typically static, focussing on short term co-ordination and steering needs. Long term 
mechanisms have weak foundations in the Norwegian system. 
d) This is evident in the state budgetary system, where short-termism prevails, and where 
even the half-yearly state budget revision gains a policy making role on its own.  
e) The long term needs of the Norwegian economy has recently been well addressed, 
pointing to future value creation needs exceeding what the current economic structure 
is likely to achieve. However, related to c), the governance system has so far been less 
able to create a momentum and implementation strategies for the changes in priorities 
that need to take place. An exception is the increasing budgetary allocations for R&D, 
albeit through new institutional mechanisms outside the state budget.  
f) The inherent principle of sector responsibility in the Norwegian system has many 
advantages, one of which is an obligation for each ministry to develop R&D strategies 
for their own sectors of responsibility. However, this system needs to amended to be 
better able to take up more strategic policy making on the one hand, and give more 
leeway to RCN on the other hand.  
g) Among the proposals presented, two are highlighted: First, a better integration 
between policy areas through goal alignment and monitoiring of implementation is 
warranted. Second, a strengthening of the prime minister’s office (PMO) is suggested 
to generate more horizontal, strategic policy making on areas that require full 
governmental attention, like innovation policy.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background: The MONIT project 
OECDs project on National Innovation Systems (NIS) started originally in 1995. Being 
managed by the working party of Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) it set out to explore 
the requirements for redirecting innovation policy in OECD countries, taking into account the 
new insights in the innovation process that came out of the innovation research at that time. 
While many accepted that the linear model of innovation did not capture the realities of the 
innovation process, it was acknowledged that public policy was still founded upon the linear 
model and its implications for policy. Hence, the OECD NIS project became an important 
collaborative mechanism for generating new data based on the interactive model of 
innovation and for developing a set of recommendations for public policy. 
 
Formally, the OECD NIS project was concluded in 2001, and had over the years produced   
many outputs that were fed into other OECD work and generated by itself several 
publications on industrial clusters, networks, human mobility as well as synthesis reports for 
renewals of innovation policy. However, in the concluding work (OECD 2002), a critical 
question was raised that became the starting point for the current MONIT project: If the 
developed economies are changing into a more innovation oriented and dynamic mode, is it 
feasible that national governments and their policy making modes can remain largely the 
same? More precisely, given the needed changes in the policy content, how could or should 
governments change their structures and processes to better accommodate the dynamism in 
their environments? 
 
To explore these issues, OECD and its working party for Technology and Innovation Policy 
(TIP) endorsed in 2002 a new collaborative study called MONIT (Monitoring and assessing 
national innovation policies). It was to be carried out as the activities of the preceding NIS 
project with voluntary research activities conducted by the countries willing to participate in a 
modus operandi referred to as focus groups. In all 13 countries decided to participate (see 
annex 1). The Nordic countries had been driving forces behind the MONIT project, and 
Norway volunteered to take the role as the lead country with the overall responsibility to co-
ordinate and steer the progress and direction of the project. It was also decided to broaden the 
lead role to ensure a collaborative management of the project, and Finland, Austria and 
Netherlands became co-leading countries.  
 
Innovation policy is not a new area, but the focus on the capabilities of the policy systems 
delivering innovation policy implies a shift in focus. If coherent, comprehensive innovation 
policy is needed, it needs to span horizontal boundaries of government to ensure that all 
policy areas that have consequences on a firm’s or industry’s innovative performance are co-
ordinated and integrated. To achieve a best possible empirical basis for drawing conclusions 
and implications for innovation policy, it was decided to include studies of policy areas that 
had similar characteristics as innovation policy in being broad, crossing sectors and in need to 
exploiting co-ordination mechanisms. Hence, in addition to the study of core innovation 
policy, a set of non-innovation policy areas was selected: Regional policy, environmental 
policy (or policy for sustainable development), policy for the information society (in many 
countries as national actions plans), and transport policy. While information society became 
mandatory for all participating countries, the others were voluntary. Norway conducted the 
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first three (all published by STEP, the contracted research institute, as independent 
publications).  
 
To ensure a best possible outcome, STEP engaged in collaboration with Programme for 
Sustainable Development (Prosus) at the University of Oslo. Prosus did most of the study on 
sustainable development, and given their well-founded knowledge of this area, were able to 
provide broad and thorough perspective on the interface between policies for sustainable 
development and innovation policy. 
 
This report is a national overview of the set of determinants and consequences of the 
Norwegian innovation governance system. It has been produced within a joint format of the 
participating MONIT countries to allow some level of comparison. However, the main 
purpose of it is to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the system to help induce changes 
and adaptations that may lead to better policy.  
 
1.2. Interactions in policy systems 
A critical point of departure is that seen from the vantage point of view from a firm, policies 
and their incentives, disincentives and regulatory effects interact to create a policy 
environment for that firm. This includes both core science, technology and innovation policy 
areas like R&D, as well as other, often more peripheral policy areas that have innovation 
consequences for firms. Governments typically know too little about these interactions and, 
needless to say, how to correct or accommodate policies to produce a coherent whole, if 
possible.  
 
Seen from this perspective, it becomes a concern for governments to engage in processes that 
produce such outcomes. But governments may not be able to do so, or do it late and with little 
effectiveness. With the typical trait of governments, sector based division of labor between 
ministries, they will vary in terms of how and to which extent they are able to overcome these 
divisions and create what the MONIT project has termed horizontalization.  
 
Horizontal interactions are combined with vertical ones: Vertical interactions depict 
relationships between different layers of government bodies, like between ministries and 
agencies, and between ministries and the regional level. Typically, this is most important 
concerning implementation of policies, but lead in total to very different governance 
structures across countries. Recent developments in governance underline this: New Public 
Management (NPM) has been to various degrees adopted across the industrialized world, 
leading to more decentralization.  Still, horizontal innovation policies is a key concept as it 
frames the focus on the need to co-ordinate and govern many policy domains to achieve better 
innovation policy.  
 
1.3. Coherence: A key feature of horizontal innovation policy 
Horizontalization is not a goal in itself, but rather a characteristic of a policy system. It could 
be defined as the degree to which (in this case) innovation policy is guided by a 
comprehensive national strategy in which contributions from the various sectors are linked to 
achieve policy coherence. The link between horizontalization and the arrangements for co-
ordination and governance is a crucial one. 
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Hence, it is the national capabilities of national policy systems to generate coherent 
innovation policy that are at stake. Coherence is important for many reasons:1 
 
• Coherent policies are more likely to be effective and more readily applied in a consistent 
and equitable way; 
• Governments are increasingly faced with complex and difficult issues, which may impact 
differently on different areas of society; 
• They frequently have a range of objectives which cannot easily be reconciled and may be 
in conflict; 
• Faced with greater accountability and challenge, through parliaments, civil society and the 
media, lack of coherence becomes readily apparent and results in uncertainty loss of 
confidence.  
 
The concept has basically three dimensions: 
• Horizontal coherence ensuring that individual, or sectoral, policies, build on each other 
and minimises inconsistencies in the case of (seemingly) conflicting goals; 
• Vertical coherence ensuring that public outputs are consistent with the original intentions 
of policy makers; 
• Temporal coherence ensuring that today’s policies continue to be effective in the future by 
limiting potential incoherence and providing guidance for change. 
 
The MONIT study aims at generating lessons for national governments on how to achieve 
coherence in innovation policy by highlighting issues like political leadership, building 
effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foundations for information exchange and 
policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems and related sources for coherent policy 
making. 2  
 
1.4. An institutional approach 
The MONIT project builds on an important assumption: The national and global economies 
are changing to become more dynamic, innovation and knowledge driven, and complex. A 
next proposition is that governments need to respond, but need to do so in manners different 
from before. There is a widespread, but differentiated, need to assume the same characteristics 
as their environments. Governments need to be able to develop new capabilities if they shall 
be able to deliver coherent policies for this changing world. Which are they? What are their 
determinants? And which are the inertia and counterforces that will undermine a socio-
institutional change? 
 
The institutional approach taken here is that “social choices are shaped, mediated and 
channelled by institutional arrangements” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:2). Behaviours and 
structures change slowly because they are institutionalized. People in different institutions 
have different preferences, and individual choice can therefore not be understood without 
reference to the cultural and historical framework in which they are embedded (March and 
                                                 
1 From a discussion paper for the Centre of Government Network: Government Coherence: The Role of the 
Centre, OECD, PUMA.  
2 See appendix for a list of tools that may enhance policy coherence. This list, derived from the above OECD 
paper, serves only as a point of departure. It is the aim of MONIT to expand and develop this into instructive 
lessons for member countries. 
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Olsen 1995). Institutionalization is understood as “phenomenological process by which 
certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted” and a state of affairs in 
which shared cognitions define “what has meaning and what actions are possible” (Zucker 
1983:2; 1987). Cognitive and cultural explanations are needed to gain a full understanding of 
institutions and how they behave. Institutions are products of interpretations of their 
environments, and even assume traits and characteristics that are blended in by these 
interpretations (Meyer and Rowan 1977).3 
 
Hence, the research reported here focuses deliberately on the dynamics and inertia of formal 
and informal institutions, and on social and cultural processes that make up the creation and 
reinterpretation of these institutions.   
 
For analytical purposes, the study of these phenomena reflects the key stages of a policy 
cycle, as depicted below:  
 
a) Agenda setting 
b) Prioritization 
c) Policy implementation 
d) Learning and evaluation 
 
This is certainly a formalistic version, and may invite a similar understanding of the policy 
making process as in the case of the linear model of innovation. However, this not the case, as 
these processes are interlinked and should be understood as elements of an interactive model 
of policy making. The processes of co-ordination, integration and communication in policy 
systems cut across these stages or elements. In the present study, the stages above illustrate 
four key capabilities in governance of innovation policy (or any other policy area), and the 
aim of MONIT as of this report is to identify the systems strengths and failures influencing 
the policy making systems to provide effective governance.  
 
1.5. The focus of the report 
 
The focus of the MONIT project is to thus to identify and help develop national capabilities of 
appropriate innovation governance. Each country has its own history or trajectory which 
implies that strict comparisons or benchmarking across countries is not seen as useful. This 
report will focus on the capabilities of the Norwegian system to govern, adapt and co-ordinate 
policies for innovation.  
 
It addresses the following issues. 
 
• How is the trajectory or history of the innovation policy area and what has been the 
outcome in terms of particular biases or priorities? 
• How does the current innovation system look like and who are the key actors? 
• What are the challenges facing Norway and what is the likely position of STI policies 
vis a vis these challenges? 
• How processes like agenda setting, prioritisation and stakeholder involvement 
conducted? 
                                                 
3 See also Rannveig Røste: Studies of innovation in the public sector: a literature review. STEP – Center for 
Innovation Research. Oslo, 2004. 
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• How are policies co-ordinated? 
• To which extent are there in place mechanisms for policy learning and capabilities for 
strategic shifts in policy and innovation system trajectories? 
 
Hence, we will aim at understanding how the system came into being, its key determinants, 
how it works and to what extent it constitute the capabilities needed to respond to the 
challenges it meets. We end with an assessment of strengths and weaknesses that seem to 
emerge from the analysis, and highlight both some particular recommendations for policy in 
the Norwegian context as well as some lessons to be learned for other countries.  
 
1.5. Methodological considerations 
This work is part of a wider international collaboration, and a general methodological 
framework has been developed with this in mind. The approach was endorsed by the TIP 
group in December 2003, but has been amended since. This report represents the work 
accomplished on the work package 1 in the MONIT terminology, focussing on the core STI 
policy making system.4 
 
In short, the methodological approach taken derives from the focus on processes and 
dynamics of policy making and the idea to identify crucial national capabilities for developing 
governance practices, policy coherence and horizontal policy. As the national practices are 
indeed national, the task at hand is to identify them as inherent components of national 
traditions, structures and cultures. Hence benchmarking is not the issue, rather, learning 
across countries on governance practices. 
 
There one common quantitative activity in the project, the comparative illustration of 
performance on science, technology and innovation indicators as presented in chapter 2. This 
was achieved by the Dutch team in MONIT, using the data from a recent EU study5. 
Countries outside the EU were then asked to supply their corresponding data to generate a 
complete set of all countries (please see chapter 2 for further information). 
 
In addition, we launched a small survey among policy makers and people being placed such 
that they would have opinions on the challenges ahead for Norway in this context and what 
blank spots there may be in the policies addressing these challenges. Results from this survey 
are included in chapter 4. 
 
Most of the work has been done through using available documents, studies and public 
information like state budget data. In addition, and due to the processual focus in this study 
several interviews have been conducted with key players in the policy system. Further, three 
mini case studies have been conducted to generate more substantial insight into the processes 
concerning selected, but highly important policy developments: The development of the new 
government plan for a coherent innovation policy (the so called HIP), the processes related to 
the recent implementation of a tax refund scheme (skatteFUNN), and the reforms of the 
Norwegian Research Council).  
 
                                                 
4 The work package 2 consists of various policy studies of more peripheral but highly relevant areas like the 
information society, environmental policy, regional policy,  and transport policy. The approach taken in these 
studies are basically similar to the one taken in work package 1, and key findings are integrated in this report. 
5 “Benchmarking national research policies: The impact of RTD on competitiveness and employment (IRCE)”, 
EU Commission 2002. 
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2. Historical development of the science and innovation 
system and governance structure6 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In October 2003, the Norwegian government presented a plan for the introduction of a 
“holistic” innovation policy, entitled From Idea to Value.7 At the heart of this plan is the idea 
that innovation policy should be embedded in a range of policy fields, and not only in the 
traditional fields of industrial and research policy. In this respect, the new policy is in 
accordance with what the European Commission has termed a “third generation” innovation 
policy. This third generation policy differs from the first and second generations - building on 
a linear and a systemic understanding of innovation respectively - in that it emphasizes the 
importance of integrating and coordinating innovation policies across several policy areas.8 
 
This paper surveys the historical developments in Norwegian innovation policies leading up 
to today’s plan for a “third generation” policy. Whereas the term innovation policy was 
introduced in Norway as late as in the early 1980s, innovation policy as a functional policy 
concern is far from new. It has been an integral part of wider industrial policies, covering 
areas such as research policy, educational policy, regional policy, etc.  
 
For pragmatic purposes, the scope of the paper is limited to the postwar period. The paper is 
organized as a chronological overview of central policy developments. Based on what have 
been the overriding trends, the period in question is divided into to four phases: 1946 to the 
late 1970s; the 1980s; the 1990s; and recent developments.9  In conclusion, the historical 
developments in Norwegian innovation policies over the past fifty years will be viewed in 
light of the idea of different generations of innovation policy.  
 
2.2. 1946 to the late 1970s: State supported development of large-
scale industry  
 
In the decades following the Second World War and up to the late 1970s, Norwegian 
industrial policies were strongly influenced by the idea that there existed a “productivity gap” 
or “technology gap” between the USA and Europe. Subsequently, “America” stood out as a 
model for industrial development, and the dominant strategy was to promote the construction 
of big industry: Large organizational units directed towards large scale production. 
 
                                                 
6 This chapter is based on Hauknes, J. and Wicken, O., Innovation policy in the post-war period, STEP Report 
01-2003. Hauknes and Wicken's report has however been reworked, edited, and expanded with substantial new 
contributions. 
7 From Idea to Value - the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (Fra idé til verdi- 
Regjeringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk), Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2003. See analysis in 
chapter 5. 
8  Lengrand, Louis et al, Innovation Tomorrow, Innovation Policy and the Regulatory Framwork: Making 
Innovation an Integral Part of the Broader Structural Agenda, DG Enterprise, October 2002 
9 Needless to say, this periodization must not be interpreted too rigidly. 
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The State played a central role in this strategy. In general, the first postwar decades were 
characterized by a strong belief in the need for direct state intervention to promote industry. 
This is clearly evident in the strong role the Labour governments in the 1950s and 1960s had 
in industrial development, also with a substantial and actively used public ownership. 
 
The Second World War was followed by great optimism regarding the roles of science and 
technology as driving forces in economic development and growth. Immediately after the 
war, a commission was established to assess the organization of Norwegian technological 
research. In its report (published in 1946), this so-called Vogt Commission stressed that future 
industrial development rested upon two forms of research activity: First and foremost, basic 
scientific research; and secondly, technological research which could develop new forms of 
technology based on the results of the former.  
 
Since there were few Norwegian companies that were large and financially strong enough to 
engage in technological research on a large scale, the State took upon itself to establish a 
public technological research institute sector. The immediate postwar years saw the rise of  
the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI, Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), the 
Institute for Nuclear Energy (IFA, Institutt for Atomenergi) and the Central Insitute for 
Industrial Research (SI, Sentralinstituttet for industriell forskning). The public institute sector 
was closely linked to the research council for technological and scientific research, NTNF 
(Norges Teknisk Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd) which had been established in 1946.10 
 
Whereas the Vogt Commission upheld scientific research as the main vehicle in industrial 
development, a report published by NTNF in 1964 emphasized the crucial role of applied 
technological research. Also, the report seemed to express a somewhat broader understanding 
of the role of research in processes of economic development and growth, in that it stated that 
research could only be a driving force in industrial development through interaction with 
other growth factors.11 Nevertheless, the belief in science as the prime mover in economic 
development remained strong well into the 1970s. 
 
As to regional policy in the first decades following the Second World War, the main focus 
was upon facilitating regional distribution and preventing de-population of rural areas. Policy 
efforts were directed towards the redistribution of capital and employment opportunities from 
central areas experiencing growth to regions that were characterized by dwindling primary 
industries.12  
 
A perspective that should not be forgotten during these post-war decades, is linked to the 
relationships between partners in the labour market and the state. The political project in these 
years were first and foremost the development of the welfare state. This demanded a financial 
base, i.e. a greater GDP. The Labour Party provided a ligitimating context for labour and 
capital to enter into what has been termed the “class compromise” in which workers agreed to 
high rates of technology deployment, rationalization and productivity for the state to be able 
to finance the welfare state. Key mechanisms were agreements on the firm level, and the 
                                                 
10 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk 
forskningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, pp. 54-56; Skoie, Hans, 
Instituttsektoren – viktig sektor med problemer, NIFU skriftserie nr. 15/2003, pp. 44-45 
11 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk 
forskningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, p. 58 
12 Isaksen, Arne, “Mot en regional innovasjonspolitikk”, in Isaksen, Arne (ed.), Innovasjoner, næringsutvikling 
og regionalpolitikk, Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget, 1997, p. 211 
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Norwegian industry had hence a relatively progressive and technology-friendly labour during 
these years. 
 
2.3. The 1980s: Growth through new technology and market 
mechanisms  
 
The industrial policies of the immediate postwar period were gradually dismantled in the 
second half of the 1970s, and the 1980s saw several new policy developments. Central trends 
in this decade were the introduction of the so-called strategic technology areas 
(hovedinnsatsområdene); reduced state intervention; a technology-push orientation; a new 
focus on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and a shift in regional policies from the 
previous orientation towards regional redistribution to an innovation policy focus upon the 
determinants and drivers for regional and local economic development.  
 
Also, as has been mentioned earlier, it was in this decade “innovation policy” appeared as a 
term for policy concern in Norway.  It was first used in the report of the Thulin Commission 
which was published in 1981.13 The terms of reference this commission had been given was 
to consider the volume, organization and efficiency of public support to industrial R&D in 
Norway. In its report, the Thulin Commission emphasized and reinforced the view expressed 
in the 1964 NTNF report, that research could only contribute to industrial development 
through interaction with other factors. Underlying this view, was the conviction that it was 
innovation - and not science in itself - that was the central driving force in processes of 
economic development and growth.14 
 
Industrial policies in the 1980s were, as they had been in the previous decades, characterised 
by attempts to reconstruct industrial structures. However, while the emphasis until the late 
1970s had been on establishing a corporate structure based on large and financially strong 
companies, the 1980s saw a shift towards attempts to develop new industrial sectors based on 
new, generic and enabling technologies. The development of this specific structure was 
regarded as necessary to achieve long term economic growth and to be able to compete in an 
international market. Technology policy priorities as these were widely shared among 
industrialised countries and were generally focussed on ICTs, material technology and 
biotechnology.   
 
The new strategy of the 1980s was based on the idea that future industrial expansion was 
dependent on success within a few core high-tech technologies.15 Growth could not be 
achieved by improving old products and industries, but only by developing new products or 
completely new industries, i.e. by an industry wide process of structural replacement of old 
industries with new ones. 
 
In Norway, the main instrument to develop new, viable high-tech industries was the policy of 
strategic technology areas. There was broad national consensus behind the idea to increase 
funding for a few selected technologies - IT, oil and gas, new materials, biotechnology, and 
                                                 
13 NOU 1981:30A Research, technological development and industrial innovation (Forskning, teknisk utvikling 
og industriell innovasjon) 
14 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk 
forskningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, p. 62 
15  In Norway, this policy was developed over the period 1982-85 and was introduced fully in 1986 in the State 
Budget for the financial year 1987. 
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fish farming - and to improve the co-ordination between public and private actors - such as 
companies, universities, R&D institutes, public agencies, etc.- within each technology area.  
 
It was generally accepted that the development of new industries was the outcome of 
scientific and technological processes. The new industries were defined as “science based 
industries”, and R&D became the core element in this industrial strategy. It became a central 
policy concern to expand the R&D sector (public and private), and to improve the industry-
research relationship so that more science-based industries could be established. 
 
One policy measure that strongly contributed to increasing the size of the Norwegian research 
sector, especially the institute sector, was the so-called “Goodwill agreements”. They were 
among a series of measures introduced in 1978 that were to ensure long term supply of inputs 
to oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Through the “Goodwill agreements”, international 
oil companies improved their position in the competition for getting concessions to explore 
and produce oil and gas from petroleum fields in the North Sea by procuring R&D and 
technological services from Norwegian suppliers.16 
 
The strategic technology areas policy was successful in the sense that public funding for the 
selected areas increased, but there is less evidence that the system succeeded in improving co-
ordination. Each technology area had different histories and institutional settings, and there 
were different policy measures used for each area.  
 
In spite of a rapid increase in R&D activities in the course of the 1980s - partly as a 
consequence of the introduction of the targeted technology areas, partly as a reflection of the 
rapid increase up to 1986-87 of research activities related to the expansion of offshore 
petroleum exploitation - the general policy apprehension at the end of the decade was that 
there was a serious underinvestment in Norwegian R&D. Several policy priorities were 
introduced to counter the perceived gap in R&D performance and bring Norwegian R&D 
performance up to OECD levels in terms of the GERD/GDP-indicator.17 In a research policy 
White paper published in 1989, the second Brundtland government (in government during 
1986-1989) set the goal of increasing public funding of R&D activities by 5 per cent per year 
in real terms. 18  
 
Another trend in the 1980s, discernable already in the late 1970s, was the ideological shift 
away from using direct state intervention to promote industry towards using market 
mechanisms. The generally strong belief of the 1950s and 60s in active state involvement in 
industrial development, broke down along with the breakdown of the counter-cyclical policies 
of 1976-78. The Lied Commission of 1979 was a signal of the need for a new market oriented 
approach,19 a transition that was brought to fruition with the second Brundtland Government.  
 
                                                 
16 For an elaboration on the “Goodwill agreements” see e.g. Nås, S.O. and Wiig, H., Goodwill – good business? 
Analyse av goodwillavtalenes betydning for næringslivets FoU, STEP Report 02-1993; and Wiig, H. and Nås, 
S.O., Teknologiavtalene som insentiv i norsk forskningspolitikk, Notat 14/92, the Future-Oriented Technology 
Policy programme, the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 1992 
17 No one at the time seemed to notice that in terms of the alternative intensity indicator - GERD/capita or 
GERD/employment - Norwegian R&D performance was at least comparable with the level of all major trade 
partners. 
18 White Paper No 28 (1988-1989) On research (Om forskning) 
19 NOU 1979:35, Structural problems and possibilities for growth in Norwegian industry (Strukturproblemer og 
vekstmuligheter i norsk industri) 
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In line with this development, the 1980s saw the emergence of the policy stance of “pushing 
the institute sector towards the market” - to increase its receptivity to the needs and 
expectations of the industrial sectors. The background was the increasing critisism directed 
towards the research institutes, which were accused of neglecting their industrial role. Up to 
the early 1980s the R&D organisations in the national institute sector - whether they were 
formally autonomous or public organisations - had generally been seen in functional terms as 
performing a public task: Producing and supplying the public good of technological 
knowledge. In 1982 a “deregulative” priority was set for the institute sector, and the formerly 
public institutes were devolved from the public sector. The relation to NTNF and other R&D 
funding agencies were implicitly seen in terms of these agencies buying a service - the 
performance of specific research activities - on behalf of society, while the commercial 
viability and competitivity of the institutes were their own responsibility.  
 
A striking aspect of the innovation policies of the 1980s is that the former focus on the 
science base shifted to a view of the criticality of the technology base. We have seen that 
applied technological research was given a more independent position vis-à-vis basic research 
already in the NTNF report published in 1964. In the 1980s science and technology were 
conceptualized as essentially different phenomena (although there were still believed to be 
links between the two), something which implied an autonomous technology. This made the 
technology push characteristic of the policies quite dominant. The considerable focus of 
generic technologies did not necessarily imply a dominant technology push view, but in the 
specification of this focus that came with the strategic technology areas and the related plans, 
this became evident.  
 
While the first postwar decades had seen a strong orientation towards large enterprises, in the 
late 1970s and the 1980s increased emphasis was put on SMEs. This shift is reflected in the 
SME White Paper which was published in 1978.20 The emergence of the innovation policy 
concept in Norwegian politics at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen against this 
background. The concomitance of the SME White Paper and the Thulin Commission is 
probably not coincidental - innovation policy emerged as a policy concern in this period as a 
consequence of the increased SME focus. 
 
The 1980s also saw a new orientation in regional policies. From the middle of the decade, 
there was an increased focus upon local innovation and value creation as the central means 
for obtaining settlement and growth in the regions. Thus, the traditional regional distribution 
policy gave way for a regional innovation policy. This shift is evident in the White Paper on 
regional policies published in 1989.21  
 
2.4. The 1990s: Searching for a new model 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, an increasing dissatisfaction with the outcomes of both the 
strategic technology area strategy and the technology push orientation became evident, and 
the policies of that decade were consequently reassessed. Although not representing a radical 
break with previous policies, the White Paper on industrial policy published in 1989 was felt 
to signal a new approach.22 However, the 1990s saw no coherent new strategy for industrial 
                                                 
20 White Paper No 7 (1977-78), Small and medium sized industrial firms (Små og mellomstore industribedrifter) 
21 White Paper No 29 (1988-89), Policies for regional development (Politikk for regional utvikling) 
22 White Paper No 53 (1988-1989), On industrial policy (Om næringspolitikk) 
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policies, and the decade was in general characterized by a lack of an overriding vision in this 
policy area.  
 
Central features of the policies of the 1990s were a departure from the “best industrial 
structure” strategy (at least in theory), and an orientation towards a broad innovation policy in 
which a “diffusion of technology” strategy played a central role. The technology push 
orientation of the previous decade gave way for arguments stressing the importance of client 
capabilities and network interactions. The decade was furthermore characterized by 
institutional restructuring; and a continuing emphasis on both SMEs and regional innovation 
policies. 
 
The broader socio-economic background for a new industrial policy of the 1990s was a series 
of problems occurring in the period 1986 to 1993 which by politicians was perceived to 
constitute a “crisis”. This led to a departure from the “best industrial structure” strategies of 
the previous decades - that is, the attempts to construct specific industrial structures that were 
seen as prerequisites for industrial growth and competitiveness. The emphasis on a “best 
industrial structure” lost ground to new arguments in favour of broad innovation activities in 
various parts of the economy. These arguments were based on the view that policies should 
not be directed towards specific (and radical) structural changes, but to promoting improved 
productivity and diffusion of new technologies throughout all parts of the economy. 
Norwegian industrial policy studies submitted by the Aakvaag, Henriksen and (the first) 
Hervik Commissions - all in the latter half of the 1990s - attached importance to maintaining a 
broad perspective on innovation.23 
 
Several policy instruments were established to pursue the “diffusion of technology” strategy. 
The old state owned diffusion institution, the State Institute of Technology (STI, Statens 
teknologiske institutt, in existence since 1916) was transformed into a private foundation. 
Under the name of the National Institute of Technology (TI, Teknologisk institutt), it was to 
promote knowledge on technology and management for SMEs. A new Service Office for 
Industry for Northern Norway (VINN, Veiledningstjenesten for Nord-Norge) had parallell 
functions to TI but only focused on the special needs of the northern parts of the country. 
Similar services were offered by the Company Advisory Service (BRT, Bedriftenes 
Rådgivingstjeneste) consisting of eighteen advisory companies offering consultancy services 
to SMEs. Information on new technologies were also provided by the Norwegian Industrial 
Attachés (Norges Industriattacher) which were part of the TI system, and the Norwegian 
Design Council (Norsk Designråd) offered information in the area of design. 
 
In spite of the new broad “industry neutral” orientation, the initiatives taken by the 
governments and Parliament (Stortinget) during the 1990s show that IT de facto remained a 
core technology of industrial policies. There are strong indications that many politicians - and 
other groups and individuals - still followed the “new industries” strategy from the 1980s and 
argued that future welfare was dependent on the development of a strong IT sector in the 
economy.  
 
Another feature of the 1990s, is that the technology push approach of the previous decade was 
countered by arguments of the criticality of client capabilities. These arguments did not, 
                                                 
23 Aakvaag Commission, The Challenge – Research and innovation for new growth (Utfordringen – Forskning 
og innovasjon for ny vekst), Report prepared by a commission appointed by the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy, 1996; NOU 1996:23 Competition, competence and environment (Konkurranse, kompetanse og miljø); 
NOU 1997:27 Cost-benefit-anayses  (Nytte-kostnadsanalyser) 
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however, generate a “market pull” alternative strategy. Rather the subsequent development 
quickly proceeded to approaches were network interactions were argued to be important.  
A White Paper on research policy in 1993 introduced innovation and systems theory to a 
larger audience and stressed the need for larger R&D investments.24 However, it did not give 
birth to a larger debate. Neither did it lead to any substantial increase in national investments 
in R&D.   
 
Also, central institutions in the R&D system came under scrutiny. In 1990, the Grøholt 
Commission was established to assess the organization of Norwegian research. The 
commission’s conclusions led to the disbanding of the former five research councils and the 
establishment of an intended single body research council, The Research Council of Norway 
(NFR, Norges forskningsråd), in 1993.25 Besides being a research council in the established 
sense, the new body was given the explicit task of being a central policy formulating and 
advising body for national R&D and innovation policies.  
 
The 1990s also saw the establishment of the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
Fund (SND, Statens Nærings- og Distriktsutviklingsfond). Like the Research Council of 
Norway, SND was established as a re-organisation and re-orientation of several pre-existing 
institutions, including the Regional Development Fund (Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond), The 
SME Fund (Småbedriftsfondet) and the Industrial Fund (Industrifondet). The initiative came 
from several commissions involved in evaluating the Norwegian credit market policies and 
groupings advocating a reorganization and simplification of the instrument portfolio.26 SND’s 
main task was to stimulate industrial development, by contributing to the development, 
modernization and readjustment of Norwegian industry in general, and by promoting 
initiatives which would secure lasting and profitable regional employment. 
 
The new emphasis on regional innovation policy - rather than the traditional regional 
distribution policy - from the mid 1980s, was upheld in the 1990s. This is evident i.a. from the 
explicit consideration of “regional policies for metropolitan areas”, with a White Paper 
launched in 1991.27 With 1993 and 1997 White Papers on regional policy these aspects were 
integrated into a perspective that highlighted the policy need of considering the “broad” and 
the “narrow” regional policy. By “broad” policy was meant all policies that indirectly affect 
development in the regions, whereas “narrow” policy referred to policies targeted specificly 
towards this goal. 28 The distinction was used to argue that to make regional policy in the 
narrow sense efficient, an explicit assessment and regulation of the broad regional policy was 
necessary. This led to reorganisations within the relevant ministry, with the responsibility for 
the assessment of broad regional policies being institutionalised within the ministry. The point 
to note here is that this involved a supervisory role from the perspective of regional 
innovation policies towards the regional implications of innovation policies as formulated in 
other ministries. 
 
In the latter half of the 1990s the importance of financial strength of large companies once 
more became a political matter. Globalisation - and in particularly the increased importance of 
                                                 
24 White Paper No 36 (1992-93) Research for the community (Forskning for fellesskapet) 
25 NOU 1991:24 Organization for totality and diversity in Norwegian research (Organisering for helhet og 
mangfold i norsk forskning) 
26 e.g. the Steigum Commission and the Kleppe Commission 
27 White Paper No 17 (1991-92), Norway needs its big cities (Norge trenger storbyene) 
28 White Paper No 33 (1992-1993), City and countryside side by side. On regional development (By og land 
hand i hand. Om regional utvikling); White Paper No 31 (1996-97), On district and regional policies (Om 
distrikts- og regionalpolitikken) 
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multinational corporations (MNCs) in the global economy - raised the question of how 
Norwegian companies could compete with large global multinationals in increasingly more 
open international capital and goods markets. The sale of the most successful Norwegian 
company of the early 1990s, Nycomed, and the national symbol company Freia (chocolates) 
to foreign competitors, as well as Kværner’s decision to move its headquarter to London, 
triggered a discussion on how to keep national control of the more important companies as 
well as being an attractive economy for MNCs. The argument for national control was the 
need for keeping knowledge production and R&D in the country.  
 
One of the political problems on the agenda in the middle of the 1990s was therefore to 
develop financially strong national companies and ownership. The State had become a major 
owner in Norwegian industry, controlling both big manufacturing industry, the bank sector 
and high tech institutions. State ownership could be used to make sure that important 
industrial companies remained Norwegian. In addition the government returned to the old 
policy of selecting some “national champions” which could be a collaborator in developing 
strong national ownership.  
 
The 1990s was the decade during which globalisation became more intesified as a context for 
innovation policy. At the same time Norway had to resolve her problematic relationship to the 
European Union as it is now called. After Norway voted negatively on the membership 
question in 1994, an European Economic Area Greement was put in place, consisting of 
Norway and the remaining EFTA countries except Switzerland, and EU. A major component 
in this collaborative collaborative agreement was membership in the European R&D policy, 
or the Framework Programme. The participation in this European system of knowledge 
creation and diffusion has since been well received and accepted as an integrated part of 
Norway’s innovation or R&D policy. 
 
2.5. Recent developments: Break through for a broad innovation 
policy? 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the political interest in innovation and R&D policies increased. 
While innovation and systems theory had been highlighted in the aforementioned 1993 White 
Paper, there had been no immediate breakthrough for this line of thinking, nor a substantial 
increase in national R&D funding. From the late 90s however, Norwegian policy makers have 
increasingly directed their attention towards matters such as increasing national investments 
in R&D; increasing commercialization of research results; improving the quality of research 
and higher education; and stimulating network interactions. The recent years have also seen a 
strong emphasis upon regional innovation policies, and substantial changes in both the 
organization and contents of innovation policies in general. 
 
A White Paper on research policy published in 1999 was completely structured around 
innovation theory. 29 The Research Council became the institutional stronghold for the theory 
and was supported by the Research Department at the Ministry of Science and Education and 
partly by the Research Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In addition there 
were individuals in ministries and in other agencies working on industrial policy for 
developing a new strategy based on innovation theory. I 1999 the Research Council 
succeeded in creating an alliance with the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
                                                 
29 White Paper No 39 (1998-1999), Research at the beginning of a new era (Forskning ved et tidsskille) 
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Fund (SND) and the Norwegian Export Council (Eksportrådet) to promote the idea that 
Norway needed a new industrial strategy and that this strategy should be based on innovation 
theory.30  
 
Increasing national investments in R&D was a central theme in the 1999 White Paper on 
research policy. It was recommended that R&D funding should reach the OECD average, 
measured as a proportion of GDP (GERD), by 2005. This has become a standing political 
goal. One of the measures that have been introduced to obtain this goal is the Fund for 
Research and Innovation which was established in 1999. Another central measure is the 
FUNN tax break scheme which was introduced in 2001 on the basis of the report of the 
Hervik Commission. The Commission was appointed in 2000 to consider policy measures 
that could stimulate an increase in private investments in R&D. The Commission 
recommended that companies investing in certain types of R&D projects should receive 
financial compensation from the State, but was split in the question of whether the 
compensation should be given as a tax credit or as direct financial support. The latter 
alternative won out in the FUNN scheme, which gave public financial support to companies 
buying research and development from universities, colleges and research institutes. In 2002, 
however, FUNN was replaced by SkatteFUNN, which gives companies tax deductions for 
investments in R&D projects.31 
 
The past few years have also seen increased focus on commercialization of university and 
college research. The report of the Bernt Commission which was appointed in 2000 to 
evaluate measures for increasing activities in this field, stressed that universities and colleges 
should consider commercialization as part of their activities.32 The argument of the 
Commission was followed up with an amendment to the Act on Universities and Colleges, 
giving Norwegian universities and colleges an explicit responsibility for facilitating the 
exploitation of research results to the common good.33 In the wake of this amendment, several 
universities have established their own technology transfer offices, one example being 
Birkeland Innovasjon at the University of Oslo. The goal of increasing commercialization of 
university and college research has furthermore led to an amendment to the Act on rights to 
inventions made by employees. The amendment, which was passed in 2002, gave the research 
institutions the rights to exploit inventions made by their teachers and researcher. This right 
had formerly belonged to the individual employee.34 
 
Another central policy concern has been to improve the quality of Norwegian research and 
higher education. In 2001, the Centres of Excellence scheme was introduced for the 
establishment of temporary research centres characterized by concentrated, focused and long 
term research efforts on a high international level. Based on recommendations in the 2000 
report of the Mjøs Commission on Higher Education, the Minister of Education and Research 
carried out a “quality reform” at Norwegian universities and colleges in 2003. The reform 
introduced a new grade system and degree structure, and made the studies shorter than what 
they had formerly been. In connection with the quality reform, the Ministry of Education and 
                                                 
30 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 
2003 
31 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 
2003 
32 NOU 2001:11 From insight to industry (Fra innsikt til industri) 
33 Ot.prp. nr. 40 (2001-1002) Om lov om endringer i lov 12. mai 1995 nr. 22 om universiteter og høgskoler og 
lov 2. juli 1999 nr. 64 om helsepersonell 
34 Ot.prp. nr. 67 (2001-2002) Om lov om endringer i lov av 17. april 1970 nr. 21 om retten til 
oppfinnelser som er gjort av arbeidstakere 
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Research established a new national organization for quality in education, called NOKUT. 
This organisation is now the main authority as regards the accreditation and approval of 
institutions and educations. 35  
 
Over the recent years, Norwegian policy documents have increasingly stressed the central role 
network interaction plays in innovation. A 2001 White Paper on the Norwegian Industrial and 
Regional Development Fund, SND, stated that one of the main tasks of this organization 
should be to stimulate innovation in industry through the development of networks between 
different actors.36 Several policy measures have been introduced to encourage networking, 
e.g. MOBI which is to promote interaction between industry, research and education 
environments and innovation policy institutions, and Value Creation 2010 which network 
based innovation at the regional level.  
 
The regional innovation policies that we have seen emerged in the late 1980s, have been 
carried on by recent governments. The Labour Government in office from 2000 to 2001 
published a White Paper on regional affairs that stressed the need for innovative and 
competitive companies in the regions.37 The Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development in the following Centre-Right government has been very much involved in the 
development of policy instruments targeting regional innovation. One new development under 
this Ministry has been a delegation of responsibilities from central authorities to the county 
administrators, who have been given more influence over the administration and allocation of 
innovation policy measures and funds.38  
 
The last few years have furthermore seen substantial changes in both the organization and 
contents of Norwegian innovation policies. A reorganization of the Research Council of 
Norway was announced in 2002 and carried out in 2003. The reorganization implied that the 
former six divisions were replaced by three. The background was an evaluation of the Council 
that in part was very critical towards the activities of the institution, arguing that it had not 
been able to coordinate Norwegian research as originally planned in 1993, when the former 
research councils were united in this new institution.39  
 
Based on an evaluation of the structure of business-oriented policy instruments and 
institutions, a new state owned company - Innovation Norway - was established on January 1st 
2004. The new institution replaced the former Norwegian Government Consultative Office 
for Inventors (SVO), the Norwegian Trade Council, the Norwegian Industrial and Regional 
Development Fund (SND) and the Norwegian Tourist Board. One of the main arguments for 
this reorganization was that the business oriented policy instruments should be better 
coordinated and directed to one common goal: to contribute to increased innovation 
nationwide.40  
 
                                                 
35 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 
2003 
36 White Paper No 36 (2000-2001), SND: New efforts, new growth, new industry (SND: Ny giv, ny vekst, nytt 
næringsliv) 
37 White Paper No 34 (2000-2001), On district and regional policies (Om distrikts- og regionalpolitikken) 
38 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 
2003 
39 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 
2003 
40 St.prp. nr. 51 (2002-2003) Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv 
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The evaluation of the policy instrument system and the establishment of Innovation Norway 
are part of the ongoing process towards the introduction of a holistic innovation policy. This 
cross-ministerial process was initiated by the Minister of Education and Research, but has 
been placed under the leadership of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The only political 
steering document for this process so far is the plan From Idea to Value which was mentioned 
in the introduction of this paper. According to this plan, the explicit responsibility for 
developing a holistic policy - and coordinating this policy across different policy areas and 
ministries - will be placed under a separate Government Committee.41  
 
2.6. Towards a 3rd generation innovation policy? 
It is evident from the overview presented here, that the contents and organization of 
Norwegian innovation policies have changed considerably over the past fifty years. Today’s 
plan for a “holistic” innovation policy, with its emphasis upon network interaction and policy 
integration, differs radically from the innovation policies of the first post war decades where 
innovation and industrial development were seen as the direct results of scientific and 
technological research. While the latter can be termed “first generation” innovation policies 
based on their underlying linear understanding of innovation, the new “holistic” policy can - 
as has already been pointed out - be seen as an expression of “third generation” policies. 
 
Our historical overview nevertheless shows that it is impossible to identify any clear cut 
transitions from a first via a second to a third generation innovation policies. Developments 
have taken place in a very gradual manner. Whereas policies in the period from 1946 to the 
late 1970s indeed were strongly colored by “the linear model”, we have seen that a report 
published by NTNF as early as in 1964 expressed the view that innovation occurred on the 
basis of interaction between several growth factors, and not as a result of research alone.   
 
Furthermore, while the view that innovation results from interaction between several factors 
was explicitly upheld by the Thulin Commission in the early 1980s, the linear model did in 
fact continue to influence actual policies. That decade’s focus upon generic technologies as it 
was expressed in the “strategic technology areas” implied a dominant technology push 
approach to innovation and industrial development. We have also seen that it was not until the 
late 1990s that policies began to be structured around innovation and system theory to a 
substantial degree, and we thus can speak of a breakthrough for “second generation” 
innovation policies.  
 
It is worth drawing attention to another feature that our historical overview makes apparent, 
namely that there is commonly a time lag from the point where a new orientation in 
innovation policy is expressed at the “idea level” - that is in policy documents such as white 
papers and government reports - until it is reflected in actual policies. Against this 
background, it should be pointed out that today’s “holistic” - or ”third generation” - 
innovation policies are still in the process of being formulated. When and to what extent such 
policies are actually implemented - and whether they will turn out to be successful - remains 
to be seen. 
 
 
                                                 
41 From Idea to Value -  the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (Fra idé til verdi- 
Regjeringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk), Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2003. See also chapter 
6. 
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3. An overview of the current innovation system and the 
key actors42 
3.1. Mapping the actors 
The institutional structure of the Norwegian innovation policy system anno 2002 is depicted 
in fig. 1. The main change since then has been a merger of three agencies related to industrial 
and innovation policy (see below). As such, this merger illustrates a main theme in this paper; 
a concentration on the agency level in the Norwegian system to accommodate and solve 
perceived co-ordination needs. Below follows a brief description of the actors in the system. 
 
In Parliament (Stortinget) the committees dealing most directly with innovation policy issues, 
mainly through the yearly state budgets and white papers, are: 
 
• The Standing Committee on Science and Education (Utdannings- og 
forskningskomiteen) 
• The Standing Committee on Trade and Industry (Næringskomiteen) 
• The Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment (Energi- og miljøkomiteen) 
 
There is no single parliamentary forum with an innovation policy responsibility where these 
issues are focused upon and co-ordinated, although the Committee on Education, Research 
and Church Affairs handles broad R&D policy matters. 
 
Accordingly, the responsibility for innovation as well as R&D matters is divided between 
several ministries. Most ministries allot funds to R&D (see horizontal indicators in Remøe et 
al 2003), the major players being: 
 
• The Ministry of Education and Research  
• The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
• The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs  
• The Ministry of the Environment  
• The Ministry of Defence  
• The Ministry of Fisheries 
• The Ministry of Agriculture  
 
The Ministry for Education and Research, The Ministry of Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development have the main responsibility for 
the development of national innovation policies. 
 
Norwegian R&D policy formulation is based on the so-called “sector principle”, meaning that 
each ministry is responsible for promoting and funding research activities within their own 
areas. The Ministry of Education and Research is responsible for the overall R&D policies, 
for funding large parts of basic science in the universities and colleges, and for co-ordinating 
sectoral R&D policies. At the governmental level there are two high level committees 
focusing on science and technology policy related issues: The inter-ministerial Research 
                                                 
42 The chapter is based on section 0.1 in Koch, P., Country Report Norway, October 2002-September 2003, the 
European Trend Chart on Innovation, 2003. 
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Forum for Government Officials (Departementenes forskningsutvalg – DFU) and the 
Government’s Research Board (Regjeringens forskningsutvalg – RFU). The Minister of 
Education and Research chairs RFU.  
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Figure 1. Policy-centred organisational map of the Norwegian system of innovation 
 
Functions in institutional matrix:
F1: Technology and innovation policy formulation, co-ordination, supervision and assessment
F2: Performing R&D (basic; pre-competitive; applied)
F3: Financing R&D (support to non-business institutions and organisations undertaking research; support of special areas
      of research independent from the institution or firm where it is undertaken)
F4: Promotion of human resource development and mobility
F5: Technology diffusion (improve the adoptation and adaptation of specific technologies; improve the general technology
       receptor capacity of firms; build the innovation capacity of firms)
F6: Promotion of technological entrepreneurship (financing technology-based firms, eg. Venture capital)
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3.2. Three key agencies 
The Research Council of Norway (Norges forskningsråd) was established in 1993, as a 
merger of the former five research councils. The institution bears overall responsibility for 
national research strategy, and manages nearly one third of public sector research funding.  
One of the principal tasks of the Research Council is to promote co-operation and co-
ordination among Norwegian research institutions. The Council identifies important fields of 
research, allocates funds and evaluates R&D. It is also called upon to offer strategic advice to 
the Government on science and technology issues (see also chapter 6). 
 
SND, the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (now Innovation Norway) 
was, like the Research Council, established in 1993 as a reorganisation and reorientation of 
several pre-existing institutions. It was until the beginning of the year the central institution 
for public funding of industrial and regional development in Norway.  SND was then merged 
as mentioned above with other agencies: Firstly, SVO, the Norwegian Government 
Consultative Office for Inventors (Statens veiledningskontor for oppfinnere) was a public 
body that offers advice and scholarships to inventors. The office may support patent 
applications and the building of prototypes. Secondly, The Norwegian Trade Council (Norges 
Eksportråd) was a foundation aimed at strengthening Norwegian exports. The Council assists 
companies and public institutions in the field of international technology cooperation. The 
most important part of its activities takes place in its 39 foreign offices, situated in 32 
countries. Thirdly, the Norwegian Tourist Board (Norges Turistråd) had the responsibility to 
further tourism through industrial development and international marketing. The idea behind 
the merger is to improve the co-ordination of international and regional perspectives, and to 
create a larger, highly integrated agency for innovation and industrial development, 
Innovation Norway. 
 
SIVA, the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (Selskapet for industrivekst) is a 
state owned enterprise with its head office in Trondheim, Norway. SIVA is a public 
enterprise, established to further the creation of business opportunities, and increased 
employment. Its goal is to develop strong local environments by providing investment capital, 
competence and networks for small and medium-sized companies. It owns and operates 40 
industrial parks and is a co-owner in ten science and “knowledge” parks. SIVA is organised 
as a “network” organisation, and operates within three areas: real estate, development and 
investment/finance. These areas often overlap. The company is owned by the state, and 
controlled by the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development.  
 
3.3. Support institutions 
TI, the National Institute of Technology (Teknologisk institutt) is a private foundation with 
approximately 270 employees. TI receives public support in order to be able to offer small 
and medium-sized enterprises relevant expertise to improve company know-how, productivity 
and profitability. TI offers consultancy and developmental services, training, expertise and 
technology transfer programmes and laboratory test and certification services. TI works in 
areas like manufacturing technology, environmental and safety technology, business 
development and internationalisation.  
VINN, the Advisory Institute in Northern Norway (Veiledningsinstituttet i Nord-Norge) is a 
semi-private consulting and contract R&D institute, organised as a foundation, and receiving 
public support for parts of its activity. The foundation offers services within several technical 
and economical/administrative areas. The purpose is to improve the competitive strength of 
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companies through increased productivity, improved profitability, stronger market orientation 
and profitable environmental and quality management measures. The most important 
industries addressed by VINN are engineering and other industrial sectors, fishing and the 
building and construction industry. They serve as advisors and offer elementary and post 
educational training, laboratory and testing services. The regional focus of VINN reflects the 
structural weakness of this part of the country. 
 
Argentum is a limited company owned by the state. It is to strengthen competent leadership in 
industry.  Argentum invests in companies and tries to influence the venture capital sector, 
helping them to gain access to international capital. One aim is to help more ideas and 
concepts lead to commercially viable enterprises and to maximize the profit made from 
investments. Argentum will normally own between 33 and 50 percent of the companies 
involved.  
 
GIEK is a state institution for guarantees insurance of export credits.  The main objective is to 
promote export of Norwegian goods and services and Norwegian investments abroad.  
 
The Norwegian Design Council (Norsk Designråd) was established in 1963 by the Norwegian 
Trade Council and The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO). It is now 
a foundation financed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and by commissions made 
through counselling and various projects. The Council is to further the use of good design in 
market oriented product development and marketing.  
 
Some public financial institutions remain outside the SND structure. The Norwegian local 
government-funding agency Kommunalbanken is a special purpose agency established for the 
Norwegian public sector to secure competitive financing to the Norwegian local governments. 
Loans are granted solely to local government or against a guarantee. Although 
Kommunalbanken may be seen as an element in the Norwegian system of innovation, the 
agency does not appear to pursue systematic innovation policies as such. 
 
Another major investor in Norwegian industry is the Norwegian Public Security Fund 
(Folketrygdfondet). The fund is operating as a large and significant financial investor. The 
fund’s industrial investment activities are based on using part of the future liabilities of the 
public security system for industrial investment with a strict financial objective. 
 
There are other institutions that are not primarily taking initiatives to do R&D nor financing 
the activities, but which still facilitate or in other ways modulate or give direction to research 
efforts and innovation processes. Among these are public regulatory, standards setting or 
appropriability agencies, and municipalities and county councils. 
 
As a part of the general framework within which firms and innovators operate there exists a 
system of supervisory public agencies taking care of public interest. Their main areas of work 
relate to problems of public health, working conditions, consumer issues, and the 
environment. They establish a system of minimum standards for products and processes and 
by doing so influence the use of technology in the business sector. Such agencies include the 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens forurensingstilsyn); the National Office of 
Building Technology and Administration (Statens bygningstekniske etat); the Drug 
Administration (Statens legemiddelkontroll); and the Norwegian Metrology and Accreditation 
Service (Justervesenet) 
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Related to processes of deregulation of key infrastructure related sectors, such as telecom, 
energy production and utilities and rail transport, the need of establishing new systems of 
regulation to accommodated the effects of deregulation have been met by the establishment of 
new and reorganised regulating agencies. Standards are taken care of and co-ordinated by the 
Norwegian Standards Association (Norsk standardiseringsforbund), which also represents 
Norway in international standardisation work. It operates on the basis of advice from five 
independent technical standardisation organisations, for general standards, construction, 
electrotechnics, technology and post and telecommunications respectively. 
 
The Norwegian Patent Office (Styret for det industrielle rettsvern/Patentstyret) offers 
protection for inventions, trademarks and designs and gives information, guidance and 
training in the area of intellectual and industrial property rights. Norway has so far not 
become a member of the European Patent Organisation (EPO). 
Municipalities and county councils have traditionally played an important role in business 
development by way of infrastructure building and maintenance, and by providing public 
services in general. Over the last years, counties and some municipalities have taken up the 
challenge to stimulate business development and innovation within their geographical area. 
The counties will now be given a much larger role in the design and implementation of 
innovation policies. 
Information is a crucial ingredient in innovation and R&D, and libraries play an important 
role in making information available. The National Office for Research Documentation, 
Academic and Special Libraries (Riksbibiliotekstjensten), the National Library 
(Nasjonalbiblioteket) and the library services at the universities are independently founded. 
Science parks also constitute an element in the Norwegian innovation system. The term 
“Science Park” is used to describe a property-based initiative  
 
• which has operational links with universities, research centres and/or other institutions of 
higher education,  
• which is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge-based industries 
and other organisations, normally resident on site,  
• which has a management team actively engaged in fostering the transfer of technology 
and business skills to tenant organisations.  
 
Among the Norwegian Science Parks are: 
 
• Tromsø Science Park Ltd., Tromsø 
• Trondheim Innovation Centre Ltd., Trondheim 
• Leiv Eriksson Innovation Ltd., Trondheim 
• Nyfotek Ltd., Trondheim 
• Bergen High-Technology Center Ltd., Bergen 
• Rogaland Science Park Ltd., Stavanger 
• Campus Kjeller Ltd., near Oslo 
• Oslo Research Park Ltd., Oslo 
• Ås Science Park Ltd, Ås 
 
The traditional role of the science parks has been to be service organisations and real estate 
managers. Now, however, the role as incubators and assistants for innovation is becoming 
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increasingly important. Many parks have their own commercialisation units or companies, 
and they are often local representatives for the FORNY-programme (see Remøe et al 2004).  
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4. Perceived policy challenges and policy mix 
In this section, we map the central challenges in Norwegian innovation policies as they are 
perceived by actors in the policy system, as well as the current policy mix – that is the set of 
established priority areas and actual policy efforts within the field of innovation policies. The 
mapping is done against the background of an actor oriented picture of the national innovation 
system (NIS), as shown in figure 2.  
 
By comparing the information of central challenges and current policy mix, we assess the 
degree of correlation between perceived problems and actual efforts in today’s Norwegian 
innovation policies. Although one may expect a considerable degree of overlap between the 
pictures, this is not necessarily the case. It is expected that factors such as lack of attention, 
lack of capabilities for experimentation, and inertia leading to politically untouchable areas 
are typically part of the policy system and should hence lead to significant gaps. 
 
4.1. Performance of the STI system 
We start, however, with an assessment of the existing priorities and biases in the Norwegian 
STI system.  This assessment is based on joint MONIT work to assemble information on 
performance indicators that reveal in this case Norway’s performance in contrast with other 
countries. This is not done as benchmarking individual indicators which is a common 
technique. Rather, we highlight how the bias for the given country is on the context of an 
average picture of other MONIT countries, with a view to inducing questions about how this 
bias can be justified and explained, and we aim at stimulating a critical focus on the 
prioritization capability of the system   
 
A necessary set of information has been reliable, comparable information on how each 
country performs on a set of science, technology and innovation indicators. To avoid 
unacceptable workloads, a dataset was chosen that included most countries as well as the 
main indicators relevant for the study. Hence, a recent EU study was chosen, and expanded 
with data on non-EU countries that were willing to provide information on those same 
indicators43. The statistical work has been done by the Dutch team for all involved countries. 
To better present how each country scores relative to the others, without creating nation-
specific patterns that were not comparable due to the scales, all data were normalised, and the 
performance for each country is illustrated on the backdrop of the “average others”. Hence, 
the scales have no meaning in absolute terms.  
 
The result for Norway is shown in figure 2 below. The (red) circle depicts the average of all 
countries involved, while the black, broken line illustrates how Norway scores relative to this 
average. 
 
The picture reveals an interesting, albeit somewhat contradictory message. Norway score 
relative high on labour productivity, although this must be seen in relation to the large GDP, a 
fact that also leads to lower GERD (Gross expenditures on R&D) than what would have been 
the case without the oil rent. More illuminating is the combined effect of high scores on 
tertiary education (without which knowledge investments (D3) would have been lower) and 
number of Ph.D.s. It illustrates well that Norway is an education society, with a great number 
                                                 
43 “Benchmarking national research policies: The impact of RTD on competitiveness and employment (IRCE)”, 
EU Commission, STRATA-ETAN Expert Group, 2002. 
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of Ph.D.s in the overall economy. On the other hand, the production of graduates in science 
and engineering is very low, a recurrent theme in Norwegian debates. Taken together with the 
fact that BERD (Business expenditures on R&D) is low, it seems reasonable to argue that the 
significant knowledge investments in Norway create a well educated work force, but one 
which is not engaged significantly in business R&D. 
 
Looking more closely at the innovation-related indicators (A1-7), patenting, employment in 
medium and high tech manufacturing, inward foreign direct investments and BERD are all 
low. On the other hand, the share of SMEs in R&D is high, as is employment in high tech 
services as well as direct government funding of business R&D. This would tell us that 
employment in high tech services are well developed, and telecom probably influences this. 
The other side of this coin is the relatively low share of innovative firms in services in general 
(F1s). The combination of low, innovation expenditures, low patenting, low FDI and low 
BERD is particularly worrisome, as it conveys a message about a low overall innovation 
activity and vitality in the Norwegian economy. 
 
 
Fig 2: STI performance for Norway 
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The combination of relatively acceptable scores on C2 and C3 should be seen together with 
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A7 to confirm a picture consistent with Norwegian R&D policy to have been greatly focused 
on direct support in a way that includes incentives for collaboration with research institutes 
and universities. This is also linked to low levels of basic research, leading to a conclusion 
that public investments in knowledge are skewed towards higher education and applied, 
business oriented support, while basic research and graduations in science and engineering 
suffer.  
 
It should be noted that these data are from 2000, before the introduction of tax incentives for 
R&D in 2002-2003 (see separate section). Still, the picture being presented in this graph 
should lead Norwegian policy makers to re-examine some of the emerging biases. While 
government activity is acceptable on several areas, areas to be rectified are in particular those 
that seem to be linked to low levels of capability and attractiveness of Norwegian firms, most 
notably employment and activity in business with higher levels of R&D (medium and high 
tech), production of science and engineering graduates, foreign direct investment, and 
innovation and R&D activity in the economy in general.  
 
4.2. Perceived policy challenges 
4.2.1. A methodological note 
Our mapping of perceived challenges in Norwegian innovation policies is based on two data 
sources: 1) a survey carried out among actors in the policy system, as well as 2) an analysis of 
relevant policy documents. Although not providing a complete picture, the mapping exercise 
gives an overview of what is perceived to be the central challenges by both individuals and 
organizations across a wide spectrum of the innovation policy system. 
 
Survey 
In November 2003, a questionnaire was distributed to a total of 90 persons who work in 
organizations44 that are involved in the development and implementation of innovation 
policies in Norway. 
 
Policy document analysis 
In addition to the survey, we have chosen to build our analysis on primary material which is 
eminently suited to our purpose. A significant collection of documents has been available to 
us in which key actors in the innovation policy system detail what they see as key challenges 
in the innovation policy system, what role their own institutions plays, and should play, and 
how specific issues concerning their own operations ought to be addressed. The documents 
are a response to the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s call for contributions to and opinions 
on an overall revamping of the innovation policy system in Norway.45 The following analysis 
is primarily based on a content analysis of this collection of documents. 
 
                                                 
44 Covering the Ministries of Trade and Industry; Education and Research; Local Government and Regional 
Development; Finance; Labour and Government Administration; Fisheries; Agriculture; the Research Council of 
Norway (NFR), the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Developments fund (SND), the Industrial Development 
Corporation of Norway (SIVA), and the Norwegian Trade Council. It should be noted that the SND and the 
Trade Council on 1.1.2004 merged with the Norwegian Tourism Council and the Norwegian Government 
Consultative Office for Inventors. See also appendix for the questionnaire (in Norwegian). 
 
45 The documents are referenced at the end of this document. At the time of writing, the documents are available 
at the internet address http://www.odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/p30000694/p30003208/024091-990021/index-dok000-
b-f-a.html.  
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4.2.2. Challenges 
The various statements submitted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry are very different in 
both scope, length, as well as in the generality of the perspectives. Small institutions with 
particular missions address narrow issues, while the larger organisations such as the 
Norwegian Research Council (NRC) and State’s Industry and Development Fund (SND) 
chose to submit voluminous reports addressing the broad issues concerning not only their own 
activities, but the overall structure and function of the Norwegian system of research and 
innovation.  
 
 
Figure 3: An actor oriented picture of the national innovation system (NIS) 
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Here, we relate the central challenges that are highlighted in these statements to our map of 
the innovation system presented above, and we discuss these in the subsequent sections under 
the headings: 
 
• General challenges 
• Performance of the governance system 
• Performance of the R&D and education system 
• Performance of the company system 
• Non-governmental organizations 
• Citizens   
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We are not able to pay attention to specific issues concerning actors and opinions, to what 
extent opinions are shared or contested, what actors hold what positions, etc. In general, we 
portray the key issues that seem generally to be focussed in the debate, and that are generally 
considered relevant and important. 
4.2.2.1. General challenges 
The shark’s jaw 
The overriding concern among policy makers is what has been termed the shark’s jaw. During 
the recent decades the Norwegian economy has been heavily influenced by the probably most 
successful innovation policy strategy in the post war era: The build-up of the petroleum 
sector. From the 1970s onwards this sector represented a change in the development path for 
the Norwegian economy, both in terms of the knowledge, technology and innovation 
generated and used in that sector (or cluster) as well as in its financial and fiscal merits. 
Measured in GDP, the trade balance, state revenues or public saving, this sector has been 
extremely important for the revitalisation and upgrading of the economy, but has also 
represented a potential threat, often referred to as the danger of becoming a “Kuwait” 
economy with heavy dependence on this one sector and a lack of economic diversification. 
 
In short, the perceived challenge consists of uncertainty of future revenues for the state as 
well as a fading away of highly knowledge-based economic activities in time when public 
welfare expenditures, notably “pay-as-you-go” based pensions will soar. This is a long term 
structural challenge, and there is wide-spread political consensus that this challenge has to be 
met. It has recently prompted the Government to initiate a comprehensive policy or plan for 
innovation policy (see chapter 5).  
 
Framework conditions and infrastructure 
Judging from the documents reviewed, there is a rather broad agreement that the general 
conditions for pursuing innovative business ventures are relatively poor in Norway. Macro-
economic policy is one concern. There is a need for restricting the use of oil revenues in order 
to curb inflation and in order to keep interest rates low. Contrasting the need for fiscal 
restraint, there is a broad concern about tax policies. Seen in isolation, tax levels are too high, 
and this, many believe, creates competitive disadvantages for Norwegian firms and hinders 
innovation and industrial growth. 
 
Liberalization of trade and globalisation trends represents formidable challenges for many 
firms and industries in Norway. The challenge concerns new competitive pressures at home, 
but obviously also the successful migration of business activities to foreign markets.  
 
Are the policy institutions, the R&D and education system, and the company system, able to 
cope? What should be done to strengthen actors in these systems so that they may prevail in 
the times ahead? Such questions are asked by many in the innovation policy system, and 
proposals are made for changes that will affect most of the subsystems and the interfaces in 
the innovation system. Collaboration, alliances, legal and institutional reform are among the 
issues most frequently mentioned. 
 
The need for strengthening infrastructure for transport of people, goods and information is 
pointed out, and is seen as intimately related to the above issues. In a similar vein, the need 
for strengthening infrastructure for regional development is also emphasised. In order to 
create opportunities for innovation, business development and industrial growth around the 
country, there is a need to improve transport infrastructure, and to gear investments to the 
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needs of innovation systems, rather than to focus on equal access to infrastructure of 
comparable quality in peripheral areas. 
 
Broadband development and telecommunications infrastructure seems not to be of very great 
concern today. The privatisation of the public telecommunications systems is a thing of the 
past. Today, only one significant issue seems to be on the agenda: What should be the role of 
government with respect to promoting the development of broadband “information 
highways”? Should this be a sole concern of the private telecommunication companies, or 
ought the state play a leading role?  
 
The results from the survey on the issue of framework conditions reveal a more simplified 
picture. The issues are all of importance, but the one that seem to stand out are in particular 
EEA regulations, IPR regulations, diffusion of ICT, taxation policy and administrative 
simplification. There is a notable difference between the two data sources on the importance 
of ICT, implying that this a contested area in the innovation policy.  
 
Figure 4:  Perceived challenges on framework conditions 
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An insufficient level of spending on R&D and innovation 
The concern with R&D and innovation spending is a continuing theme in the innovation 
policy debate, from top to bottom in the innovation policy system. Nearly everyone seems to 
be in agreement that the low level of investment is a bad thing, and there is considerable 
debate concerning what ought to be done about this.  
 
An ideological and professional dividing line demarcates two approaches to the issue. The 
dominating paradigm for dealing with the issue is economic, and addresses the problem with 
an economic vocabulary where terms such as market imperfections and additionality are key 
concepts. A core issue for proponents of this line of thinking is what is called “crowding out”. 
The question is: Do public activities, in spite of all good intentions, in effect replace private 
activities which would have been able to emerge if it weren’t for the public activities going on 
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already? Is there a crowding out of what could be normal economic activities, when 
government establishes itself in functions and roles that could just as well be filled by private 
firms?    
 
On the other hand, there is a line of more systems oriented thinking which focus on systems 
failures (or bottlenecks) and which has a more pragmatic and evolutionary approach to 
innovation policy issues. 
 
The two strands of thinking do not only lead to conflicting policy implications. All agree that 
there is a need to create incentives that help fostering research in industry, and more 
collaboration between researchers and people in industry. However, there is disagreement on 
the need for and the usefulness of direct measures targeting specific industries, technologies 
or firms. It appears that the systems perspective today increasingly is entering the scene in the 
policy system as a theoretically well grounded alternative to neo-classical economic 
arguments.  
 
Systemic flaws 
To what extent concrete systems mappings and bottleneck analysis can deliver what policy 
makers need, cannot yet be fully established. The fact remains, however, that the systems 
perspective has entered decisively into the Norwegian innovation policy debate. There is 
broad concern with the structure and function of the innovation system. In particular, there is 
focus on the key interfaces, and on the volume and quality of links between agents within and 
across subsystems. Issues that are raised in the debate concern, for example, the ability and 
willingness of people in business and academia to establish collaboration and alliances. Also, 
there is a concern with the ability of government institutions to collaborate strategically with 
actors in the company system. Further, there is concern with how much and how well 
different institutions in government are able to collaborate. Beyond this, there is, as 
mentioned earlier, very much concern with the ability of Norwegian firms and institutions to 
enter into collaborations and alliances internationally.  
 
4.2.2.2. Performance of the governance system 
The disagreements referred to above influence the policy debate to a great extent. Some feel a 
great need for bridging the gap, or at least for establishing a theoretical framework that could 
make it possible to establish a more solid scientific rationale for more direct and hands on 
policy action. In this perspective, and in line with the dictum that nothing is as practical as a 
good theory, some of the participants in the innovation policy debate are convinced that the 
performance of the policy system could be greatly improved, if only a better and more 
coherent theoretical rationale for policy action could be established. In reality, the large scale 
and ambitious reorganisation of the RCN as well as the SND (now part of Innovation 
Norway), build on opinions about what is necessary and important, for example with respect 
to needs for basic and applied research, that are not at all well grounded in theory and 
knowledge. 
  
The systems oriented and the neo-classical economics oriented approaches do not always 
contradict each other, but they seem to lay the ground for distinct initiatives with respect to 
policy action. In general, economists play a very important role when analyses are concluded. 
There is, thus, a very strong tendency to see the introduction of market based and for-profit 
interactions (privatisation) as a necessary means to achieve greater effectiveness and 
efficiency in most areas of activity. In part, institutions are transformed by changing the 
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framework conditions within which they operate. Not seldomly, this transformation amounts 
to moving an agency from the Government sphere into the Company system. Less drastically, 
the activities of centrally placed bureaucratic structures are transformed by dividing them into 
smaller units, placing each unit in different regions, in effect, it is claimed, “moving the 
agencies closer to their customers”. 
 
Finally, there is a current concern today with the overall structure of the government system, 
the coherence of decisions and actions, as well as the timeliness and rationality of decision 
processes. This concern is voiced by key players, not least in the ministries and at the level of 
Government Ministers. (The financing of MONIT project activities in Norway is a result of 
such concerns.)   
 
There are clear indications of shortcomings in the policy or governance system, a fact that we 
will assess more broadly later in the document. Fig. 5 illustrates some of these issues. Both 
co-ordination between units in the same organisation and learning in policy institutions are 
seen as more important then the other two, although all four stand out as important. Still, we 
assess this indication that the Norwegian system may be better equipped with evaluation and 
benchmarking activities and a knowledge base than the capability to exploit them.  
 
Fig 5: Important issues in the policy system 
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4.2.2.3. Performance of the R&D and education system 
In the innovation policy debate, there is a concern with both the quality and volume of 
research being undertaken, as well as a concern with the way the investments actually being 
done in these areas pay off with respect to commercially successful innovation. Results 
depend on the performance of the company system, a fact we will return to in the next section.  
 
The quality of disciplinary research has been a concern for a long time. Norwegian 
researchers do not publish sufficiently in academic journals, and many are preoccupied with 
why this is so, and what can be done about it. As will be pointed out later, the current 
government has embarked on a program of concrete policy action to promote higher quality in 
university level research. The task is ideologically problematic, as the principles of academic 
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autonomy and individual freedom for academics are potent rhetorical weapons against 
conventional approaches to management reform and organisational streamlining. 
 
Another issue which is considered very important is the issue of size and structure of the 
public and semi-public research institute sector. Over the years, the institutes have 
increasingly been moved away from the system of government and public services towards 
the company system. Institutes have gradually had to deal with economic competition, in 
addition to the academic competition faced by institute researchers aiming at scientific 
publication. The institute sector is still large, public financing of the sector significant, and it 
is a key issue to decide on the future development path of this sector. 
 
It appears unavoidable that further debate on this raises fundamental questions about roles, 
relationships and missions of the research institutes seen as elements in the larger innovation 
system. So far, little has been said about this. 
 
The relationship between business and academia is a key concern, and many are critical to the 
ability of academic researchers and research institutions to relate meaningfully to firms, 
business activities and real life innovation processes. Academics are seen as being located too 
far away from milieus where commercial applications are being developed. This is not least 
seen as a cultural issue, but also as a clear result of institutional and individual incentive 
structures. 
 
The broad picture above is supported by the results from the questionnaire. Fig. 6 shows that 
commercialization of R&D and educational attainment or improvements in the education 
system We assess the latter to be linked to the general discussion in Norway on the 
shortcomings of the educational system to provide quality education in natural sciences and 
engineering throughout the educational chain.  
 
 
Fig 6:  Challenges for the R&D and education system 
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4.2.2.4. Performance of the company system 
The debate may be critical to the actual contribution of academic researchers to innovation 
processes, but it is no less preoccupied with the ability and willingness for firms to connect to 
advanced research in order to exploit the fruits of this effort. The industrial structure of 
Norway is considered to be a problem, in two ways: There are too many small firms in which 
the absorptive capacity with respect to science and research results tends to be very low. At 
the same time, the industrial structure of Norway has a bias in the direction of process 
oriented activities around exploiting raw materials and cheap energy. Not enough business 
activities are knowledge based, and more should be done, it is claimed, in order to develop 
such knowledge based industry in Norway. 
 
The debate on performance of the company system does not seem at present to pay much 
attention to corporate governance. This relates to the fact that there is broad political 
agreement (in the policy system) to reduce the role of state ownership in commercial 
activities. This is a general view relating to the overall layout of the Norwegian innovation 
system, but it is also an issue which is seen as touching upon the company system in 
particular. 
 
In general, framework conditions are considered essential. The push for privatisation in the 
sense of reducing state ownership, and in the sense of moving public agencies and services 
towards the Company system (corresponding to new approaches to public management), is 
very important today, at least in the political rhetoric.  
 
Some steps are taken to improve innovation effectiveness for private firms, as well as the 
competitive environment. The debate on the need for a tax incentive scheme for allocation of 
resources to R&D, a scheme which has recently been implemented, is a sign of this. Taxation 
overhaul which would improve profitability of firms is argued to be another effective means 
for promoting the establishment of new firms and to promote a entrepreneurial spirit among 
citizens in Norway.  
 
But several of the ideas and opinions on why the Norwegian company system is 
underperforming with respect to research and innovation run counter to this. Some of the 
themes brought up are the following: What can be done to counter the almost total lack of 
private venture capital which new firms experience today? What can be done to stimulate 
collaboration and networking between firms, and between firms and other institutions, inside 
Norway as well as internationally? 
 
These are supported by the results form the questionnaire in fig. 7: Both the R&D 
performance and seed or venture capital stand out as severe challenges for the renewal of the 
private sector or the company system in Norway.  
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Fig 7: Challenges for the company system 
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An important component of the company system is its capability to engage in co-operation 
and collaboration with other firms or knowledge sources. This includes the capability for 
policy makers and public institutions to engage in networking to ensure their own learning. In 
short, networking is key to an innovation driven economy in times when the firm’s knowledge 
base is more widely distributed among private and public actors and sectors, and when the 
policy environment is getting more complex with important ramifications for policy 
institutions. Policy makers’ assessment of these challenges is presented in fig. 8, illustrating 
several dimensions of networking.  What is here termed triple helix networks, i.e. between 
firms, R&D institutions and the public sector, are seen as extremely important and a challenge 
for the Norwegian system. Policy makers’ need to engage in learning across countries is also 
seen as an area to be invested in.  
 
Fig 8: Challenges for networking 
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4.2.2.5. Non-governmental organisations 
NGO’s are critical elements in the innovation system, as they gather and focus popular 
demand for renewal both in commercial and non-commercial operations. It is an interesting 
fact that NGO’s are not mentioned in the innovation policy debate that we have analysed. 
4.2.2.6. Citizens 
Citizens are focused on in two ways in the debate. First, by pointing out that a culture for 
entrepreneurship must take root in the population as a whole. Interest for and commitment to 
industrial renewal may well be seen as a cultural trait, and the role of the education system 
and other opinion formers in promoting such a culture is called for. 
 
Secondly, citizens are seen as the most basic and essential of resources for innovation efforts, 
and the need to recruit and motivate the young to embark on studies and careers that are key 
to technological and other innovation efforts are emphasised. 
4.2.2.7. The overall picture 
A graphical representation of what we have found is presented below. In sum, the perceived 
challenges include some of the usual suspects, like low R&D funding, an industry structure 
not conducive to future needs of the economy, lack of venture capital and lack of 
entrepreneurship (start up of new firms with growth potential). However, beyond these there 
are several interesting issues coming up. In particular, we would like to highlight the focus on 
a lack of coherent policy rationale and the overall governance of the innovation policy area. 
This also leads to an awareness of the problems linked to the macro-economic policy, and 
implicitly the dominance it takes in the Norwegian policy environment. Notable are also 
transport and infrastructure as well as issues linked to globalisation and international 
competitiveness. Lastly, we note a clear awareness of weaknesses in the core education and 
research system, including basic research and the role of the research institutes in the 
innovation system. A general, long term threat providing a context to these perceptions is the 
future reduction of state revenues as discussed under the heading of the “shark’s jaw”. 
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Fig 9: A summary of perceived challenges 
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4.3. Policy mix 
By policy mix, we understand the set of established priority areas and actual policy efforts 
within the field of innovation policies. First, current priority areas are identified on the basis 
of the latest Trend Chart reports for Norway46 as well as recent policy documents such as 
white papers, government reports, action plans, law amendments, etc. Secondly, we provide a 
picture of the scale and direction of actual policy efforts by mapping the largest innovation 
policy measures by annual budget. 
 
In conclusion, we provide a summary of the recent government proposition Instruments for an 
innovative and creative industry. The proposition is part of the Government’s plan to develop 
a new “holistic” innovation policy. Thus, the proposition - and the reactions to it in Parliament 
- gives us an indication as to how the Norwegian policy mix will develop in the future. 
 
4.3.1. Current priority areas 
Figure 4. provides an overview of central themes in current Norwegian innovation policies. 
 
                                                 
46 The reports contain a section on innovation policy developments, which accounts for the areas in which the 
focus and drive in innovation policies are concentrated. 
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Fig 10:  Current priority areas 
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Against this background, it is possible to identify seven overriding areas in which the present 
interest and drive in Norwegian innovation policies is concentrated: the actual contents and 
organization of innovation policies; the general framework conditions for Norwegian 
industry; the scale and quality of national research and development; the quality of higher 
education; the commercialization of research results; the level of interaction between industry 
and institutions for education and research; and the scale of company start ups. 
 
4.3.2. Contents and organization of Norwegian innovation policies 
The development of a new holistic innovation policy (HIP) was initiated by the Minister of 
Education of Research in 2002 (see separate assessment). The new policy is to be 
characterized by a coherent understanding of traditionally separate policy areas in order to 
ensure an effective use of existing resources and to avoid that different policy measures are in 
conflict with each other or in other ways hinder innovation. The process has been placed 
under the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, but - as the main objective is to 
establish a horizontal, intersectoral policy - it involves other Ministries as well as actors 
outside the Government.47  
 
                                                 
47 Koch, Per M., TREND CHART Country Report: Norway, September 1 2003 
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The process has hitherto resulted in an “innovation plan” entitled “Fra idé til verdi”, which 
was published on October 23rd 2003.48 As part of the HIP process, the Government has also 
proposed a comprehensive reorganization of the business oriented policy instrument system.49 
The proposition is presented in more detail below. 
 
Another recent effort concerning the organization of the Norwegian innovation policy system 
is the reorganization of the Norwegian Research Council (NFR) which came into effect in 
September 2003. The decision was made by the Government in 2002, and was for a large part 
based on an evaluation of NFR which pointed to weaknesses in the coordination of 
Norwegian research. The previous six “theme- based” divisions have been replaced by three 
“function-based” divisions: 
 
• a division for disciplinary development  
• a division for innovation and user-initiated R&D  
• a division for strategic efforts  
 
The new organization is to ensure that Norwegian research actively contributes to innovation 
and industrial development by facilitating interaction between on the one hand industry and 
the institute sector, and on the other hand basic and applied research.50  
 
The delegation of responsibilities from central to local authorities is yet another current focus 
area touching upon the organization of the Norwegian innovation policy system. The 
Government is in favour of giving the counties more responsibility for resource allocation and 
development in the regions. Thus, the administration and allocation of innovation policy 
measures and funds are to be increasingly the responsibilities of regional rather than central 
authorities. This trend is discernable in the 2003 state budget where parts of the regional 
funding have been decentralized to the counties, who are free to use parts of this funding to 
finance innovation policy measures.51 
  
4.3.3. Framework conditions  
The appointment by the Government in 2000 of a Commission for Benchmarking 
(Referansetestingsutvalget) reflected an interest in improving the framework conditions for 
industrial activities in Norway on the basis of comparisons with framework conditions in 
other countries. The commission was to evaluate the use of benchmarking as a method and 
develop a system for the evaluation of the framework conditions for industrial wealth 
creation. In its report, the commission recommends that the Ministry of Industry and Trade - 
possibly in cooperation with other ministries - is made responsible for industrial framework 
condition benchmarking; that there should be established a reference group with the 
                                                 
48 http://www.odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/09/fraid001.pdf 
49 St.prp. nr. 51 (2002-2003) Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv 
50 http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070067/index-dok000-b-f-a.html; 
http://www.tu.no/arbeidsliv/article.jhtml?articleID=21680; Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in 
innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 
2002  
51 White Paper No 31 (2002-2003), White Paper on Big Cities (St.meld. nr. 31 (2002-2003), Storbymeldingen); Koch, Per M., Monitoring, 
updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, 
Covering period: October 2001-September 2002  
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responsibility for updating and development; and - with reference to the EU Lisbon-strategy - 
that benchmarking exercises should be held every second year.52 
 
In order to increase productivity and efficiency in industry, it is a political goal to reduce 
firms’ administrative burden. As part of a broader programme for the modernization of the 
public sector, the Government has introduced the action plan “Simplifying Norway”. The plan 
is to provide Norwegian industry with a sound regulatory framework and user-friendly public 
services. Emphasis is placed upon: 
 
• making the regulatory framework easily accessible 
• improving regulations in targeted areas  
• strengthening the knowledge base for decisions on new regulations and other 
government reforms 
• reducing firms’ reporting obligations 
• making the public sector aware of the needs of industry 
 
It is the Government’s ambition that the quality of Norwegian public services is to give firms 
an international competitive advantage. An advisory forum with participation from the 
business organizations has been set up in order to secure a balance between the needs of 
industry on the one hand and society at large on the other hand. The Government is to present 
a revised and updated plan in the autumn of 2003.53 
 
Traditionally, competition policies have not been an integral part of Norwegian innovation 
policies. However, stimulating the development of an innovative industry is presented as one 
of the motives for the action plan for competition policies which has been initiated by the 
Government. The action plan is part of the programme for modernizing the public sector, and 
the main focus is upon 
 
• strengthening the position of the Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet) 
• assessing laws and regulations in order to remove arrangements that may impede 
competition 
• developing a public purchasing policy that promotes competition.54 
 
Improving the conditions for value creation by reducing industrial taxes is a core issue for the 
present Government and a central priority in the 2003 state budget. 2002 saw the removal of 
the investment tax and an increase in depreciation rates. One central initiative in 2003 is the 
extension of the tax incentive scheme SkatteFUNN. Whereas the scheme, which gives tax 
                                                 
52 http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/publ/utredninger/NOU/024001-020006/index-ved001-b-n-a.html; 
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/nhd/2000/pressem/024041-070003/index-dok000-b-n-a.html; Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating 
and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering 
period: October 2001-September 2002  
53 From words to action – modernization, efficiency improvement and simplification in the public sector (Fra ord til handling – 
modernisering, effektivisering og forenkling I offentlig sector), report to Parliament from the Ministry of Labour and Government 
Administration, 24.01.02 (electronic version at http://www.dep.no/archive/aadvedlegg/01/02/85128065.pdf); Presentation of the action 
plan Simplifying Norway on the Government’s web-pages (in English), http://odin.dep.no/nhd/engelsk/publ/handlingsplaner/024081-
220006/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
54 From words to action – modernization, efficiency improvement and simplification in the public sector (Fra ord til handling – 
modernisering, effektivisering og forenkling i offentlig sektor), report to Parliament from the Ministry of Labour and Government 
Administration, 24.01.02 (electronic version at http://www.dep.no/archive/aadvedlegg/01/02/85128065.pdf) 
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reductions for industrial R&D investments, originally was targeted towards small and medium 
sized enterprises, it now applies to all firms - irrespective of size.55 
 
eNorge 2005 is the Government’s plan for IT policies for the period 2002-2005. The 
overriding goal of these policies is to exploit the possibilities offered by information 
technologies, the use of which is seen as an important impetus for societal change and 
improvement. eNorge has three focus areas: 
• Value creation in industry: A strengthening of the development and use of information 
technology in industry is believed to contribute to value creation in industry by 
increasing innovation and competitiveness.  
• Efficiency and quality in the public sector: The use of IT is to improve the quality and 
efficiency of public services. 
• Participation and identity: The possibilities offered by IT are to be open to all citizens, 
and to be exploited in the conservation and development of Norway’s cultural 
heritage, identity and languages.56 
 
4.3.4. Research and development 
Increasing R&D investments as a proportion of GDP is a central political objective. In 1999 
investments amounted to 1,70 % of GDP, which is below the OECD average and the lowest 
share among the Nordic countries. The Government’s goal is that Norwegian investments by 
2005 as a minimum should have reached the OECD average. The State is to play a significant 
role in achieving this goal, i.a. by increasing the capital of the public Fund for Research and 
Innovation. However, the Government maintains that industry is to be responsible for 60% of 
the increase. The tax deduction scheme SkatteFUNN has been introduced as an instrument for 
increasing industrial spending on R&D.57 
 
It is also the ambition of the Government to strengthen Norwegian research in qualitative 
terms. Several evaluations have indicated that the quality of the research being conducted is 
low, at least in some disciplines. One subsequent government initiative is the establishment of 
“centres of excellence” - research groups united under a common leadership which are given 
long-term financing based on a research plan. In addition, the Government wishes to increase 
the number of researcher recruits and to strengthen the funding of scientific equipment.58  
 
4.3.5. Quality in higher education 
The Norwegian system of higher education is presently undergoing major changes referred to 
as “the quality reform”. Among the changes are  
• the introduction of a new degree structure consisting of three levels: Bachelor (three 
years), master (two years) and Ph.D. (three years)  
• the introduction of a new grades system  
                                                 
55 Government proposition  No 1 (2002-2003) The state budget including the Social Insurance Scheme [folketrygden]  
56 http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/enorge/p10001876/024101-990129/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
57 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The 
TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002; http://www.skattefunn.no 
58 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The 
TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002; http://www.skattefunn.no 
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• the establishment of a new national organization for quality in education, NOKUT, 
whose main task is to evaluate the mechanisms for quality assurance in both public 
and private universities and colleges  
 
The quality reform was initiated by the previous Labour Government in 2001, and has been 
followed up by the present Conservative-Centre Government.59  
 
4.3.6. Commercialization of research results 
It is a political goal that inventions based on publicly funded research should be 
commercialized, and hence exploited to the benefit of society at large. Universities and 
colleges have been given a legally based responsibility for promoting the practical use of 
scientific research results. In 2002, a government appointed committee presented its report on 
commercialization of results from university and college research. Based on this work, there 
has been a political process leading up to a recent amendment of the law on rights to 
inventions by employees. Unlike other employees, teachers and researchers at universities and 
colleges have hitherto had the primary right to patent or commercialize their own research 
results. The law amendment implies that this right is transferred to the institution. This is 
believed to result in the establishment of institutional structures which will ensure that 
research results are patented and made available for industrial use. 
 
The political interest in stimulating the commercialization of research results is also reflected 
in several policy instruments. The FORNY programme aims at promoting commercialization 
of research based business concepts or ideas conceived at universities and colleges as well as 
research institutes. Also, the science parks actively help university and college researchers 
patenting, developing and marketing their inventions vis-à-vis industry.60 
 
4.3.7. Interaction between industry and education/research institutions 
Interaction between education/research institutions and industry is a central theme in 
Norwegian innovation policies. In the so-called “Government-platform” - a document which 
outlines the main ambitions of the present Government - it is emphasized that the knowledge 
transfer between universities/colleges and industry is to be strengthened.  
 
A number of policy measures aim at increasing the links between research institutions and 
industry, e.g.: 
• the user driven programmes, the objective of which is to actively involve firms in 
publicly funded R&D programmes 
• the NT programme, which gives support to innovation in Northern Norway by i.a. 
developing networks of companies and knowledge institutions 
• the MOBI programme, which aims at promoting innovation in firms i.a. through 
establishing links to research environments 
                                                 
59 http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070077/index-dok000-b-f-a.html 
Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The 
TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002  
60 Innst.O.nr.6 (2002-2003) (electric version at http://www.stortinget.no/inno/200203-006-001.html; Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating 
and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering 
period: October 2001-September 2002; http://program.forskningsradet.no/forny/om/ 
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• Value creation 2010, which is to promote innovation at the regional level through 
strong interaction between industry and reseach 
• Science parks, which are property-based initiatives with operational links to 
education/research institutions designed to encourage the formation and growth of 
knowledge-based industries61 
 
4.3.8. Company start-ups 
Facilitating company start-ups is an expressed political goal and a central motive behind the 
current restructuring of business oriented policy instruments and institutions. Today, there are 
several policy instruments oriented towards start-ups. Science parks play an important role in 
encouraging the establishment of new technology-based companies, as do the programme for 
incubator activities (in which science parks may participate) which stimulates the 
establishment of “incubators” – environments for the development of firms in the start-up 
phase. A related measure is the incubator grant scheme which provides financial support to 
entrepreneurs located in an incubator.62 
 
4.4. A summary of  innovation policy measures 
This overview, illustrated in fig.11 below, confirms that the Norwegian policy mix has taken 
up the innovation systems perspective to a great extent, but, relative to the challenges 
perceived by many, fails to address some deeper concerns like industrial structure and 
globalisation. Still, some of the challenges are being met, at least in terms of political 
ambitions, like improved coherence and rationale in policy. The overall assessment is that the 
Norwegian system is capable to address proper challenges on the fringes, but fails to integrate 
and renew the foundations for industrial policy using perspectives from the innovation policy 
tool box and thinking. A number a areas are still challenges, as they have been over many 
years, like the institute sector and funding of R&D, without being addressed properly in the 
wider policy system.  
4.5. Looking ahead: the 2003 Government proposition on 
instruments for an innovative and creative industry 
On March 28th 2003, the Ministry of Trade and Industry presented to Parliament a proposition 
entitled Instruments for an innovative and creative industry. In this document, the 
Government proposes a comprehensive reorganization of the business oriented policy 
instrument system, with the aim of making the system more efficient and better suited to 
facilitate value creation in Norwegian industry. The proposition is based on a review of the 
existing innovation policy instruments (Virkemiddelgjennomgangen), and is part of the 
Government’s initiative to introduce a new “holistic” innovation policy.  
 
                                                 
61 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The 
TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002  
62 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The 
TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002 
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Fig 11: The 20 largest policy instruments 
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According to the document, the policy instruments should increasingly be targeted towards 
the same goal, which should be to promote innovation nationwide. To achieve this, the 
instruments are mainly to focus upon the following three areas: 
 
• research and competence development 
• the idea, development and commercialization phases 
• internationalization, 
 
and to target the following five main groups: 
 
• entrepreneurs 
• young companies 
• the innovation system 
• small and medium sized enterprises with ambition and potential for growth 
• researchers and R&D environments in industry and the research and education sector. 
 
On a more specific level, the reorganization of the policy instrument or delivery system leads 
to the establishment of a new organization for innovation and internationalization by January 
1st 2004. It is proposed that the new organization is to be represented abroad as well as 
domestically, and that it is given the responsibility for the measures presently administered by 
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the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (Statens Nærings- og 
Distriktsutviklingsfond, SND), the Norwegian Government Consultative Office for Inventors 
(Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere, SVO) and the Norwegian Trade Council (Norges 
Eksportråd), as well as some of the innovation oriented policy measures administered by the 
Research Council of Norway (Norges Forskningsråd, NFR).  
 
The suggested organizational form of the new unit is a “Special law company” 
(Særlovselskap). The company is to own and administer a network of offices all around the 
country, which is to provide a single “point of entrance” to the policy instruments and thus 
making them more easily available to their users. The main reason for organizing the unit as a 
“Special law company” is that such an arrangement allows for the necessary balance between 
the Government’s need for control on an aggregated level on the one hand, and the unit’s need 
for independence and freedom to make decisions on a day-to-day basis on the other hand. 
 
Other proposals forwarded in the document, include an increase in the budget for regional 
funds from NOK 500 mill (€ 60,7 mill) to NOK 1 billion (€ 121,4 mill) and that the 
Norwegian Space Agency (Norsk Romsenter) is to become a more independent state 
institution (forvaltningsorgan med særskilte fullmakter). 
 
The government proposition was discussed in Parliament on June 18th 2003, and was in 
general positively received. There was broad agreement on the need for increased co-
ordination of the policy instruments, and that innovation should be a central goal.  
 
Parliament was also in favour of the establishment of a unit for innovation and 
internationalization. It was however decided that the unit should include the Norwegian 
Tourist Board (Norges Turistråd, NTR) in addition to the institutions suggested in the 
proposition. Also, the possibility for including other institutions or instruments at a later point 
is to be held open. 
 
While Parliament’s reactions to the proposition all in all were positive, a few critical 
comments were made. For one thing, some Members of Parliament expressed “a slight 
surprise” with the fact that decisions regarding policy instruments have been made before the 
actual content of the new “holistic” innovation policy has been established, pointing out that it 
would have been more rational to deal with the two matters in reverse order. Also, several of 
the parties in opposition argued that more attention should be paid to regional development, 
and that the objective of the policy instrument system should be to promote regional industrial 
activities in general, and not only activities that are related to innovation.    
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5. Agenda setting, prioritisation, and stakeholder 
involvement 
 
Innovation governance includes the capabilities to identify challenges ahead for the respective 
national economy, formulate strategic visions for future development, and prioritize resources 
accordingly. Agenda setting and prioritization are therefore key elements in the process of 
creating dynamism and inducing structural changes if that is perceived as necessary. 
However, these processes do not take place in a vacuum. They are influenced by earlier 
agendas and priorities, inertia in building knowledge and preferences, stakeholders often 
representing existing priorities, and political and economic belief systems prevailing in the 
policy making system. The institutionalist approach taken in this analysis, as presented briefly 
in the introduction, assumes that agendas and priorities are not the result of rational, explicit 
choices, but depend on a numbers of formal, informal, structural and cultural factors. The 
analysis in this chapter aims at creating an understanding of how these influence the outcomes 
in the innovation governance system in Norway 
5.1. A corporatist system in a macro-economic environment 
Norway’s governance system has generally been based on a tri-partite relationship between 
the parties in the labor market and the state. For a brief assessment in the context of 
innovation policy, it is fair to say that the corporatist system has been strong, but limited. 
Nordby (1994) states that the corporatist governance system in Norway rests on three pillars:  
 
a) The tri-partite incomes policy, that is a division of labor with employers, trade unions and 
the state to ensure the competitiveness of Norwegian industry through moderate income 
settlements. This pillar also underlines the very way competitiveness has been conceptualized 
in Norway: low unit costs relative to competing countries. This was a high level relationship, 
but was indeed limited to a very narrow segment of the overall economic policy.  
 
b) The second is referred to as corporatism under public management, a key mechanism for 
agenda setting and stakeholder involvement. It refers to the system in which organisations and 
individual persons are invited to take part in commissions, committees, advisory boards etc. 
These entities typically deliver their assessments and conclusions on specific issues within the 
framework of “public studies” (Norges offentlige utredninger”, see also section on policy 
learning). An important aspect of this form of corporatism is that the “owner ministry” giving 
the mandate for the commissioned work represent a deeply ingrained tradition in Norwegian 
public administration, the sector principle, implying that each ministry has all relevant 
responsibilities for policy actions within their respective domain. As such the link between 
sectoral ministries and this corporatist system reinforces divisions between policy domains 
and hence may lead to lack of policy co-ordination. It should be noted that a great many 
reforms and major policy decisions in the innovation policy field, like the recent tax refund 
system for R&D expenditures, the merger of five research councils into one in 1993, and 
benchmarking of Norwegian industry’s competitiveness in 2002 have been initiated through 
such corporatist solutions.  
 
c) The final version is often referred to as inner corporatism, which is linked to profession 
based trade unions and their influence in public management (see Moen 2001). 
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This brief description deserves expansion on some key points. First, the committees and 
commissions referred to do not exercise any power in terms of decision making. Government, 
or the respective ministry, are totally free to accept, reject or change the implications as white 
papers and other documents are prepared for wider policy debate. This was e.g. the case 
during the reform of the research council system. Hence, these structures should be seen 
essentially as stakeholder mechanisms.  
 
Second, the sectoral principle has led to processes within what has been coined the 
“segmented state” (Egeberg, Olsen and Sætren 1978) and “the negotiated economy” (Hernes 
1978), implying a strong tendency to un-co-ordinated, but selective action vis a vis industries 
and interest groups. It is for example reflected in an old fashioned organisation of industrial 
policy whereby primary industries (fisheries and agriculture) still have their own ministries. 
This system prevails and is recognised in an extremely skewed distribution of government 
support to industrial activity: Of the total amount of support in 1998 of 18.5 bill. NOK, 12.4 
bill. NOK were directed to agriculture, 4.8 bill. NOK to secondary and tertiary industries, and 
0.7 bill NOK to industrially oriented R&D (NOU 2000:21; Moen 2002).  More recently, an 
increasing tendency to implement reforms according to principles of new public management 
(NPM) has led to what is termed a “fragmented state” (see Tranøy and Østerud 2001). 
Reforms and governance lead to a swelling of agencies and other institutions mandated with 
implementation of policy, leaving the overall institutional design to fragmentation and co-
ordination failures. A general assessment is that while the prime minister level has little 
power, the individual ministries much more so, the agency level has increased in authority 
and power due to the position in the policy cycle. An additional conclusion from the recent 
power study was that even the recent reform processes of state institutions itself have been 
sectoral and un-co-ordinated (NOU 2003:19). 
 
The key point in this analysis is that the Norwegian policy making system lacks a co-
ordinating body or mechanism ensuring broad and strategic decision making across the 
domains of individual ministries. It is mirrored by a policy making platform that may be 
termed the “macro-economic rationality” (Koch 2003). Compared to other countries, this 
macro-economic rationality has been particularly strong, based on the “iron triangle” of the 
economist institutions of the Central Bank, Department of economics at the University of 
Oslo and the Ministry of Finance. Starting out as a strong element in labour party 
governmental planning, it has only increased its role in policy making with the stronger 
tendency to rely on market solutions and economic liberalism in recent years. Industrial 
policy as such has been more or less removed from the agenda to the benefit of a market 
failure approach to especially capital markets. Industrially oriented policy is best left to the 
Ministry of Finance (Moen 2002). On top of that, the role of the state is now characterised as 
state capitalism without strategy, except selling state shares in major corporations (NOU 
2003:19). 
5.2. The politics of agenda setting 
Agenda setting basically takes place at the political level. In this section we explore briefly 
some key aspects of this. Although the term political level usually refers to politicians and 
political parties, patterns of tension and conflict typically cut through many layers and 
institutions. 
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5.2.1. Multi-dimensional tensions 
Relative to the emergence of comprehensive innovation policy, several dimensions of partly 
deeply ingrained tensions influence the Norwegian system. A point of departure is the notion 
of the dominant “macro-economic rationality” alluded to above. Although this dominant 
feature of Norwegian policy making has existed during most of the post-war era, in particular 
in the 1960s and 1970s with Keynesian economic policy, it has become even more dominant 
over the past 20 years due to two factors: First, the petroleum sector has generated not so 
much energy for the Norwegian economy as financial assets. From early on a perceived 
challenge has been to avoid the dangers of a Kuwait economy identified as one being deeply 
dependent on oil and gas based revenues and activities. The financial assets were therefore 
defined as oil and gas reserves transformed, and put aside as savings. The strong capabilities 
of the economists community in Norway has been a stronghold and a competence asset in the 
management of these resources. Second, a cross-political preference for new public 
management (NPM) became pervasive over the past 10-15 years, including a market oriented 
focus in economic policy, privatisation of suitable public services and a stringent, even 
ideologised, view on the interface between the state and the market.  
 
As new perspectives on innovation policy emerge, several lines of tensions become visible in 
the political and policy making system: 
 
a) The conservative party, Høyre, currently leading the government coalition, is split 
between a traditional or neo-classical economist view and a more pragmatic stance. 
Still, innovation policy is a difficult issue in Høyre, as it challenges the role of the state 
in economics and politics. 
b) The Labour Party has tensions along the same lines, but less severe. The party is 
also more pragmatic than Høyre on the role of the state in the economy, in particular 
state ownership. The party is also strongly linked to the trade union movement. 
 
These tensions provide a vital background for the fact that a modernised version of industrial 
and innovation policy is very difficult to achieve. Further, these tensions are reinforced by 
similar rifts in the civil service: 
 
c) There are deep tensions within the Ministry of Trade and Industry, basically 
between the division for economic policy well founded on the neo-classical approach 
to economic policy, and the division for R&D and innovation that has assumed a 
perspective more in line with the innovation systems approach and evolutionary 
economics. 
d) There are tensions between the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development, in particular on the question of state 
vrs regional perspectives. 
e) The Ministry of Science and Education takes up an ownership role for R&D policy 
and remains resistant to being (too much) co-ordinated. It led, as will be shown for the 
new Government Committee for Innovation Policy RIU (see chapter 6) to a lack of 
integration between R&D policy and innovation policy. 
 
Hence, there are two dimensions of conflicts related to economic and innovation policy, on 
the one hand an academic-economic dimension, and on the other a political-economic 
dimension, both reinforcing each other and making a well-informed modernisation and 
renewal of the interface between economic and innovation policy very difficult.  
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5.2.2. Processes in Parliament 
As mentioned above, the Parliament is the high level policy formulation body and has 
therefore an overall policy function. We cannot include all kinds of proceedings taking place 
in the Parliament in this paper, but some key mechanisms and process are important to be able 
to understand the system as such.  
 
First of all, the Parliament divides itself into 12 standing committees as described above. The 
Presidency decides on how this is done, but the rule is that the committees should have a 
reasonable workload, a rule that necessarily leads to trade-offs concerning which get what for 
political treatment. For example the Standing Committee on Science and Education (SCSE) 
has responsibility for the R&D budget. The Standing Committee on Trade and Industry 
(SCTI) has responsibility for three ministries (all industrial), and will according to the 
procedural system leave major R&D affairs to the former. These trade-offs are well illustrated 
by the way the yearly state budgets are treated. The state budget, with its resource allocation 
and prioritization, is the key vehicle for policy formulation. However, due to the division of 
labor between the committees, they may not have the whole budget for a sector for treatment. 
For example, the Standing Committee of Trade and Industry will not treat the chapters of the 
budget for the Ministry of Trade and Industry that deals with R&D allocated for use outside 
that ministry (for RCN). Those chapters will be dealt with in the Standing Committee for 
Science and Education. This seems at face value to represent a co-ordination failure, since an 
important instrument in industrial and economic policy is R&D. This seems even more to the 
point in so far as the SCTI does not formally attach comments for priority for the subsequent 
treatment in SCSE. But the SCSE is then responsible to prepare the discussion in parliament.  
 
This cross-functional system could not operate without the co-ordinating role of party groups. 
Before preparing the final proposals for discussion in Parliament, the issues at stake are 
discussed broadly in the respective parties, allowing them to instruct or inform the committee 
delegates to vote or push for specific positions and priorities. Hence, the party groups operate 
as cross-references in the system. In other words, the organisation of parliament as such does 
not necessarily indicate how positions are being formulated. It is the party machinery that has 
opinions through the committees, while these are not decision making bodies in their own 
right. For example, as is the case in Norway, the treatment of industrial R&D budgets for 
RCN in the SCSE and not in SCTI often leads to competition between basic, university 
research and more applied industrially oriented research. Seen through the budgets for 
industrial R&D over the 1990s, there has been a clear trend that industrial R&D lost out (RCN 
yearly report 2002). The typical sectoral principle of responsibility is broken leading to a 
weak link between industry and R&D. In addition, there is an implicit abdication of political 
responsibility vis a vis RCN, the receiver of these funds. Not without some truth, many people 
refer to this situation as having the kinder garden teachers in SCSE deal with important policy 
issues for industrial development.  
 
Contrary to some countries, these committees do not have joint meetings to better co-ordinate 
policy. On the other hand, some important cases may be treated in more than one committee, 
a matter that is decided by the presidency. Still, the committee system is vulnerable to the 
competence of party delegates and the level of information and knowledge among these. In 
addition, delegates, or members of Parliament, may also operate individually as allowed by 
the parties, or individually according to specific procedures in the parliamentary agenda.  
 
The latter is best illustrated with the proposal to establish a new regional loan facility for 
industrial development for the year 2003. One MP, Inge Ryan from the socialists, forwarded 
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an individual proposal for the facility, after which the Parliament entered into a compromise 
with the government resulting in total financial limit of 1 billion NOK. The regulations for the 
new facility, or fund, were established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in consultation 
with other ministries. No clients and relevant agencies were consulted. During the process, Mr 
Ryan was asked to reduce the overall limit of the fund and instead achieve a higher loss 
threshold. This was not done, and the Ministry of Finance, concerned about the balance of the 
budget, cut the loss threshold to 15% from 25%, thereby deciding through a zero-sum game to 
implement a fund for which no client has any use. The 2003 limit of 500 mill NOK was 
exploited only with 146 mill NOK (Mühlbradt 2003).  
 
A co-ordination challenge also arises from the type of instruments in various ministries’ 
portfolios. For example, the Standing Committee of Finance Policy (SCFP) will discuss 
policies that are of key importance for the SCTI, but since the former, through the contents of 
finance policy, handles all financial instruments, like tax policy, a coherent treatment vis a vis 
industry and innovation is extremely difficult. This case also illustrates that the division of 
labour in Parliament has a multi-dimensional co-ordination problem: Firstly through various 
policy fields being distributed across the committees according to the “fair burden” principle, 
and secondly through the fact that various instruments are distributed across committees.  
 
For a coherent and horizontal innovation policy this situation becomes extremely difficult, 
and a rational process is hence dependent on insightful processes in and among political 
parties and their delegates. The organisation of parliament is ill suited to broader, strategic 
approaches in areas like innovation policy. In fact, if the government is to have success in 
establishing a comprehensive innovation policy, it needs to be extremely sensitive to 
important positions taken by the opposition in parliament to able to achieve negotiated 
outcomes. 
 
5.3. Prioritization in R&D: The role of ministries and RCN 
 
Prioritization takes place through state budgets which we technically discuss in the next 
chapter as a co-ordination mechanism. Here we focus on the more policy relevant decision 
making system.  
 
As alluded to earlier, the ministries have great autonomy in the context of a weak prime 
minister level.63 They operate according to the principle of sector responsibility, which says 
that each ministry shall be responsible for their own R&D strategy according to their own 
knowledge needs. Typically, the ministerial strategy shall include a definition of the 
boundaries of responsibilities and strategies for exploitation.  
 
The key ministry is the Ministry for Science and Education (see also chapter on co-
ordination). But prioritization takes place within each ministry. This process is linked tightly 
with implementation as each ministry delegates the implementation of the priorities to the key 
agency, the Research Council of Norway, the dominant and almost omnipotent agency in the 
STI domain. Hence, the prioritization takes place within the “contract” between the ministries 
and the RCN on a yearly basis (see section on state budgets).  The process is a combined top-
                                                 
63 It is said that a main reason for this stems from the period under Danish rule, where the Danish king was afraid 
of possible opposition from a strong prime minister and government, and hence ensured to weaken the office of 
the prime minister and made the ministers autonomous and divided (a version of the well known split and rule 
doctrine).  
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down and bottom up, in which priorities stemming from strategic processes with RCN are 
interfaced with ministerial priorities. This is depicted in fig 12 which gives an overview. 
 
The main points to be made here is that the prioritization processes take place without formal 
exercises like foresight etc. The main priorities from government are typically laid down in 
white papers, which in the Norwegian system substitutes other strategic intelligence functions. 
But these are loose visions and objectives with no binding impact on yearly allocations. 
Hence the prioritization process is very much linked to the yearly budget.  
Fig 12: RCN Budget Process Overview 
 
Source: Research and Innovation Governance: A study of eight countries. Technopolis 2003. 
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However, the main feature in the system is the principle of earmarking, as ministries in their 
prioritized allocations to RCN in a very detailed manner instruct the use of the funds. Six 
ministries provide the general funding base for RCN, which together with financial means 
from the new Fund for R&D and Innovation, makes up 75% of RCNs financial base. The rest 
is provided by dedicated funds from 14 ministries, in many cases with very small allotments 
(down to less than 1 mill euro). The RCN is therefore very much reduced to an implementing 
institution rather than the strategic institution it was meant to be. A recent study of this 
earmarking system highlights the fact that while the Norwegian governance system in general 
rests very much on new public management principles, the earmarking system is a very 
evident contradiction (Technopolis 2003). The overview over the styles of various ministries 
(see table 1) is summed up as follows: 
 
Table 1: Ministries’ Earmarking Styles 
 Spend with 
RCN 
Allocation 
basis 
No of 
categories 
Biggest 
category 
(MNOK) 
Smallest 
category 
(MNOK) 
MNOK/ 
category 
No of 
earmarks 
Smallest 
money 
earmark 
(MNOK) 
Categories 
+ 
earmarks 
Degree of 
Ear-
marking 
KRD 101 P 12 45.2 1.5 8.4 10 0.45 22 H 
           
OED 249 V 4 70.0 34.0 62.1 14 ns 18 L 
           
SHD 99 P 20 21.8 0.3 4.9 4 2.00 24 H 
           
LD 251 Strategy/P 20 31.8 0.1 12.5 32 1.50 52 H 
           
NHD 848 V/theme 17 165.0 2.9 49.9 17 2.00 34 L 
           
KUF 765 V/theme 8 208.0 43.0 95.6 20 0.85 28 L 
           
FiD 180 strategy 47 24.2 0.1 3.8 12 ns 59 H 
           
FIN 8 P 10 3.3 0.1 0.8 1 0.05 11 L 
           
UD 39 P 12 11.7 0.2 3.2 0 0.20 12 H 
           
SD 53 P 4 11.0 0.3 13.2 3 1.50 7 H 
           
MD 194 V 5 102.0 27.0 38.7 37 1.00 42 H 
           
Total/A
vge. 
2785.1  159 208.0 0.1 17.5 120 0.05 279  
Note: Allocation basis: P = programme; V = type of funding (virkemiddel).  ns = not specified.  Ministries 
providing general funds are indicated in italics 
Source: Technopolis 2003, based on  Tildelingsbrev 2000, except FiD, 1999 and FIN, 2001.  KUF earmarks 
relate only to special funds 
 
 
“Smaller spenders tend to discuss their funding of individual programmes.  Rather than 
supporting various categories of activity, they treat RCN much more like a supermarket, 
buying a packet of this here, a slice of that there – essentially for their own consumption.  
They are also much more likely to earmark within individual programmes, and these earmarks 
can relate on occasions to quite small amounts.  From the allocation letters, it is clear that 
these earmarks represent a mixture of politically imposed requirements and ministries’ needs 
for very specific pieces of research.  In isolated cases, it seems that the level of control desired 
by the ministries is extreme.   
 
The agriculture (LD) and fisheries (FiD) ministries have a behaviour of their own.  As former 
owners of research councils, they have a more developed set of internal definitions of needs 
 56
than most ministries, and these are articulated in strategies.  Their allocation letters refer to 
these strategies in a general way, but the effect is to make the instructions to RCN highly 
specific.  It is as if their management style has not adjusted to the new situation, so that the 
real management of RCN’s BF division is contested.  The detail and complexity of the 
agriculture ministry’s micro-management in the past is illustrated by a letter64 from the general 
audit office to RCN, which proposed an 80-point agenda for a meeting intended to review 
whether RCN had complies with all the instructions contained in the agriculture ministry’s 
1999 allocation letter to the council.  The environment ministry is in a somewhat similar 
position.  While it never formally owned a research council, the Norwegian National 
Committee for Environmental Research had, in practice, worked as the environment ministry’s 
research council for a period before the RCN merger.  The environment ministry therefore acts 
in a similar way to the ministries of fisheries and agriculture, with a high degree of 
formalisation of its needs and with very specific earmarking of funds.” 
 
Several analytical points may also be made in the degree of variation in behaviour (ibid): 
 
• “The purpose of the funding – whether it is fundamentally paying for research to be done or whether it 
is paying for answers to the ministries’ questions – or, in other words, whether the funding provides 
patronage or custom.  Often, the two are not clearly distinguished 
• The scale of the funding.  Small funders trust RCN less and earmark more 
• The history of the ministry.  Those who have owned sectoral research councils in the past still deal with 
RCN at a level of great detail 
• Intensity of political demands of the sector.  Some (such as regional development) are simply more 
prone to lobbying and political interference than others 
• Variations in the degree of personal interest and competence, especially at the level of the responsible 
officers in the ministries” 
 
Hence the sector based governance system is deeply ingrained in the way priorities are made, 
and undermines a broader strategic agenda setting for R&D and innovation policy. The 
control exercised may more readily be termed negative than positive, it implies a significant 
weakening of RCN strategic elbow room and potential to broader and long term policy 
deployment.  
 
As mentioned, the Ministry for Science and Education is a major player in general R&D 
policy as well as education policy. It funds some 25% of RCNs yearly budget (in 2003). But 
given the fact that R&D and education are both core areas in innovation policy, one may also 
expect that these two areas in the ministry are highly co-ordinated to represent a coherent 
policy.  
 
This is not the case. It may be illustrated by the discussion of the research institute sector in 
Norway. Currently, Norway, after the privatization of major parts of the institute sector, has 
some 200 small and large research institutes, mostly organised as private foundations. These 
are linked to the public R&D policy through a system of basic and strategic funding. The 
point here is that the recent and current debate point to the possibility of this sector being to 
big.65 The R&D department of this ministry has typically held that position. However, by 
recent policy developments, universities and colleges have been met with increasing demands 
for more external funding aside the funding received from the ministry. This has led the 
institutions in many cases to establish their own applied R&D institutions generally in 
                                                 
64  Riksrevisjonen letter from Per Scott and Maggi Vineshaugen Rødvik to RCN, dated 3 March 2000, 
reference S.2 2000/627 MVR/WSC 
65 This debate tends to overlook the fact that many countries have a similar size, but organised as units of public 
institutions and therefore more invisible in the institutional landscape.  
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competition with the research institute sector. The development has been encouraged by the 
other main department in the ministry, the department for universities and colleges. Hence, it 
is fair to say that the left hand does not know what the right hand does.  
 
The story behind this seemingly lack of co-ordination is in simple terms as follows: Through 
the late 1990’s the political pressure for increased external funding for universities and 
colleges increased, partly to enhance their economic vitality and reduce the dependence on 
public funding through the state budget. The department for R&D affairs observed that this 
would lead to contradictions in the institutional as described above, but chose to downplay the 
possible internal conflict in the ministry. This was done to better engage in the struggle with 
the Ministry of Finance as this was seen as more important for overall R&D policies. Further, 
there is an important difference between the two sister departments, as the R&D department 
has its roots and rationale in developing R&D policy, but had no administrative responsibility 
for external institutions. The department for universities and colleges, on the other hand, was 
established with the explicit rationale to ensure the administration of the external institutions. 
It was preoccupied with the task of managing the resources for these institutions, and hence 
took on the role of being the protector of them. Currently, the division between the two has 
been reduced, but the example about the consequences of external funding illustrates very 
well how policies interact, and how easily they may be left un-coordinated.  
 
5.4. Innovating a new policy: The case of the tax credit scheme 
The dynamics of policy making often take place within the context of tensions between policy 
agendas or orientations. This was certainly the case in the development of the SkatteFUNN or 
the tax credit scheme (see Kaloudis 2004 for a complete analysis). The market model of 
conservatives or liberals has typically been opposed by the welfare model of the left. The 
tensions that often arise concerns whether to choose market models in promoting R&D 
investments, i.e. using tax breaks, or relying on direct measures through R&D support 
programmes. In addition this, there is often a tension concerning the use of the tax system for 
various purposes in general, often not following strict part lines.  
 
 
 
 
Chronologically, the history of introduction and implementation of SkatteFUNN in Norway 
may be divided in three periods:  
1. The first period started officially with the nomination of an expert commission 
(Hervik-commission), 23rd of March 1999, with a mandate from the Ministry of Trade 
Box 1: What is SkatteFUNN? 
SkatteFUNN is a tax credit measure for enhancing R&D investments in Norway.  
- Small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) are the primary recipient of this 
measure, with the right to claim 20 per cent of their expenses on internal 
R&D-projects within a predetermined baseline of 4 million NOK each, or 8 
million NOK if the R&D project involves collaboration with an approvable 
R&D institution.  
- From 2003 all businesses are eligible to receive tax credits.  
The Research Council of Norway (RCN) has to approve that the project falls within 
the definitions of an R&D activity. 
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and Industry (NHD), in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance (FIN) and the 
Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs (KUF) to assess measures to 
enhance R&D-activities in Norway. This period ends on 8th of March 2000, when the 
committee’s final report was formally delivered to the minister of NHD.  
2. The period after the 8th of March lasts until the implementation of the measure in 
October 2002. This period is characterized by intense policy maneuvers about how the 
suggestions from Hervik-commission may be implemented. Initially, under the period 
of the Labor party minority government (government Stoltenberg), a measure for 
subsidizing firms’ purchase of R&D services from R&D institutions with a predefined 
budgetary limit (FUNN) was introduced in 2001. During the period 2001-2002 
competing agendas of political parties and a shift of government in October 2001 
(Bondevik II) resulted in the phasing out of FUNN and in the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN. Inputs and initiatives from the responsible ministries, in particular FIN, 
KUF and NHD played also an important role in shaping the FUNN and SkatteFUNN.  
3. The period after the implementation of the SkatteFUNN is characterized by a period of 
adjustment. As predicted by the Ministry of Finance, businesses immediately 
embraced the SkatteFUNN measure. R&D tax credit claims in 2002 surpassed 700 
million NOK. In comparison, the entire budget of the Research Council of Norway for 
stimulating R&D and innovation in 2002 was about 600 million NOK. On the other 
hand, because of the popularity of SkatteFUNN, the tax revenue loss for the 
Norwegian state has been understood as considerable. This triggered the need to limit 
funding to direct measures for enhancing R&D and innovation as a response to the 
principle of an austere fiscal policy due to the phasing out of oil revenues 
(handelregelen) 
 
The main recommendations of Hervik-commission were:  
- The introduction of a new tax-credit measure enabling small and medium size firms 
to claim a deduction of a 25 per cent of maximum 4 million NOK R&D expenditures 
from their tax bills. This upper limit can increase to 8 million NOK if the R&D-
project involves collaboration with an R&D institution.  In case of negative balance 
sheet, companies receive an allowance equal to the tax credit. The Research Council 
of Norway (RCN) has to approve that the project falls within the definitions of an 
R&D activity before the firm has the right to a tax credit. There was a disagreement in 
the commission about whether the new measure should be practiced as tax credits or 
as R&D subsidies. The majority of the Commission voted for the tax credit solution. 
The chairman of the Commission, prof. Arild Hervik, together with two other 
members of the Commission voted for the subsidy solution.  
- In addition to the introduction of this new measure, the Commission recommended a 
500 million NOK increase in funding of strategic and marked oriented R&D 
programs administrated by RCN. However, the Commission proclaimed that the 
content of these programs should be adjusted in order to achieve good synergies with 
the new measure.  
- The funding of risk-taking loans as well as seed-money to start ups, administered by 
The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), should be 
increased. 
- The Commission recommended a series of other measures encompassing the entire 
national system of innovation, but these recommendations are not so relevant to the 
theme of this paper.  
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However, a shift in government soon after to a Labor party government led to the rejection of 
using the tax system and to an introduction of a subsidy scheme. Soon after the current 
government took over, representing a political philosophy more in line with the market model, 
an introduced a tax base scheme, but even more comprehensive than what the Hervik 
commission had proposed, embracing all firms. 
 
The interesting issue is how the introduction of ths innovation policy instrument contrasts 
with some key arguments on the tax system. Formally, the arguments against a tax credit 
scheme was that the new measure represents a real expense for the State and , therefore, that it 
should be treated as an expense in budgetary terms. This argument refers to a subsidy measure 
administrated exclusively by RCN and not to a tax credit measure.  
 
Furthermore, a subsidy measure could be administered by RCN without the unnecessary and 
inefficient involvement of tax authorities. Furthermore, it was argued that businesses would 
appreciate a swift subsidy payment through RCN compared to a tax credit realized after a 
considerable time interval. Finally, in principle, it is not recommended to impose such tax 
credits on the tax system because this leads to a non-neutral tax system. A non-neutral tax 
system, according to economic theory, distorts optimal investment decision making in private 
sector (see Skatteutvalget 2003: 61). 
 
There are reasons to believe that the real worry of the Ministry of Finance was that firms’ 
statutory right to tax credits may result in a substantial (and in worst case uncontrollable) loss 
of tax revenues. A subsidy measure, administered by RCN, could, if necessary, be framed inn 
by defining some maximum upper budgetary limits to SkatteFUNN in the annual State 
budget. In other words, a tax credit scheme would escape the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. A subsidy scheme was easier to manage and to bring it under the Ministry’s 
budgetary control if necessary.  
 
On the other hand, the SkatteFUNN was seen as the main instrument to achieve the overall 
goal of reaching a level of R&D investment, measured as share of national GDP, equal to that 
of OECD average within a five year period. This goal, which had the support of the 
government parties as well as most parties in parliament, necessitated a rapid and substantial 
increase of R&D investments especially in the private sector. A tax credit scheme is less 
likely to be framed in budgetary terms compared to a subsidy scheme. And the unrestrained 
use of SkatteFUNN by the private sector was considered as a precondition for reaching the 
OECD average R&D level of investments.  
 
The real shaping of SkatteFUNN took not place in the parties, but in the civil service, 
especially in negotiations between the relevant ministries. During the second half of the 
1990’s the Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs was struggling hard to get 
increases in public investments in R&D and in national R&D investments in general. So did 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, although they focused exclusively on R&D of relevance 
to the business sector. 
 
They did not succeed. The Ministry of Finance proposed substantial cuts in the public R&D 
investments, and the two pro-R&D ministries had to struggle to keep the funding lines they 
already had allowable. The Ministry of Finance did not accept the arguments presented by the 
policy advisers in the Ministry of Education and Research, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
and other ministries with substantial R&D portfolios seeing R&D and innovation as the 
driving force of economic growth. 
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The Ministry of Education and Research proposed the establishment of a special fund for long 
term research and innovation, the proceeds of which could not be touched by the Ministry of 
Finance. The Ministry of Trade and Industry was given the task of working for a genuine tax 
incentive, which – of course – would also be outside the control of the Ministry of Finance. 
By combining these two measures, the proponents of R&D could hope to gain more funding 
for public R&D (through the fund) and private R&D investments (through the tax incentive 
scheme). 
 
It could perfectly well be that the policy advisers and civil servants in the “pro-R&D” 
ministries originally preferred other solutions, seeing the weaknesses of both approaches. 
However, given their negative experiences in the annual budget negotiations with the Ministry 
of Finance, a tax credit scheme would seem to be an alternative strategy to bypass the 
objections of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
5.5. The need for long term perspectives: The case of the fund for 
research and innovation 
As will also be discussed further below in the context of the state budgets and the ministry of 
finance in the co-ordination process, there has in recent years been an ever increasing 
tendency to more “short-termism” in Norwegian policy making. Further, the sector principle 
was in the late 1990’s seen as a potential source of government failure for policy areas that 
requited a more long term perspective. As the government in the 1999 white paper on 
research made a commitment to increase the R&D expenditures by 5% yearly, it ensured this 
by installing a funding mechanism that literally cheated the short term prioritisation logic of 
state budgets. The solution was the fund for research and innovation, or generally the 
Research Fund which was set up with a capital base of 3 BNOK, whose earnings should be 
used to fund research. The capital base has been increased in subsequent budget years. The 
fund came also to replace a less stable funding for research through a specific public lottery 
scheme. It is notable that Research Fund was initiated by what many observers held as the 
first research minister in decades (Mr Lilletun) who saw the need for long term investment, 
implying that ministers of science and education have been mostly occupied with educational 
matters. Hence, the case underlines the importance of personal characteristics and ambitions 
of ministers in question. 
 
The fund is currently (for the year 2003) earning 793 mill NOK from a capital base of 15.8 
BNOK. 1/3 of that is devoted to universities and colleges, while the RCN retains the rest (see 
also below). Although the priorities change according to strategic decisions in RCN, the 
research part of the fund is crudely allocated to the following priority areas (2002 numbers): 
 
• Quality enhancing initiatives (including Centres of Excellence) with some 175 
MNOK; 
• Large, long term initiatives or programmes (270 MNOK, like functional genome 
research, cross sectoral competence areas, long term programmes like petroleum 
research, material research, biospecter research linguistics and technology, polar 
climate research, modernisation of the public sector, and basic deceases; 
• Thematic priorities in the white paper of 1999 (58 MNOK). 
 
However, there are some dilemmas concerning this new mechanism for increased long term 
priority of research. Firstly, the prioritization of the fund was meant to channel funding to 
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research, mainly basic research that was seen as having been under-prioritized. Instead, the 
fund was increasingly used to finance another reform, the one called the quality reform in 
universities and colleges. Secondly, and this is not so much a problem as an illustration of the 
fund being a solution to later defined problems, the fund became the available source of 
funding for the new Centres of Excellence, as scheme that was initiated in 2002 to enhance 
scientific quality in selected areas. Thirdly, and this is possibly the most interesting feature, 
the fund is managed by RCN, and hence reinforcing what some observers call a monolithic 
structure of research funding in Norway. In other words, as the fund was established, there 
was no policy in place to ensure a funding diversity in the system, and the fund is generally 
subsumed under the RCN’s priorities. Fourthly, as the earnings from the fund is defined as 
part of the state budget and thus in the realms of the ministry of Finance, there are some 
uncertainties as to whether the fund represents a source of fresh money (see Sejerstad 2001). 
 
As a concluding remark, the fund is an interesting illustration of a well meant mechanism for 
additional or supplementing research funds, but is institutionalised under the umbrella of RCN 
and thus subsumed under the “monolithic” umbrella of this single research council. Still, the 
fund helped significantly to improve the long term allocation and prioritization of research 
funding.  
 
5.6. Innovation in fish farming: Different agendas from different 
ministries 
Firms and industries may typically be seen as a nexus of influences from various 
governmental policies. These may or may not be well co-ordinated. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that these policies represent instrumental, easy-to-co-ordinate priorities. 
Rather, they may reflect deeper concerns and traditions in various ministries that lead to a 
policy environment for a given industry that is both complex and inconsistent.  
 
This is well illustrated in one of the studies in MONIT on how innovation in fish farming is 
influenced by a set of partly inconsistent and conflicting cultural preferences, priorities and 
mentalities in policy. Fig 13 shows the interaction on the industry level of four participating 
ministries in the development of the fish farming sector in Norway (Ørstavik 2004). 
 
This diverse focus is supported by a sector-specific knowledge base typically organised in 
research institutes and agencies that are linked to the agendas of their principals (ibid). Hence, 
the conflicting agendas are not only a ministerial challenge of integration, but a structural 
challenge of providing coherence in the knowledge base used for developing policy for such a 
sector.  
 
Lastly, the results from this study visualize the difficulties in creating a cross-ministerial 
strategy for innovation policy, and the problems inherent in perceiving co-ordination as a 
technical activity when agendas differ the way they do in this case.  
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Fig 13: Conflicting agendas for an emerging industry 
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5.6. Setting a new agenda? The Government’s plan for a coherent 
innovation policy66 
5.6.1. Introduction 
Responding to various pressures, the Government set out in 2002 to develop an action plan 
for innovation policy.  This initiative was in particular motivated by two drivers: First the 
Government had been criticised for a lack of industrial policy and relying only on what many 
critics termed “old-fashioned”, hands-off market-failure policy with no long term perspective 
in meeting the structural challenges facing the Norwegian economy in a post-petroleum era. 
Second, a key political challenge, often referred to as the “shark’s jaws”, was the future 
discrepancy between the flattening out and even reduction of state revenues from the 
petroleum activity and the increasing welfare expenditures to be met by the state. This section 
explores the emergence of this new agenda and to what extent it is linked to subsequent stages 
of the policy cycle.   
 
                                                 
66 This section is based partly on Mariussen, Å. and Fraas. M.: Development of the entire country: Regional and 
innovation policy co-ordination in Norway. Report on the MONIT regional study, draft, STEP-Centre of 
Innovation Research, Oslo, 2004. 
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5.6.2. Which agenda? 
How was a “holistic” innovation policy to be understood?  The SEM declaration of the 
Government of 2001 explicitly referred to the OECD indicators of national expenditures on 
R&D.  GERD is a measure of public and private investments in research and technological 
development, as a share of gross national product.  Throughout the 1990s, GERD had an 
important role in countries with an offensive R&D policy, like Sweden, Finland, and Korea.  
In these countries, both public and private spending on R&D is high.  High public R&D 
spending is supporting knowledge development in new industries, where private actors are 
following research oriented competitive strategies – and accordingly are investing heavily in 
R&D.  The combination of these factors results in a high over-all level of R&D spending.  
Throughout the 1990s, it also resulted in the development of regional clusters in university 
and industrial cities, where public spending on universities and basic research was 
successfully combined with private investments in industrial R&D, exploiting regional labour 
markets with highly educated young people.  This public – private dynamic was often 
supported by local and regional planning, known as regional cluster policies.  It led to growth 
in capital and medium sized university cities, as well as high GERD levels. In Norway, this 
industrial dynamic was not initiated.  This was the problem referred to by the SEM 
declaration.   
 
However, a high GERD level is an outcome of a specific form of interaction between public 
and private partners.  The absence of this dynamic in the case of Norway clearly had to do not 
just with lack of public investments in research, but also in the structure – and strategic 
orientation - of Norwegian private industries.  Most private Norwegian firms – and in 
particular large firms in the core national clusters, petroleum, maritime and marine industries - 
are not competing to create new science driven products and industries.  Instead, innovation 
strategies are often focussing on a higher level of efficiency in processes based on natural 
resources.  Norway has developed sophisticated supplier industries, for example in machine 
and engineering industry, as well as highly sophisticated bio-technologies, serving the users in 
the petroleum industry, shipping, marine aquaculture, and fishing.  These industries provide 
advanced technological products to the receiving industries.  An important source of funding 
is public investments in industry-oriented R&D, through the Research Council of Norway.  
 
The specialization of the Norwegian marine – maritime – petroleum clusters in the direction 
of process efficiency did not motivate these big private actors in the Norwegian industries to 
invest as heavily and directly in R&D as their counterparts in for example Swedish and 
Finnish ICT industries did.  During the 1990s, this disjunction in the Norwegian innovation 
system efficiently aborted the initiation of the public – private synergy in promoting R&D 
investments which characterized the leading OECD countries.  Instead of a positive spiral of 
public and private investments, leading to the development of new high tech industries, the 
Norwegian innovation system is locked into a negative spiral, where lack of private R&D 
investments is used as an argument to avoid public investments.67   
 
One may have thought that the structurally determined lack of firms with entrepreneurial or 
research driven strategies of competition could be seen as a problem.  On the contrary, this 
somewhat reluctant attitude among the big industrial actors soon became an argument against 
                                                 
67 We are not suggesting that copying the Swedish or Finnish pattern would have been wise. For example, the 
enormous concentration of R&D in a few firms in Sweden is both unfeasible and irrelevant in the Norwegian 
system, and possibly even ineffective in the Swedish. 
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the public sector in going in an OECD direction.  If private actors are not investing in R&D, 
why should the public sector do it?    
 
When the problem emerged on the agenda through the SEM declaration, it is not surprising 
that the initiative to move further was made by the Minister of Research and Education, and 
the Government’s Research Committee.  The Minister, Kristin Clemet (Conservative), was a 
former deputy director of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO).  As 
the leader of the Research Committee she initiated a cross-ministerial process that continued 
with the process of a new “holistic” Norwegian innovation policy led by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry.   
 
Given the fact that the initiative came from the science and research sector, one may have 
expected an understanding of innovation inspired from the OECD emphasis on new high 
technologies, such as ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc – and a corresponding thrust in 
the direction of regional clusters in university cities, copying the “OECD success story”. 
 
On the contrary, in the debate which followed, it soon became clear that the dominating 
perception of innovation in the core group of people working on coordination was more in the 
direction of innovation policy interpreted as a new form of cross-sector industrial 
development policy.  It was new job creation, rather than new path creation – i.e. creation of 
new science based growth industries - which was the focus.   
 
As it were, the expansion of the scope of innovation policy, which was implied in the 
reference to “holistic” policies, tended to reduce the significance of R&D policy.  Not 
surprisingly, then, the responsibility for the development of a new “holistic” innovation policy 
was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the summer of 2002.  This move 
tended to draw attention in the direction of existing industries which are the major clients for 
industrial policy operators.  A key focus became the commercialization phase of the 
knowledge conversion process, rather than on science based knowledge creation, and new 
path creation.   
 
This focus tended to give the work on innovation policy a somewhat incremental point of 
departure.  A Swedish consulting company was asked to make an analysis of the Norwegian 
innovation system.  This analysis did result is some specific recommendations, which were 
referred to in the plan.  However, the over-all point of departure for innovation policy 
development was not analytic, but administrative.  Horizontal innovation policy was 
interpreted as an upgraded industrial policy – on a cross sector basis. Needless to say, because 
this placed the administrators in the leading role, the policy making approach taken tended to 
be incremental.   
 
The minister – level coordinating group had an administrative cross sector secretariat, a HIP 
committee, the objective of which was to develop an action plan.  It was supplemented with 
thematic groups.  
 
Most of the ministries were involved in this work.  The objective was to develop a policy that 
encompasses more than the “traditional” innovation ministries of Trade and Industry, 
Education and Research and the Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development.  
The development of the plan was characterized by horizontal dialogues and hearings between 
sector ministries, where the development of the understanding and definition of the new 
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policy was debated.  Not surprisingly, this approach stirred up several conflicts of 
understanding and definition within and between the sectors.   
 
The interaction undertaken in this process was time-consuming, and sometimes frustrating, as 
there was resistance against the new policy initiative from several partners in the sectors.  
Sector ministries mobilised arguments against the new policy approach – to defend their 
objectives and modes of operation.  There was also a keen interest in the process from the 
level of the ministers, who were personally engaged.  Accordingly, the process did not 
produce the needed consensus in terms of developing an analytical basis of the new policy.   
 
These debates led to a document which was published in 2003, titled “From idea to value” 
(Fra ide til verdi). Failing to achieve a consensus-based, implementable action plan, it was 
emphasized that the document was a start of a longer process.   
 
5.6.3. Loosing coherence: Towards prioritization and implementation 
The document specified that it was an initiation of a process which would continue.  The next 
step came shortly after the publication, and it gave the development a more operational – and 
somewhat different direction.  This was the Government Conference of February 10.  Here, 
the innovation policy of the government was presented.  This policy was a step further – to 
some extent in a new direction, as compared to the previous plan. 
 
The 10 February conference took as a point of departure three major challenges 
 
• Increased international competition, globalization, and technological development  
• Reduced production in the core Norwegian industry, petroleum and natural gas,  
• Increased costs in maintaining the national welfare and pension system (the shark’s 
jaw).    
 
The emphasis was a bottom up mobilization: 
 
“The government recognizes clearly that innovation policy must be bottom-up.   
 
Innovation takes place in firms and markets, where people meet.  Innovation may also 
take place in cooperation with other firms and with actors within research and 
education.  But also local authorities are important to enable innovation.  Much may 
be achieved through a right attitude in a municipality.  (…) we also have given the 
county council (fylkeskommune) a new responsibility to enable industrial 
development.”  (Prime Minister Bondevik, 10 February 2004)  
 
In this way the government strategy was more oriented towards regional policy than the plan 
presented from the administration.  The over all approach was followed up by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, who stated that   
 
“To ensure our value creation, we must mobilize a common effort in the entire 
country” 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry launched 8 projects (later to be extended by 2): 
 
• The petroleum and maritime cluster.  This project is targeting the core national cluster 
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• Commercialization of research, with a focus on a leading regional cluster in the 
“technology capital” of Trondheim 
• Northern-Norway – which is a territorially oriented project targeting job creation in 
peripheral areas 
• The industrial cluster Kongsberg-Grenland-Vestfold (a regional cluster)  
• The Interior, a territorially oriented project to develop specific industries in agriculture 
and forestry 
• The capital city and regional centers, a project for city and regional development 
• Entrepreneurship 
• Innovation in services 
 
However, these projects were not based on key priorities in the earlier plan, nor were they a 
result of a strategic process of prioritization. They were selected through an informal process 
in which the minister basically made a choice. Hence, there is a weak link between the agenda 
setting as laid down in the earlier problem identification and plan, and the priorities that came 
of the process.  
 
This spilled over into the implementation phase: First, the Government chose its own 
ministries to manage the implementation, giving a marginal role to the implementation 
agencies like RCN and Innovation Norway. This represents a solution contrary to earlier 
practice in which ministries do not have any explicit competence in project management. In 
fact, it runs contrary to the Government’s own principle of public management as one of 
contracting out tasks that were not seen as key to the Government’s role. 
 
Second, the as key civil servants were not part of the prioritization process, and disagreed 
with many of the outcomes, they tended to resist the implementation even to the point of 
communicating negatively about the likely realisation and funding of these projects, to the 
detriment of both internal confidence in the ministries, as well as external confidence among 
the business community. It should be noted that the key ministry responsible for the 
innovation policy, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, is dominated by a strong market 
failure/market efficiency focus in its traditional economic policy. 
 
Third, the loss of confidence was reinforced as one the implementing agencies, Innovation 
Norway, received dramatic cuts in its budget in the process of the half-yearly state budget 
revision in June 2004. The proposal for a cut (later “saved” by the opposition in Parliament), 
severely undermined the over all confidence in the new innovation policy vision of the 
Government. This problem came on top of a message of uncertainty in the conference of 
February 10: The minister of trade and industry communicated that the most important role of 
the Government in this innovation policy was “to get out of the way” of private industry, 
hence substantiating a hands-off position vis-à-vis the market. 
 
5.6.4. Inherent contradictions in the policy cycle: A summary analysis 
How can the initiation and early implementation of the Government’s plan for a 
comprehensive innovation policy be assessed? What may explain the apparent problems that 
this otherwise timely and important initiative met? We try in this concluding section to bring 
together some dimensions that, linked to material elsewhere in this report, may put the plan in 
perspective. It should be added that a specific outcome of this process, the Government’s 
Committee for Innovation Policy (RIU) will be assessed in chapter 6 as a co-ordination 
structure. 
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The external threat: Raising the right agenda? 
The perception of the external challenge to Norwegian economy as outlined in the document 
is mostly long term and related to the widening divide between a long-term decline of 
petroleum revenues and increased welfare expenditure.  The challenge is structural, and the 
implication would have been to identify a structural solution, like science-based creation of 
new industries or long term structural change.  This is not the case, rather, a shorter term 
approach of industrial policy and new job-creation became the main focus.   
 
Innovation policy v. s. economic policy  
Whereas economic policy in Norway has a focus on general framework conditions promoting 
entrepreneurship and industrial development, some protagonists of innovation policy argued 
for the need to make an emphasis on specific, selected industries, like the existing strong 
clusters – or, alternatively, new high technologies.   
 
This stirred up a debate on “industry neutrality” as a guiding principle in economy policy.  
The solution to this conflict is balanced in the stated “vision of the government” in the 
introduction to the document:  
 
Norway should be one of the most creative countries in the world, where firms and 
people with courage and creativity have good opportunities to develop profitable 
activities.  In important areas, Norway will be leading internationally when it comes 
to knowledge, technology, and value creation.   
 
The orientation towards general or “neutral” industrial policies to promote industrial 
development and entrepreneurship and job creation across all industrial sectors is obvious 
through the first sentence.  The second sentence balances this approach in the direction of 
national specialization, without specifying what this specialization is.    
 
Innovation policy v. s. R&D policy 
To those who may have expected this document to be in line with the OECD approach of the 
SEM declaration, it came as a surprise.  The document did include an argument for innovation 
policy, as well as a summary of the debates between and within sectors as to how innovation 
policy was to be understood and defined.   However, to the extent that the document refers to 
networks of innovative firms, the text is going to great lengths is rejecting the significance of 
R&D policies. 
   
Innovative firms are learning firms.  It is firms who develop or access the new 
competence necessary for renewal, either from customers or suppliers, various public 
or private knowledge institutions, private consultancies, or from public industrial 
policy agencies. (Fra Ide til Verdi, page 9)  
 
This statement is a factual description of typical incremental innovation processes in core 
Norwegian industries, in line with findings from innovation research in Norway.  Importantly, 
the document does not make a problem out of this state of affairs. This is surprising in the 
context of the discussion on what innovation is: 
 
Innovation builds on new knowledge and new combinations of existing knowledge.  
New knowledge may be generated from practical experiences or through systematic 
research and development. (Fra Ide til Verdi, page 9)    
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When it comes to measures, four priorities are mentioned: 
 
• Educational institutions which produce and disseminate relevant knowledge on an 
high international level 
• Better competence in natural sciences and mathematics 
• Strengthen life-long learning and the capacity of firms to apply knowledge in practice 
• Increase knowledge flows between industry and milieus of knowledge and 
competence, regionally, nationally and internationally 
   
The section on “research, development, and commercialization” includes references to  
 
• Work to get Norway to the OECD average in GERD within 2005 
• Increased quality and internationalization in Norwegian research 
• Stimulate increased research in private industries (through a tax deduction scheme) 
• Stimulate commercialization of results of research 
• Stimulate better interaction between knowledge institutions and private industrial 
actors 
 
In sum, the emphasis on knowledge diffusion and application vrs knowledge creation is well 
balanced: 
 
An increased emphasis on R&D to promote innovation must be accompanied with 
increased emphasis on commercialization of research results. (Fra Ide til Verdi, page 
27 
 
The analysis presented on why Norway has such an over-all low level of R&D does 
emphasize the industrial structure.  The answer to this problem is, however, incremental.  
There is no focus on the need to create new R&D-intensive industries.  On the contrary, most 
of the core measures, such as a tax deduction system for private investments in R&D, and 
programmes to promote public R&D – private industry networking, are incremental.   
 
Regional policy   
The plan document does not have any specific section on regional policy.  Instead, regional 
policy considerations are referred to throughout the entire document.  In the introduction, the 
potential problematic link between a science driven innovation policy and regional policy is 
presented:  
 
There are significant regional differences when it comes to the industrial efforts 
towards development, growth, and innovation.  Differences in industrial structure, 
differences in distances to important markets and knowledge milieus may also 
generate different preconditions for innovation.  An increased transformation from 
capital- and labour intensive industries towards knowledge intensive industries may 
also lead to a lower level of activity in the periphery”.    
  
This obviously is at odds with the over all objective of the government regional policy, which 
is  
 
,,to secure population, value creation and sustainable local communities all over the 
country (The SEM declaration, page 37) 
 69
 
Hence, throughout “Fra Ide til Verdi”, several references are made to various aspects of 
regional policy, such as: 
 
• The new objective of the Norwegian Research Council, to support R&D all over the 
country, through regional offices 
• The regional development role of educational institutions and regional universities 
 
Competing paradigms 
The general emphasis of “Fra Ide til Verdi” is a long-term understanding of the global threat 
to Norwegian economy.  Even though more short-term challenges are mentioned, often 
referred to in terms which are quite similar to general industrial development policies, it is the 
long term structural challenge that is identified.   
   
• No analysis of the national innovation system.  Even though several references are 
made throughout the document of properties of the Norwegian industry and 
innovation system, no comprehensive theoretically informed analysis of the National 
system of innovation is presented.  Instead, references are ad hoc – and related to 
specific problems, such as lacking private investments in R&D, explained through 
loose references to industrial structure.  This incremental approach may be expected, 
given the theoretical dispute over the field.  The field of innovation policy was, and 
still is, characterized by a conflict between on one hand innovation theorists, on the 
other hand neo-classical economy theorists.  Given this theoretical conflict, assuming 
an analytical point of departure for policy development was a lost option.   
• An eclectic operational approach.  The other option – which was chosen, was an 
administrative, eclectic approach. The horizontal or holistic notions of innovation 
policy are feeding into a general discussion of the framework conditions for 
Norwegian industry.  On this basis, long lists of measures are presented.  Several of 
these measures are quite similar to industrial policy discussions in general.  
• The definition of innovation policy is a contested area.  In the analysis of the 
document, outcomes of conflicts with other sectors are referred to several times, as 
compromises of conflicting interests between innovation policy and other policy 
fields.  These outcomes contribute to limiting the scope of innovation policy. They 
include 
o R&D policy, where the importance of basic research and knowledge 
dissemination through education and the labour market is emphasized. 
o Regional policy, where the potential conflict between a research driven 
innovation policy approach – and regional policy spatial redistribution, was 
emphasized 
o Economic policy, as the document did not contribute to solving the inherent 
conflict within Norwegian economic policy, between on one hand improving 
general framework conditions for industry through reducing public spending, 
on the other hand public investments to break the spiral reducing R&D 
investments in Norway, preventing new path creation. 
• The new innovation policy represents an inherent challenge to the existing policy 
making paradigm in economic and innovation policy. The general arguments for 
R&D are well founded, but weakly linked to long term structural choices. To some 
extent we see two paradigms competing: First, the traditional, strong and well-
founded paradigm of market efficiency and market failure, implying a focus on 
framework conditions and an ideologically based, clear interface between the state 
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and the market. This implies also a state that “gets out of the way” and interferes in 
markets only if these are distorted. Second, a more dynamic, long term paradigm 
based on the presumed need to make choices concerning structural development, a 
flexible and pragmatic understanding of the interface between the state and the 
market, and integration between policy areas.             
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6. Co-ordination of policy formulation and implementation 
 
6.1. Indicators of horizontalization 
Measuring horizontalisation in national STI policies is a challenging task. So far there is no 
established set of indicators for this. The challenge in this part of MONIT is to grasp 
qualitative aspects of policy in a meaningful system of metrics. There is a growing number of 
studies on qualitative indicators for policy action. This body of knowledge can be helpful for 
MONIT. However, one should be aware of the obvious limitations of such indicators.  
 
The Norwegian organization of STI policies is in this respect an interesting case study for 
several reasons. Firstly, there is a strong and long tradition of a sector-oriented R&D and 
innovation funding policy, meaning that each ministry has a particular responsibility to fund 
research relevant to ministries’ objectives. This decentralized pattern of public R&D funding 
has recently been viewed as a major hindrance for an overall harmonisation of the Norwegian 
innovation policy efforts (Arnold, 2001).  
 
Secondly, the Research Council of Norway was established in 1993, by merging Norway’s 
existing 5 research councils. The main coordination responsibility of national STI-policies is 
hence delegated to the Research Council of Norway, despite the principle of sector-oriented 
R&D and innovation funding policy. A distribution of responsibilities on the policy level is 
attempted re-integrated on the implementation level.  
 
Therefore, there is a tension between ministries’ sector-oriented R&D funding policies and a 
centralized Research Council of Norway which complicates the horizontalisation efforts of 
national STI- policies in Norway. In the following we shall briefly present some basic 
indicators and facts about STI-funding policies in Norway.     
 
6.1.1. STI funding in Norway 
Figure 14 displays shares of R&D funding in the Norwegian innovation system the last 20 
years. In 1990’s there is a marginal change towards more private R&D funding relative to 
public sector. Figure 16 below displays the flows of public R&D funds in 2001.  
 
Figure 15 illustrates some of the dilemmas in coordinating ST-policies in Norway. Research 
Council of Norway (RCN) share of the total public R&D funding was 26 per cent in 2001. 
R&D direct subsidies to the private sector (as performing sector) are mainly channeled 
through other sources than RCN, mainly through The Norwegian Industrial and Regional 
Development Fund (SND). Collaboration between SND and RCN has been quite successful 
the last years and there are several concrete examples showing an increasing degree of 
intended complementarity between these two key institutions for innovation policy in 
Norway.  
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Fig 14:  R&D expenditure in Norway by source of funding. Shares of total R&D-funding 
(20,3 billion NOK in 2001). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01
Source: NIFU and Statistics Norway
Per cent
Private sector
Ministries
Research Council of Norway
Other sources
 
 
Fig 16: Public funding to performing sectors. 2001 (2003 data constructed later in 2004).  
 
  
 
 
Source:NIFU/SSB (General funds, government’s 
purchase of R&D not included) 
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Ministries funding of R&D performing institutions takes place either directly with funding 
allowances or through RCN/SND.  Figure 17 shows the breakdown of public R&D funding 
by ministries.  
 
Figure 16 illustrates the sector-oriented character of public R&D funding in Norway. Of 
course the most important ministries for ST-policies in Norway are the Ministry of Education 
and Research and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, other ministries, such as, The 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Fisheries, etc. are important funding actors of R&D performed 
by research institutes and the private sector. Several studies of the Norwegian innovation 
system conclude that a better coordination between Ministry of Education and Research and 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry could be achieved.  
 
 
Figure 16: Norwegian public R&D-funding by ministries.2003. Project assignements 
excluded. Million NOK. 
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For a better understanding of the potential for an horizontal and coordinated ST-policy in 
Norway is important to know not only who are the main funding agencies, but also what kind 
of funds are channeled through the state budget. Table 2 below shows some of the main types 
of R&D funding in Norway in addition to ordinary R&D transfers via the state budget.  
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Table 2: Types of public funding of innovation in Norway  
Ministries' funding of R&D and innovation 
Funding of the Norwegian participation in international R&D organizations and in EU's research 
Research Fund (Forskningsfondet) 
Tax deductions of R&D costs (SkatteFUNN) 
Public procurement of technological products and services 
 
 
Norwegian participation in EU’s Framework programmes is seen as the main instrument for 
a more international oriented R&D activities in Norway and have had a remarkable direct and 
indirect effects on how modern innovation policy is performed in Norway. Not only R&D 
performers have been more exposed to international R&D collaboration, but also ministries 
and RCN has been exposed to international policy processes. From this point of view the 
Norwegian participation to EU’s research at a policy level have had a catalytic effect on the 
advancement of a more coordinated Norwegian ST-policies.   
 
Apart from the ordinary governmental R&D funding there is another important ST funding 
source in the Norwegian policy system. That is the Norwegian Research Fund of about 350 
million NOK in 2002. This type of funding is mostly earmarked for high-quality basic 
research, but it also provides funding to alleviate various ‘bottlenecks’ in the Norwegian 
innovation system (see Forskningsrådet 2003). This type of funding is of great interest in the 
future since it could be used as an instrument to achieve a better coordination within and 
between national ST-policies. Yet, it is too early to assess the long-run effects of the 
Norwegian Research Fund on the Norwegian innovation performance.  
 
Tax deductions for R&D expenditures is also a new policy measure in Norway, launched in 
October 2002,  and has been welcomed by many firms, most of them having a low R&D 
performance. A high-profile evaluation of the effects of this new policy measure is already 
under planning. A particular important issue in this evaluation is the direct and indirect effects 
of tax R&D deductions on the overall coordination of ST-policies.  
 
Last but not least is the question of how public procurement policies are managed and 
coordinated in Norway. To our knowledge there is a poor if any kind of coordination between 
state agencies and ministries with respect to procurements of high importance for the 
Norwegian innovation system. This is a key question, since the value public procurement in 
Norway amounts to 200 billion NOK per year. Although this figure includes all types of 
public procurements, it is almost certain that the value of procurements of innovation 
intensive products and services is much larger than the value of the total R&D public funding.    
   
6.1.2. Measuring coordination in innovation policy agendas  
Some few qualitative indicators may be introduced in order to address this question. These 
are:  
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- Importance and frequency of innovation white papers: There is no regular production of 
an innovation white paper, although innovation policy issues are included in white 
papers on R&D, industrial policy etc. 
 
- The Norwegian white paper on R&D policy is signed by the minister of education and 
research and is published every 4-6 years. The last white paper has been published in 
1998 (Stortingsmeld. Nr. 39, 1998-99).  
 
- A mechanism for regularly producing a government innovation policy agenda or 
innovation strategy. The Ministry of Education and Research is responsible for the 
overall R&D policies, for funding large parts of basic science in the universities and 
colleges, and for coordinating sectoral R&D policies. In this respect and at the 
governmental level there are two high level committees both chaired by the Ministry of 
Education and Research focusing on science and technology policy related issues: the 
inter-ministerial Research Forum for Government Officials (departementenes 
forskningsutvalg – DFU) and the Government’s Research Board (Regjeringens 
forskningsutvalg – RFU). DFU consists of high level civil servants in ministries with a 
substantial R&D-budget and its main responsibility is to discuss issues of organization 
of research and innovation policies, including R&D-budget. RFU consist of ministers in 
ministries with a substantial R&D-budget and its main responsibility is to prepare policy 
proposals for the cabinet.   
 
-  The number of ministries mentioning innovation in their mission statement: In Norway 
only the Ministry of Trade and Industry explicitly mentions innovation as its major 
objective. However, and as mentioned earlier, almost all ministries have and take 
seriously their responsibility for funding research (and innovation) falling within their 
cognitive domain (see for example Fiskeridepartementet 1998, Landbruksdepartementet 
2001, Miljøverndepartementet 2001). From this point of view one may say that in the 
Norwegian governmental system there is relative high awareness but, perhaps, little 
focus on ST policies.  
 
- Number of  STI-programmes are governed by more than one ministry? RCN identifies 
and implement a large number of multidisciplinary R&D-programmes. All these 
programmes are almost invariably discussed, negotiated, approved and funded by one or 
more ministries. Therefore, in important innovation areas, such as, biotechnology, ICT, 
nanotechnology, etc. there are many R&D-programmes funded jointly by many 
ministries. This again underlines the importance of a RCN as a coordinating actor of 
STI-policies in Norway, but highlights also the high degree of coordination costs for 
funding type of innovation not clearly defined within ministries jurisdiction.  
6.1.3. Co-ordination practices 
Before discussing the practical arrangements in place in the Norwegian system, some 
indications on the practices and behaviour of the governance system will be illustrated. From 
the questionnaire we are able to tap into participants’ experiences and assessments, and the 
results are given in fig. 17. 
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Fig 17: Co-ordination practices in innovation policy 
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A striking feature is that while the majority of the respondents were involved in the 
development of the Government’s plan for a comprehensive innovation policy (HIP), only 
some 35% assess that the HIP work led to improved collaboration with other departments or 
ministries. The existence of informal networks both within own organisation and beyond 
pervasive, but participation in systemic co-ordination processes within own organisation or 
across ministerial boundaries is quite mixed.   
 
 
6.2. Two levels of R&D policy co-ordination: The role of RFU and 
GFU 
R&D policy constitutes a core element in innovation policy. It is essentially cross-ministerial 
and is long term, and therefore subject to specific governance or co-ordination needs. In this 
context, two arrangements stand out as key to the co-ordination process. They are the 
Government’ research committee (RFU) and the ministries’ research committee (DFU), and 
should be seen as a response to co-ordination needs arising from the following tasks:  
 
a) White papers on research policy. Research policy is cross-ministerial, as illustrated 
earlier in the way each ministry, according the principle of sector responsibility, has 
the responsibility for research policy for its own sector, presuming that they know 
better than anyone else about long term knowledge needs in the sector. The white 
papers on research are typically produced every four years (the current situation is 5), 
and includes the need to exchange information, conduct discussions and dialogue, 
organising view points from people and organisations inside and outside government 
and the like. The work on white papers in the Norwegian system is relatively open, 
typically with inputs from stakeholders and experts, and could be seen as a functional 
alternative to research foresight processes which has not been conducted in Norway to 
any great extent for policy formulation purposes.  
b) Yearly state budgets (see further discussion below): This work contains co-ordination 
activities especially in case of growing budgets, as the additional budget from one year 
to the next needs to be prioritized and distributed across ministries. In this case the 
Ministry of Science and Education has a role in proposing to the Ministry of Finance 
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how a possible distribution should look like. In the case of no-growth or reduction, the 
co-ordination is essentially done by the Ministry of Finance in their budget balance 
activity, and the Ministry of Science and Education is not able or competent or 
intervene in other ministries budgets.  
c) The relationship to the RCN:  As RCN is funded by a whole range of ministries, and 
the interaction between the council and the ministries needs to be co-ordinated. 
 
6.2.1. RFU (the Government’s research committee) 
This committee is at the outset key to an over all political co-ordination of research policy. 
However, and this is a contradiction between objective needs and political priorities, it is not 
institutionalised as such. Every government makes its own decision about the RFU, and one 
government (the Jagland government in the mid-1990s) even chose to close it down, having 
other solutions in mind that did not materialize). Hence, the mandate is general, and 
reinvented for every government. It contains the general task of preparing research policy 
issues for discussion in Government. The composition varies, relative to the importance given 
to R&D by each government, to personal interests of ministers etc. But the key ministries are 
always member of the committee. An interesting point is the current coalition government’s 
decision to only allow less than 50 % of the ministries participate, to avoid a (party-based) 
decision making process ahead of the formal process in government as a collegium. The 
meetings are held according to need, typically 3-7 meetings a year. The Ministry of Science 
and Education is the secretariat and co-ordinates and prepares the agenda etc. It also co-
ordinates inputs from other ministries. 
 
It is also variable to what extent civil servants take part in these discussions. From a “back 
up” point of view, one should expect that this was a regular routine. However, for policy co-
ordination to take place without representatives from the individual ministries performing a 
strict sector based view, the ministers often take part alone. It should be noted that this 
political, or supra-ministerial, function is similar to the way the committees of deputy 
ministers perform (see below).  The RFU processes and performance vary, mostly with the 
degree of importance attached to the policy issues at hand.   
 
6.2.2. DFU (the ministries’ research committee) 
The DFU covers all ministries. It is no decision making body, and it is being led from the 
Ministry of Science and Education. In earlier times, under a different state budget regime, 
there was close contact between the two levels of co-ordination. However, with the current 
framework budgeting (see below), these two have been mostly decoupled.  
 
DFU meets 4-6 times a year, participants in are typically middle management, often 1-2 from 
each ministry, and DFU is used as a reference group during the work on white papers on 
research. DFU is an important body for the Ministry of Science and Education as it helps 
fulfil the co-ordination function assigned to the ministry. In the structural context of the 
Norwegian public administration, DFU co-ordinates through exchange of information 
between ministries, facilitating dialogue between them, 
 
In the context of DFU, there is an additional structure of ministries, in particular the two 
camps of “industrial ministries” like trade and industry, agriculture and fisheries, and “welfare 
ministries” like social affairs and health. These two camps resembles quite different outlook 
on R&D policy, they have very different traditions and cultures, making positions in the DFU 
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quire different. The Ministry of Science and Education has a better contact with the industry 
ministries, as the latter seem to have a more profound R&D policy as a means to achieve 
political goals. There is no policy integration at hand between the two camps, e.g. to let 
industrial R&D be better integrated in areas of health to enhance health technology and the 
relevant industrial development. Rather, such group structures to some extent compete to have 
their priorities and line of thinking embedded in the white papers. For example, the recent 
white paper on research had a tilt towards industrial issues while welfare issues were to a 
lesser extent on the agenda. Additionally, bilateral processes between ministries take place, as 
e.g. is currently the case between the ministries of Agriculture and of Fishery in their attempt 
to align their research policies.  
 
An additional feature of the work of DFU is its working group. To allow for better continuity 
and to be better able to deal with key policy matters, DFU has also constituted a smaller 
working group of some eight ministries. They meet more frequently than DFU itself, and 
focuses especially on policy issues arising from the interaction with RCN, e.g. priorities like 
large programmes. 
 
6.3. Committees of (deputy) ministers 
On major cross-sectoral policy issues, the government organise politically to leverage the co-
ordination of the issues at stake. One response may be to organise the work within specific 
committees of ministries, like spontaneous RFU’s. This became the response to the deep co-
ordination needs arising from the attempts to formulate a horizontal or coherent innovation 
policy in 2003 (HIP). As will be discussed elsewhere, this policy came out rather empty-
handed and constituted a will to act rather than substantive policy. Committees of ministers 
are generally difficult to assess, as they are dependent on ambitions, dedication, frequency of 
meetings and the nature of policy issues. Such committees are backed up by deputy ministries 
as a working group. For example, the HIP initiative was a new area in which the ministers 
participating had little experience, and it represented policy initiatives in which some major 
ministries felt uncomfortable, e.g. ministry of trade and industry. On well known policy 
issues, such committees may prove more fruitful. 
 
The more relevant co-ordination mechanism that is often put in place, are committees of 
deputy ministers (CDM). The Norwegian system of government is based on one minister for 
each ministry (which is frequently changing in numbers and structure due to reshuffling, with 
the inherent result of fragmentation), and 2-3 deputy ministers, each responsible for dedicated 
policy areas.  The CDM is typically initiated on the basis of a governmental decision which 
formalises the selection of ministries to participate, and the mandate and leadership. CDM has 
a key ministry as the “owner” and which also serves as the secretariat. The CDM meets 
frequently, often once a week, implying a tight working schedule. Based on lessons learned, 
the following seem to constitute a reasonable assessment of conditions for a positive impact if 
CDMs:  
 
• In case of difficult political questions (in particular in the context of a coalition 
government), there is a need to clarify these in government itself, and lay these 
clarifications down in the mandate, with the result that deputy ministers may more 
easily arrive at consensus. 
• A dedicated leader with legitimacy vis a vis the others in the group. 
• Ministerial ownership in the sense that ministries internalise the policy area as one of 
their own. 
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• The deputy ministries need to behave as politicians and not as representatives or 
defenders of sectoral interests of their own ministry. This means also that civil 
servants participating in the process need to be held in check. 
• Active participation is needed, and participation based on duty rather than ambition is 
detriment to the outcome.  
• Well known policy areas are better suited to this co-ordination mechanism, while new 
ones, like the HIP, needs more time for maturation and more substantial inputs to have 
an impact, as they may to a greater extent challenge the traditional policy priorities 
and values of the ministries in question.  
 
6.4. State budgets and the role of the Ministry of Finance 
The budgeting process and the Finance Ministry has been alluded to above, but are important 
components in innovation policy co-ordination and deserve a more extensive treatment. This 
is even more so the case as the budgeting procedures changed recently and contrary to 
expectations gave more elbowroom to the Ministry of Finance and less to sectoral ministries.  
 
Given the lack of long term budgeting, the yearly process for the state budget becomes a key 
ingredient in the innovation policy co-ordination. The process itself is best depicted by the 
R&D budgets, and according to the so-called sectoral principle in Norwegian governance, 
each ministry is responsible for the R&D for its own domain. The process itself overseen, if 
not steered, by the Ministry of Finance, which takes the role of keeping the budget balance 
decided by government.  
 
The co-ordination of R&D and innovation allocations were more easy in the former system 
than the current. Formerly, the process started with the development of an adjusted budget 
based on last year’s allocation adjusted by additional calculations. In addition, the various 
ministries presented new proposals, and the budgets were discussed in detail also in 
government. Although this was a rather messy process, this was not the case for the R&D 
budgets (Olsen 1997): 
 
• Typically, an R&D pool emerged, that is a total allotment for R&D 
• The proposals from the ministries were then assessed against the pool 
• The Ministry of Science and Education proposed a solution for distribution across 
ministries, thereby taking on a role as a mini-Ministry of Finance. This was then 
discussed and decided in co-ordinating bodies like DFU and RFU (see below).  
 
Hence, there was a system in place that ensured a reasonably coherent treatment of R&D 
budgets. This was helped by a decision in 1989 of 5% growth in R&D as well as a certain 
profile on these investments. R&D was given priority, contrary to what has been the case in 
subsequent years. 
 
More recently, a new system emerged, still in place, called framework budgeting. This system 
is organised through three governmental budget conferences: The first (called Halvorsbøle 
conference and takes place in March) includes the main priorities for next years budget based 
on proposals from ministries. As a preparation for this conference, the Ministry of Finance 
issues so-called R-papers, basically a list of budget cuts to retain a given budget balance. The 
interesting feature here is that contrary to what one may expect, the Ministry of Finance does 
not cut on the overall sum (in a framework mode) but directly on detailed posts in sectoral 
ministries’ budgets. Hence, the Ministry of Finance is deeply involved in substantial policy. 
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The key player in this conference is therefore the Ministry of Finance. The outcome of the 
conference is a set of preliminary budgets and some proposals that are held against a “profile 
pool” of new initiatives. 
 
Then there is the adjustment conference in May/June. The ministries have by then allocated 
the budget posts and often also proposed new ones. The Ministry of Finance is also here the 
key player. Cuts are suggested often with reference to the budget balance. The third 
conference is set in August, where the profile pool is distributed. 
 
For our purpose the main conclusion from this process is that ministries responsible for R&D 
and innovation policy areas have their influence reduced to the benefit of the Ministry of 
Finance. As R&D lost on the priority lists during the 1990s, R&D is now one of many areas 
each minister has to defend, compared to earlier where the overall pool received more 
strategic attention, including recommendations from RFU. 
 
An interesting feature of the recent developments in the budgeting process, is the erosion of 
long term perspectives, most notably the disappearance of the tradition long term programme 
issued by the ministry. For decades there was a system in place with the function to ensure 
long term planning in state budgeting. The ministry had at times even its own secretariat to 
perform this function. However, the viability of this system, or rather the steady tendency of 
having a marginal impact of the long term planning, led to the abandonment of the four year 
planning schedule. It is evident that this development also leads to greater degrees of freedom 
for the Ministry of Finance, as it assumes the strategic role for each yearly budget.68 It is also 
notable that the government as a collegium is weak vis a vis the Ministry of Finance. The 
government may at points in time communicate visions and strategies, e.g. on targets for 
R&D investments like reaching the OECD average. But the Ministry of Finance has a very 
high barrier in the way room is made available for such change in priorities. A new target by 
the government is not sufficient, and is even not seen as binding, if it is not backed by a 
formal government decision that explicitly implies that there will be sacrifices in other areas. 
This was in fact the case in the white paper on research from 1999 (no 39) in which the 
investment target was extensively discussed. Rather than choosing the fluctuating target of a 
share of GDP on the level of OECD average, which had been a loose target for a while, the 
government formulated a binding decision to raise the R&D expenditures by 5% every year 
over the period covered by the white paper (4 years).  This was largely followed up, and the 
logic of this is that the more expenditures are committed in this way, the less elbow room 
there is for the ministry of finance in the processes for the yearly state budget.   
 
6.5. Building agencies: Processes and outcomes in the case of the 
Research Council of Norway 
6.5.1. Introduction 
The Norwegian state is fragmented, contains more than a fair share of contradictions, and a 
part of this picture is the “agencification” of the governance system. The case of the Research 
                                                 
68 An interesting inconsistency in this case is that the ministry demands from the municipalities a four-year 
budget plan, and while the revenues of these to a great extent come from the government, the latter’s budget are 
decided on a one year basis, albeit long term allocations typically in the welfare sector.  
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Council of Norway (RCN) illustrates very well the complex political processes behind such a 
reform in the innovation policy governance domain, and is therefore discussed here.69  
 
The phenomenon of research councils; separating funding from research, first came into being 
immediately after the Second World War. The Norwegian Research Council for Scientific and 
Industrial research (NTNF), under the Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD), and the 
Norwegian Research Council for Agriculture (NLVF), under the Ministry of Agriculture (LD) 
was established in 1946. In 1949 a council for basic research was set up: the Norwegian 
Research Council for Science and the Humanities (NAVF). NAVF was organized in four sub-
councils: medical, natural science, social science and humanities. 
 
The council system was lively debated in the post-war period; the tasks and roles of the 
existing institutions, proposals to create new research councils and the co-ordination and co-
operation between the different councils. New sub-councils were established and reorganized. 
The universities were not content with their position under NAVF; they wanted to become 
more active in determining their own research policy. And, a series of committees on 
governmental level were put in place to advice on research policy. 
 
In 1970 a proposal was put forward to establish a single research council, but was turned 
down due to its “centralist” character. However, a need for a reform in the research council 
structure was repeated several times during the 1980s. The need for ‘strategic agencies’ was 
emphasized, including a capacity of mediating between the political and the institutional 
level. The relationship was handled through the ‘Langslet doctrine’ in the early 1980s, 
bringing in the principle of distance between ministries and research. The ministries roles 
were to define research budgets and not buy research needed to support policy development 
directly. 
  
In 1990 the Grøholt committee was set up to examine the research council structure. They 
reported in 1991 that there should be a single research council, organised in three strategic 
disciplinary councils; for life sciences, physical sciences and technology and culture and 
social science. The members of these Disciplinary Boards and the Executive Board should be 
appointed by the government, and the Ministry of education were to take over responsibility 
for the core funding from the other ministries. The sector principle would in that way be 
modified, and make room for a national research strategy. There should be a better integration 
of basic and applied research and a professionalized research management. Research councils 
should be central, neutral managers of interests, and research policy advice and 
implementation should be more clearly separated in a re-establishment of the research policy 
council (Forskningspolitisk råd). 
There was agreement on the general lines of the Grøholt report, but conflict on the divisional 
organisation. In February 1992 the major research ministries had reached a compromise upon 
the new research council; constituting in the six sub divisions (områdestyrer) that became the 
1993-organisational model: 
• The Bio-production and Processing Division (BF) 
• The Culture and Society Division (KS) 
• The Environment and Development Division (MU) 
                                                 
69 See also Remøe, S. and Røste, R. Agency level governance – the case of the Research Council of Norway. 
Report to the MONIT project, Oslo, STEP 2004, and reports from the evaluation of RCN by Technopolis 
(www.technopolis.com).  
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• The Industry and Energy Division (IE) 
• The Medicine and Health Division (MH) 
• The Science and Technology Division (NT) 
 
The government had some other proposals than the Grøholt committee regarding the 
institutional model. A white paper in June 1992 said that the Government should appoint the 
Executive Board, but that the Executive Board it self should appoint divisional boards. The 
Government was also of the opinion that the research policy council was not necessary, this 
should be a part of the tasks of the new research council. The White Paper emphasised in 
particular the unified nature of the council with the unified organisation of the council’s 
administration. RCN was formally established on the 1st of January 1993. 
6.5.2. RCN comes into being 
To understand the reasons and dynamics of RCN and its birth, there is a need to go back to 
the formative year of 1988. At that time there was general agreement that the system of 5 
research councils and additional policy bodies like the National Committee for Environmental 
research, the Committee for Development Research and eight steering committees for priority 
areas, was in great need of a major overhaul. The system was plagued by many overlaps, 
rivalries and unclear division of labour (Olsen 2000).  
 
Further, the political climate was ready for change. There was a readiness in the system to 
generate better conditions for innovation, and it was seen as “… important to make borders 
between sectors and subjects permeable for knowledge and experiences in other sectors and 
fields. A more integrated research council system was therefore more than wanted (ibid). 
 
The white paper addressing these issues ended up with a proposal to let an independent 
commission dig deeper. However, there was no easily traceable link between the proposal by 
the committee and what came out of the process as the end result. In fact, it is unclear what 
the committee actually proposed. This is evident from the following statement from one of the 
committee members: 
 
“The basic idea in the proposal by the committee was that there should be three 
research councils. To be better able to distribute resources between the three councils, 
based on a certain degree of scientific competence, and to ensure awareness of areas 
falling between them, there was at the last moment proposed an umbrella organisation. 
The result, however, was one council, far more integrated than what the Grøholt 
committee had proposed. Whether this was caused by misreading of the committee 
proposal or simply that the political bodies had a very different view than the 
committee, I do not know.”70 
 
More insight into this process is gained from the text in box 2, which links the proposal and 
the government decision with the Standing committee in Parliament. This committee felt 
uncertainty as to the proper policy to be chosen, and as a result became victim to this 
uncertainty, partly due to its own traditional lack of insight in research policy matters. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Interview with prof. Francis Sejersted, member of the Grøholt committee, Forskningspolitikk 2/2001, 
Forskningsfondet: Nytenkning må til. 
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Box 2: RCN in the political process71 
 
A White Paper was submitted to Parliament in May 1992. Initially, the Standing Committee on 
Education, Research and Church Affairs in Parliament did not see the Government proposal as 
an obvious road to follow. It was hesitant about discussing the White Paper at the end of a 
hectic spring term immediately prior to the summer recess. Actually, the Government had 
presented the White Paper after the normal deadline for such matters in the spring session and 
postponing it was not far-fetched. 
 
The Standing Committee made a preliminary decision to postpone the matter to the autumn 
term. They also had in mind to study the R&D organisation in the other Nordic countries before 
reaching a decision. The possibility of delay led to great disappointment as much activity 
among the supporters of the reform inside and outside of government. They argued that the 
research councils should not be in limbo much longer. More importantly, they feared that the 
opposition to the merger might gain momentum. However, some key actors outside the 
Parliament managed to make the Chairman change his mind on the timing. 
 
Most of the Committee members soon came to the conclusion that for them it was a matter of 
“taking or leaving” the entire reorganisation package. It was so much of a fragile compromise 
that it could easily fall apart if even minor changes were introduced. 
 
The result was that the bill passed the Standing Committee without any major cleavages or 
changes; the entire Committee except its Progressive Party members (right wing liberalists) 
supported the Government proposal. However, the Committee stated that all resources to the 
new council should be channelled through the Ministry of Education and Research. This was a 
significant, but somewhat naïve point of view, given the existing financial structure, practice 
and ministerial attachments to he existing funding and existing research councils. For example, 
the Ministry of Industry channelled the greater part of its funds for R&D through NTNF; 
Parliament’s view would have revolutionised R&D funding in Norway. The Committee also 
stated that all staff members in the former councils should be offered jobs in the new council. 
Accordingly, the new organisation started off without much new blood.  
 
Another point made by Skoie should be added. The White Paper was drafted carefully, almost 
strategically, and gave room for different interpretations on important points. The text was 
vague, and critical considerations were left out. It was basically a compromise paper 
representing a commonality of the positions taken by the research councils and the relevant 
ministries and “attuned to parliamentary politics”.  Further, states Skoie, “… its supporters 
accepted the merger at a very abstract and general level; during the process many of the 
qualifications they set for accepting it de facto evaporated – they could not at all be met.” 
(ibid).  
 
A stunning fact is also that while such a reform needs “lubricants” to get off to a good start, 
typically with sufficient funding, the availability of financial resources declined severely over 
the next years, challenging both the outside legitimacy as well as the internal functioning of 
the council (see more below). 
 
                                                 
71 From Hans Skoie: Diversity and Identity: The Merger of Five Research Councils in Norway. Science and 
Public Policy Vol. 27, no. 2 pp 83-96, April 2000. 
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6.5.3. The policy function: Introducing a contradictory role? 
The research council set up from 1993 had, as mentioned, several contradictions that were 
mainly structural. A salient feature of RCN and the new all-encompassing model was a 
combination of a classic, albeit highly integrated, research council, whose main function was 
to implement policy through funding operations, with a policy function. In fact, the RCN was 
expected by the minister of Science and Education to perform a key science policy advisory 
role.  
 
RCN never played the role foreseen. In addition to arguing for increased budgets for R&D 
and providing strategic plans for its own mission (impossible), activities that should be 
expected anyway (Skoie 2000), no major initiative for long term policy development and 
prioritization was taken. Meetings were held between the council and the Standing Committee 
of Science and education. “However, these meetings do not seem to have been particularly 
successful, and the number of attending ministries has varied considerably. It is noteworthy 
that criticism of the lack of vigorous advice and engagement from the Council has come from 
the Government itself” (ibid: 91). 
 
A wider assessment of this seems needed. First, it seems natural that a new council like RCN, 
meeting with demanding and multiple expectations from the environment, puts the finger on 
the scar left over from the start up phase: A significant reduction in funding that on the one 
hand led to infighting for resources and on the other hand to recurrent demands vis a vis its 
owners for appropriate funding. The lack of funding in the years after this reform is clearly a 
policy or government failure leading to years of set-backs of the overall innovation system. 
Second, the inability of the council in performing its policy advisory role may be linked to a 
vacuum of interest and capability in the political system. The Standing Committee of Science 
and Education in the Parliament was essentially an educational committee, and members had 
little if any competence and interest in science or research policy. Still, they were the 
committee to deal with the R&D budget, while R&D policy and budgets were not dealt with 
in the committee that had the long term interest in the area from an innovation policy point of 
view, namely the Standing Committee of Trade and Industry (following an arrangement by 
the presidency of Parliament, see also ch. 5). It is therefore fair to conclude that the capability 
failure in the RCN to perform was and is mirrored by the lack of capability, competence and 
interest in the political system as well as a structural failure of attention in that system.  
 
This criticism of the RCN may also seem unfair. After all, there was an independent research 
policy advisory committee before 1993, but was abandoned with the research council reform. 
The RCN was then expected to pick up that function, and has held it until the new 
reorganisation valid from 2004. While the research policy function may be criticized in 
general, it played a constructive role in the inputs for policy processes related to white papers 
and decisions on membership etc in the EU framework programme. Still, the RCN has now 
more competition in policy advise, as the ministry of Science and Education currently seeks 
advice and inputs from other institutions like the NHO (employers’ institution, NGO’s, 
universities etc). 
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6.5.4.  Lock in and representation 
RCN is a typical example of an ongoing trend in reforming governance in Norway: the 
tendency to build monolithic structures72.  Such structures may or may not offer co-ordination 
effects. One point to highlight, however, is the lack of diversity in the system, and the 
possibility that innovators become too dependent on one source of funding. This is especially 
the case as Norway has a traditional corporatist structure with representation by interest 
groups on various levels in committees and boards. As we have seen, the committee structure 
of RCN invites representatives from user groups, usually established firms, to serve on these 
committees, and these in turn both formulate objectives and contents of the R&D programmes 
and decide on distribution of support.  
 
The political economy of this situation is evident, and is further supported by a recent study 
by Narula (2002). While referring to the representative committee system already described, 
he illustrates that established firms (larger, energy- and or capital intensive firms) are able to 
control the priorities of industrial R&D in the RCN, thereby confirming the tendency to 
exclude smaller, technology-intensive firms which then have to seek R&D funds and 
collaboration abroad.  
 
The governance problem of producing legitimate allocation decisions when persons serving 
on the committees are themselves parties with interests in the outcome of the decisions is 
evident. Hence, on a repeating basis, the problem of independence is haunting the governance 
of RCN. While there is a need to create distance, legitimacy and independence, there is also a 
need to ensure sufficient expertise in the areas in question. Further, the system of programme 
committees is well in line with the kind of corporatist traditions in Norway. While there may 
be possible to initiate several changes of a detailed nature in the recruitment and proceedings 
of the committees, the main challenge of such a system in a small country is to operate with 
sufficient transparency and exploit the potential for using expertise from abroad.  
 
6.5.5.  Mission impossible?  
The framework conditions under which RCN has operated mean that many of the more 
radical ambitions for the reform are simply “mission impossible” (Arnold et. al. 2001: 118 
and 39):  
 
“Given the birthday present of a large budget cut, followed by several years of apparent government 
indifference, the organisations locked itself into internal battles and budget struggles.”  
 
“RCN was set up in a period of very active educational reform. (…) In 1993, with the students’ unions 
demanding better grants and the overall government budget under pressure, the government reallocated 
money from research to fund students grants, reducing the budget of the new council. (…) the 
government therefore unknowingly created conditions which would make it very difficult for the vision 
of an integrated research council to be realised. This birthday present of a 10 % budget cut set divisions 
and ministries against each other in a struggle for resources, reinforcing the very obstacles to a more co-
ordinated research policy that RCN had been created to overcome.” 
The public rhetoric was that of New Public Management, and that RCN had enthusiastically 
embraced many of these ideas including the principle of management by objectives. However, 
at the same time, the Ministries’ interests in research are strongly sectorized, and they have a 
                                                 
72 A recent one is also the merger of three innovation related agencies: The Norwegian Trade Council, The 
State’s Fund for Industrial and Regional Development (SND) and the Norwegian Council for Tourism into one 
new “Innovation Norway”. 
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tendency to defend their sectoral interests through very detailed micro-management of their 
research expenditures. Neither the promised money nor the required autonomy was granted to 
RCN. The effectiveness of horizontal co-ordination advisory mechanisms and the level of 
government interest in research and innovation policy have been highly dependent upon 
personalities. 
 
The relationship between the two councils should enable strong cooperation on closely 
selected topics and this will require a mutual understanding of both the research and the 
innovation support traditions. With two well-organized bodies this could be easier to achieve, 
the authors argue, as with the current unified but fragmented RCN seems to be “governed by 
peace treaties and not by a common strategy.” 
 
The Ministry of Education and Research commissioned the evaluation and was therefore 
responsible for following up this work. A Project Governing Board (Styringsgruppe) was led 
by Christian Hambro. The Government announced on the 28th of May 2002 that the RCN 
would not be split into two or more organisations.  
 
In an article in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten73 the Minister of Education and 
Research, Kristin Clemet, underlines the need for a close relationship between basic and 
applied science, which is much easily achieved in one organisation. Moreover, she argues that 
in many areas the present organisation functions well. There is for instance a better co-
ordination of international research co-operation, and a more coherent research institute 
policy. She mentions several issues that will have to be improved, however. Basic science will 
have to be strengthened, the innovation policy functions are to be strengthened and better co-
ordinated, and internal governance and co-ordination must be improved.74 
 
On the 10th of September 2002 the Government announced that the RCN would be 
reorganized. Six divisions were to be replaced by three: 
 
• The Division of Science, which is to contribute to the development of basic science 
within all disciplines as well as the development of interdisciplinary research  
• The Division for Innovation is to be a partner for the private and public sector in the 
field of research and innovation. The main focus is on innovation. 
• The Division for Strategic Priorities is to identify and prepare research needs of 
national importance and develop the knowledge base in priority areas. 
 
In the October 2002 National Budget, the Ministry of Education and Research gave more 
detailed presentation of the plans for reorganisation.75 The Ministry underlined that: 
 
• The main board must be strengthened 
• It may be possible for members of the divisional boards to be member of the main 
board 
• The main board will be given the responsibility of reorganizing the institution within 
the framework given by the Government 
                                                 
73 Aftenposten, May 29 2002. 
74 Norwegian press release at http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070045/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
75 St.prp. nr. 1 (2002-2003) Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet, pp.19 
http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/publ/stprp/045001-030004/index-hov003-b-n-a.html 
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• The Research Council will remain an important policy adviser for the Government.  
However, the Government will to a larger extent also ask other parties for advice. 
 
On September 1 2003 the Research Council switched to its new structure, in accordance with 
the reform implemented by the Government.76 
6.5.6. The new model – end of governance failures? 
A key issue emerging from the story of RCN is the fact that the process is one of integration 
rather than co-ordination. In other words, merging several research councils into one reflects 
institutional integration, but not necessarily policy-co-ordination. A contrast with the EU 
framework programme may be helpful in demonstrating this point. Over several programmes 
the framework system has tried to integrate various activities into more wholistic approaches. 
For example, the 3rd FP concentrated greatly on technology platforms, integration basic and 
applied research in building knowledge bases for industrial development. The 5th FP 
attempted another focus in using key actions in achieving a more coherent approach to R&D. 
The current 6th FP instigated Integrated Projects (IP) to essentially do the same as the 
technology platforms attempted in the 3rd. Hence, the framework system has been, albeit to 
variable degrees, an instrument to co-ordinate activities through programme design. RCN on 
the contrary has been an institutional solution of sectoral integration to what was at the outset 
labelled co-ordination problems. But RCN as an institution has not been able to co-ordinate 
various R&D activities through e.g. organising basic and applied research in dedicated 
programme design.  
 
Therefore, one may rightfully ask the question of how much institutional integration is 
warranted to ensure proper policy or activity co-ordination? There is no straight forward 
answer to this, but what maximum integration leads to is a lack of capacity in the system for 
self-organisation and adjustment, important co-ordination mechanisms that play a role in 
more loosely coupled, flexible or competitive systems. To high a degree of integration may 
therefore lead to loss of co-ordination, but of course greater political control. There is 
therefore a tentative contradiction in this material, as policy makers delegated policy making 
functions to the research council while at the same time opting for an organisational solution 
that had greater control potential. In sum, we do not see significant effects in policy co-
ordination from these reforms. Some further conclusions may be noted: 
 
First, the case of RCN illuminates a political failure in the sense that the policy system is ill 
equipped, both in terms of attention and capabilities, to formulate and address long term R&D 
policy issues. The consequence thereof is two-fold: The political system abdicates from key 
policy challenges while leaving to the RCN to perform such a role. Next, RCN becomes the 
level of co-ordination, as the political level is not able to do this. RCN as an example of the 
agency level in the Norwegian governance system, is then overburdened with co-ordination 
tasks for which it has few resources. The root of this problem, as we see it, may even lie in the 
deeply set sectoral system in the Norwegian public administration, a point that is dealt with 
elsewhere in the MONIT project.  
 
Second, of the two explanatory factors presented for the organisational and co-ordination 
problems in the RCN, the structural and the cultural, we see the structural as the main 
problem. The inbuilt tensions in the organisation, reflecting a diverse set of expectations from 
                                                 
76 See St.prp.nr. 1 2003 and new governing regulations for the Research Council decided by the Cabinet on 
December 20th 2002.  
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a complex environment, stretched the council in many directions, giving much leeway to the 
divisional level. Agency level co-ordination in a world that is highly fragmented is indeed a 
mission impossible.  
 
Third, the linkage with the outside world, or rather the constituency, through extensive user 
representation in boards and not least programme committees, may have a great number of 
advantages. But the history also illustrates that it may extend the conflicting interface with the 
user community as well as with the science community. This has in particular been the case in 
several conflicts relating to funding decisions, where people serving on programme 
committees are part of the decision making process concerning funding of projects by their 
own competitors. These governance dilemmas have not yet found their solution, but an 
independent study is being conducted with the aim to recommend new procedures.    
 
Fourth, the policy process leading to and beyond the reform to the current reorganisation was 
based on assumptions of governance that were ill-conceived. The idea of a monolithic 
structure being the answer to apparent co-ordination problems seems to be a political 
preference for control rather than diversity. Researchers and innovators in the Norwegian 
system may have got a one-door system to forward their applications, but have lost a diversity 
in which different research and innovation policies may have enriched the funding system and 
priority setting. We conclude at this point that the underlying logic of achieving coherence is 
through bureaucratic, agency-level monoliths, rather than flexible and diverse, even 
competing systems. An interesting implication from this is that a monolithic structure may be 
by far sub-optimal in achieving policy coherence and –co-ordination in an otherwise 
fragmented environment, while agency level flexibility and adaptability may be better of, 
creating the necessary diversity for innovators and researchers to exploit a system in which 
bounded rationalities are better distributed and represent lower risks. 
 
Fifth, and this is a key issue, there is a need to distinguish between integration and co-
ordination. The story of RCN is not a story about co-ordination as such, but rather sectoral 
integration on an institutional level. Such integration may or may not have co-ordination 
effects. The process, as well as the outcome, was evidently focussed more on developing a 
controllable institution than on achieving dedicated co-ordination impacts.  
 
In sum, the story of RCN is one with great and well-meant ambitions, but with many 
weaknesses. It illustrates that the decision making process is weak, in that far more resources 
are deployed for ex-post evaluation of the reform than a thorough ex-ante assessment of the 
status quo as it was. Reforms with vast implications are carried through without a sound 
policy assessment, and represent often a trend in time and personal political ambitions of  
ministers and other key actors. We do not know how a revised, multiple system of research 
councils would have looked like, but a system of more diversity would not necessarily be 
worse off when it comes to co-ordination and buffering the complex system of interests in the 
environment.  
 
6.6. The Government’s Committee for Innovation Policy: A 
necessary addendum? 
One of the outcomes of the innovation plan issued by the Government in 2003 (according to 
some observers the major outcome) was the establishment of the “Government’s Committee 
for Innovation Policy” (RUI). Given the perceived need to co-ordinate policies across policy 
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areas, RUI was given a key role, and in the Norwegian system it assumes the strategic body 
for the Government’s strategy in this area.  
 
RUI is conceived basically according to the model of RFU, but as an extended version. While 
RFU is made up of 5 ministers, RIU has 10 ministers, including those for ministries like 
health, public administration, finance, and foreign affairs. It is led by the minister for trade 
and industry. The most striking feature of RIU is that it was organised as a separate institution 
and did not contain or reorganise RFU. Hence, RIU is a governmental paradox: It has a 
broader responsibility than RFU, but has no responsibility for the R&D part of the innovation 
policy. That is still contained in RFU.  
 
As the RIU is just recently established and has no track record of performance, a reliable 
assessment is not warranted. However, some features of RIU may be highlighted, as it seems 
to resemble some important characteristics of the innovation plan itself. 
 
• First, it will meet twice a month (only three meetings at the time of writing). Hence, 
the intensity of RIU will be higher than RFU. 
• Second, RIU has not yet established a strategic agenda, including a broader 
assessment of the Norwegian innovation system, long term priorities for industrial 
development or redefinition of the apparent contradictions in Norwegian policy 
making related to a new innovation policy. 
• Third, the key tasks so far has been the management of the 8 (now 10) projects 
launched spontaneously by the minister of trade and industry in February. RIU itself is 
focussed on a division of responsibilities for these projects and on avoiding overlaps 
and inefficiencies in the overall management of them. 
• Fourth, as in the case of RFU, the Prime Minister has no function in RIU, and there is 
therefore no “supra-ministerial” role that could provide perspectives beyond what each 
minister or ministry brings to the meetings. 
• Fifth, to widen the basis for policy making, RIU is being extended with external 
stakeholders from industry, labour, and science to make up an extension termed FIP 
(Forum for Innovation Policy). This is an open forum where also the Prime Minister 
may take part, and is further extended with new participants on a flexible basis. It 
meets twice a year, and its main function is to ensure a dialogue to improve the 
contents and direction of the innovation policy. However, FIP is only an advisory 
body, and there is no obligation for the Government to follow up its advice and 
recommendations.  
 
As a rather preliminary assessment, RIU is aimed at an incremental co-ordination of the roles 
of the various ministries taking part in the innovation plan, and may thus serve important co-
ordination functions. FIP is a useful extension to provide a dialogue mechanism with 
stakeholders. However, while RIU includes the ministry of science and education, it is still 
separated from the committee of R&D policy, which is in our analysis a structural weakness 
and an unnecessary complexity. Further, the agenda of RIU does not so far compensate for the 
lack of structural focus in the innovation plan and the need to engage in broad and long term 
prioritization for structural change. 
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6.7. A summary assessment 
In this section we return to the questionnaire for an assessment by those who participate in the 
system. Fig. 18 taps the respondents’ views on some key dimensions of the governance 
system for innovation policy. 
 
Fig 18:  Assessment of the governance system for innovation policy 
 
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 %
Distributed responsibility hinders co-ordination
HIP leads to improved co-ordination
A separate innovation ministry leads to improved IP
DFU plays an important role
RFU plays an important role
Reorganisation of RCN leads to improved IP
Establishment of IN leads to improved IP
Don't know
Correct
Wrong
 
 
One immediate striking result is that the respondents have great difficulty in assessing the role 
and impact of the mechanisms in place. For example, both RFU and DFU are met with 
uncertainty or lack of knowledge, although RFU fares better. An obvious preoccupation is the 
view that the distribution of responsibilities in the area of innovation policy across several 
ministries leads to cumbersome c-ordination. On the other hand, there is not much confidence 
in a specialised or separate ministry for innovation either. There is much hope concerning the 
merger of agencies into Innovation Norway, but far less so in terms of the co-ordination 
impact of the reorganisation of RCN.  
 
Taking this into an overall summary, there is apparently too little knowledge of how the key 
co-ordination mechanisms actually work, and how this leads to policy outcomes. The strong 
sector principle in the Norwegian governance system is viewed as a serious obstacle to a more 
coherent and co-ordinated policy although close to 50% assess the HIP process as a useful 
compensating factor in this respect.   
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7. Policy learning: The production and use of policy 
relevant knowledge 
7.1. The policy cycle 
Common to all participants in the MONIT project, there is a simple model of the policy cycle. 
It consists briefly of the following steps: 
 
a) Agenda setting 
b) Prioritization 
c) Policy implementation 
d) Evaluation practices 
 
While policy learning has often been associated with evaluation and monitoring practices at 
the end of this cycle, and their feedback in the cycle for analysis and prioritization, we take 
the view that policy learning includes the management of learning processes throughout the 
cycle. Hence, while the cycle itself may be seen as steps to be taken by governments in 
formulation and implementing policy, policy learning may be seen as the particular ways and 
means that governments may use in the production, dissemination and use of policy relevant 
knowledge.  
 
In this chapter we will describe and assess the key policy learning mechanisms in place in the 
Norwegian system. This discussion will not strictly follow the cycle presented above, but lead 
to a broader discussion in this context towards the end.  
7.2. Knowledge and learning the governance system 
Before discussing and analyzing the policy learning practices, we present a crude assessment 
of some policy learning dimensions by respondents of the questionnaire. The results are found 
in fig. 29. 
 
Fig 29: Knowledge and learning in the governance system 
 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Broad competence in departement
Internal unit consensus on IP
Internal organisation consenus on IP
External consenus on IP
External influence from experts
Systemaic use of evaluations and studies
 Internal learning fora
Participation in extrnal arrangements
Don't know
No
Yes
 
 
The message from this figure is that there is a great activity but little consensus, There is a 
clear assessment that available competence among collegues in innovation policy issues is 
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quite high, and there is a notable participation in external workshops, seminars etc. The use of 
evaluations and other assessments and studies is very extensive, as is the receptivity of inputs 
by external experts like researchers. On the other hand, there is a significant lack of common 
understanding and consensus between organizations like ministries on what innovation policy 
is and should contain, a fact that necessarily leads to collaboration and co-ordination problems  
7.3. Strategic intelligence 
The Norwegian system does not use technology foresight as a means for forward looking, 
strategic intelligence. Even though some socio-political traits seem very conducive to such 
foresight processes, notably an otherwise corporatist basis for dialogue and partnership, the 
political system has not embraced the foresight model as a broad, collective process for 
prioritization and learning. This seems to be rooted in a lack of tradition in such a collective, 
expert-based process with an imperative that outcomes and recommendations should be 
included in the government’s policy making. 
 
7.3.1. White papers 
However, there are in place mechanisms that partly serve as functional alternatives. Most 
notably this concerns the white papers and the way these are being produced and used. In 
short, white papers are broad communications from the government to parliament on some 
key policy issue. As mentioned earlier, innovation related white papers are being produced 
regularly in the case of R&D, and less regularly on related issues.  
 
What makes the white paper interesting from a policy learning perspective, is that the process 
is quite open and based on a number of inputs from a variety of inside and outside sources. 
The full cycle of producing a white paper takes typically 1-2 years. They contain a factual 
description on areas under scrutiny, and include broad assessments of developments, 
challenges and policy options. The government will often use extensive outside expertise, e.g. 
the RCN, but increasingly also other sources like stakeholders (e.g. the Norwegian Business 
Association). Experts often participate, indirectly or directly, in providing updates on specific 
issues, reflections on complex topics, and summaries of relevant research.  
 
The white paper is in the Norwegian system an important document, although they vary in 
quality, comprehensiveness, and ambition. Hence, some white papers, also in the R&D and 
innovation policy domain, have a standing as reference documents even parts of the proposals 
therein may not be followed up for political reasons.  
 
7.3.2. Commissions and hearings 
In line with the committee based corporatist model in place in Norway, the work by 
commissions (a simple term for short term task forces or committees) is important as well as 
abundant. On several complex policy issues, like the reform of RCN and the tax credit scheme 
for R&D, both of which discussed in this report), such commissions are set up with a mandate 
given by government or a minister, and a participation typically based on a mix of 
representing stakeholders and independent expertise.  
 
As with the white papers, the work of the commissions are open, only even more so. Their 
work is typically published in the series of public documents called “Norwegian Public 
Studies” (NOU). This practice implies full transparency of the process, such that the 
independent council represented by the commission is public in full.  
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There are two related policy learning processes attached to these commissions. First, 
governments will not adopt their council as such, but will often launch a white paper in which 
the governments own assessment is presented as well as a proposal vis a vis parliament. 
Second, and before this takes place, the study is publicized to target audiences with invitations 
to respond with comments and proposals.  
 
It is important to state that the link between these commissions and subsequent white papers 
or even governmental decisions is rather weak. It means that governments may or may not 
adopt the line of thinking used in the studies, and may reject partly or fully the 
recommendations coming out of them. Still, they are important institutions for policy 
learning, in particular since they are open and inclusive.  
7.4. Evaluation practices 
If the strategic intelligence function of the system is limited to two, albeit rather well-
functioning institutions, the evaluation practice in Norway in the context of innovation policy 
is very broad and comprehensive. Further, it is worth mentioning that the various evaluations 
undertaken are also linked to the existence of a relatively large sector of social science 
research institutes and other research based consultancies. These are indirectly an extremely 
valuable part of the policy learning system, and Norway’s policy learning rests on an active 
exploitation of the research community, much unlike most other countries.  
 
For practical purposes it seems fair to divide the evaluation practice in two; institutional 
evaluation and programme evaluation77. These are discussed separately below.  
7.4.1. Institutional evaluation 
There is a comprehensive evaluation practice with the aim to assess and develop innovation 
related institutions. Crudely speaking, there are several variations according to which 
institutions are being evaluated. We may divide this practice as follows:  
 
a) Agency evaluation: This takes place when a responsible ministry intends to 
consider reform of their own agencies. The evaluation of RCN is a near 
example, the evaluation of the State fund for regional and industrial 
development (SND) another. In the first case the evaluation contract was given 
to foreign expertise, with a Norwegian subcontractor for technical assistance 
and data collection. Such agency evaluation will only be launched at times of 
specific change or controversy, and is thus not a regular evaluation practice. 
b) Performer evaluation: The research institutes and other knowledge institutions  
are regularly evaluated as part of the contractual relationship with the RCN. 
RCN has within its mandate the responsibility to manage the sector via a 
system of basic funding and strategic institutional programming, and regular 
evaluation, typically every 5 years, by a broad, often international panel is 
carried out. These evaluations are conducted in a learning rather than a control 
mode, implying that the institute (or university etc) in question is expected to 
enact on the recommendations set forth in the evaluation, and hence comply 
with the expectations from RCN. As such, evaluation is carried out within the 
                                                 
77 In addition RCN performs discipline evaluation, like evalution of Norwegian research in engineering science 
currently underway. 
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framework of improvement as an imperative in the contractual relationship 
between the institution and the RCN. 
 
7.4.2. Programme evaluation 
Programme evaluation represents the core business of Norwegian evaluation practice. The 
centre of this activity is the RCN (and to a lesser extent other agencies running programmes, 
like SND). This activity is very much an issue of accountability, whereby the funder is 
expected to generate reliable knowledge about the use of its public funds. 
 
Programme evaluation is conducted on a regular basis, primarily as an ex-post evaluation 
after a programme has ended. Programmes, be they research programmes or innovation 
related programmes, typically last 5 years and are managed by a programme committee made 
up of a mix of stakeholders and professional expertise. This committee manage the 
programme according to a mandate supplied by the administration of RCN. This mandate is 
then used as a point of reference for the evaluation.  
 
While the programme committee will not launch a programme evaluation, but rather the 
administration of RCN itself, this is different with monitoring. Monitoring on the programme 
level is usually to be decided by and carried out by the programme committee as a means to 
ensure learning within their management task. Hence, monitoring is not a regular activity.  
 
7.5. Evaluation in RCN 
As the RCN was established in 1993, one of the 10 tasks assigned to it by the statutes laid 
down by Government was to “Implement and follow up evaluation of research and research 
institutions”. After the reorganization in 2004 this item still exists, albeit changed to the 
shorter “ensure evaluation of Norwegian Research”.  An evaluation strategy was developed 
and endorsed by the main board of RCN in 1995. This was ambitious, and stipulated that the 
resources devoted to evaluation in RCN should be raised from 0.22% (1994) to 1-2% of the 
total budget, in line with international practice. 
 
The strategy was comprehensive, but not followed up. Currently, there is no overall budget 
for evaluation in RCN, and over the years the responsibility for conducting evaluation has 
been delegated to the divisions and their need for evaluations of programmes and research 
institutions. This does not mean that evaluation is neglected. On the contrary, it is pervasive, 
and as seen above, widely used. The apparent problem is that the strategy endorsed in 1995 
was never followed up as a RCN-wide mode for learning and development. In particular, this 
concerns the need for a comprehensive, strategic evaluation of the overall goal fulfillment of 
RCN and its role performance. This was among the issues stated in the strategy, but not 
implemented. Neither was there a follow up on the strategic need to create a central R&D 
evaluation budget for evaluation across divisions. Rather, the yearly evaluation plan 
resembles a bottom up assembly of evaluation projects by the various divisions. In sum, and 
which was confirmed by the RCN evaluation, the strategic approach to evaluation is missing, 
a point that has weakened the strategic role RCN could have had, and which would have 
helped RCN fulfill another statutory task: Giving advice to government on R&D policy.  
 
However, a number of activities and improvements have been initiated over the years, some 
of which are briefly discussed below as examples of a practice that seems to be the brand 
mark of RCN: Operative evaluation of programmes and institutions: 
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• As RCN has the responsibility of governing the framework conditions for the research 
institute sector through basic funding, it has developed a set of criteria for 
performance of research institutions that are evaluated every 5-6 years. These 
institutional evaluations are basically development oriented rather than towards 
control. 
• A forum for evaluation of strategies and instruments for industrial development (EVA 
forum) has been in place since 1994. This forum aims at contributing to learning and 
improvement of the knowledge base for evaluations and their practical use. Several 
ministries participate together with RCN, the Norwegian Business Association (NHO), 
Innovation Norway etc. Recently the ministry of research and education has cut their 
participation, as has the business association, seemingly an indicator of loss of 
relevance. However, State Accountancy system has showed interest and participates.  
• A modular system of data collection and analysis (ProVis) has been established, 
improving the database for evaluation of results, effects and impacts in and among 
firms participating in RCN’s programmes.  
 
These examples illustrate that activities are there, but, as the evaluation of RCN by 
Technopolis confirms, evaluation activities are extremely decentralized, implying too little 
attention to this function as a strategic learning tool, and evaluation results are hardly used for 
institution-wide learning and role development. 
 
It should be noted that some notable changes may be under way. With the recent 
reorganization of RCN, new initiatives have been made to re-establish evaluation as a 
centralized, strategic tool to enhance knowledge production and use for policy development. 
With the simpler organizational set-up of RCN, such a strategic function should be within 
reach. 
 
7.6. Two lessons from other policy areas 
Wrapping this chapter up, we will draw attention to some results from studies of two policy 
areas within the MONIT project. As mention in the outset of this report, three policy areas 
outside the traditional realm of innovation policy have been studied, with the aim to generate 
knowledge of governance in complex, horizontal areas that may be of value in developing 
governance capabilities for comprehensive, horizontal innovation policy.  
 
First, the study of ICT policy in Norway, or the governance of national plans for the 
information society, a particular mode of governance emerged that deviates from the 
traditional bureaucratic, hierarchical mode. Although a special unit in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry has the central responsibility for co-ordination of the policies and initiatives in 
this area, the practice of governance is far more decentralized and flexible (Pedersen 2004). 
Governance rests more on distributed knowledge flows and self organization, leaving units in 
other ministries or agencies with great responsibility for priority setting and implementation. 
In line with Grande (2001), the mode of governance can be referred to as emergent policy 
making, in contrast with deliberate policy making that is more hierarchical and top-down. 
While the latter may have been useful for stable, non-complex environments, the former 
seems functional for dynamic, complex environments with a high degree of uncertainty and 
hence less potential for hierachical control. On the one hand, this mode of policy making has 
inherent c-ordination mechanisms built upon flexible adaptation and self organization. On the 
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other hand it has a need for a more decentralized build up of information and learning 
systems. 
 
Second, and this is in line with the first point, horizontal implementation of a particular policy 
area may be well supported by dedicated monitoring and information systems that help 
integrate information on the effectiveness and progress of policy implementation. This was 
well illustrated in the study of environmental policy (see Ruud and Mosvold Larsen 2004). To 
follow of a national action plan for environmental policy, a particular monitoring system has 
been initiated that has the potential of being a powerful tool for broad based implementation 
and learning across ministerial sectors, as illustrated in fig. 20. 
 
Fig 20 The National Environmental and Monitoring System 
 
 
 
 
The system builds on an overall national strategy broken down in sectoral environmental 
plans. From these plans each ministry is required to provide reports that are integrated in a 
result and documentation system (RDS), which together with cross sectoral analysis form the 
basis of bi-annual reports from the Ministry of Environment. Although this system is not 
properly implemented, it has potential for elevating environmental policy into a dynamic, 
horizontal learning area. Innovation policy would be a relevant candidate for such a system. 
 
b)
Sectoral 
Environmental plans 
by the ministries
c) 
Sectoral Environmental 
reporting 
by  the ministries 
a)
MoE’s Bi-annual
Reports
c) 
Result and  
Documentation 
System (RDS) 
Administered by  the 
Norwegian Pollustion Control  
Authority (SFT) 
Cross Sectoral Analysis 
by the MoE and relevant  
Directorates
Source: White paper 8 (1999 -2000: 13) 
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8. Towards a comprehensive innovation policy? 
 
8.1. Conclusion 
The general conclusion arising out of this analysis is that the Norwegian governance system is 
rather ill fit for broad, strategic developments in innovation policy. The many contradictions 
in the policy processes make it extremely difficult to formulate strategic policies for 
innovation. However, significant changes have been introduced in recent years that are likely 
to continue. We will highlight the following important factors supporting this conclusion. 
 
a) Innovation as a key ingredient to economic growth and industrial restructuring has 
received great attention. Over the past years this area of policy has been elevated to a 
central place on the political agenda. However, the winner in real terms is R&D. R&D 
policy has received the significant increases in funding, not least though new 
mechanisms like the Research Fund and the tax break scheme SkatteFUNN. In the 
context of tight macro-economic and fiscal management, the “science rationality” and 
the research community has won back a role as a nexus for governmental efforts at a 
knowledge-based renewal.  
b) While the government’s plan for innovation policy has been framed in an economic 
policy setting, it was initiated by the R&D sector. While R&D policy avoids cuts in 
state budgets, industrially oriented innovation policy is more easily a target for such 
cuts, illustrating on the one hand a tension between direct measure handles by 
implementation agencies and indirect measures (SkatteFUNN). As long term 
budgetary allocations will need a binding governmental decision to guide the ministry 
finance, we conclude that a broad, industrially oriented innovation policy has not yet 
received the backing as a governmental strategy, although rethorically it has.   
c) The past decades have reinforced a market oriented economic policy giving a far less 
strategic role for the state than was the case in the decades after 1950. In the context of 
trends like new public management and economic or market oriented liberalism as the 
general pillars of economic policy, markets are expected to solve long term allocation 
and strategic decisions. This has served one important function in innovation policy, 
competition, and competition policy has been revitalised. The state has become a 
passive capitalist with great ownership in Norwegian industry, but without strategic 
visions. The role of the state is deemed ideologically to be passive and “not get in the 
way” of private enterprise as was recently stated by the minister of trade and industry. 
Projects as vehicles for long term development and resource allocation has been 
abandoned compared to what was the case in the decades after the war.  
d) The general organisation of the state is now more fragmented than before, with a 
greater role played by agencies and the implementation phase. The prime minister 
level is weak, combined with strong and autonomous ministries, making it difficult to 
transcend yearly combats for resources in the budgeting process. Corporatist 
stakeholder involvement has been reduced relative to the former model used by social 
democrats in the build up after the war. The sector principle in R&D policy has a 
significant strength in that it institutes a broad-based, but distributed responsibility for 
each ministry to invest in R&D in their respective areas. However, it reinforces 
autonomy and independence that are assessed as being obstacles for a government 
wide linkage between innovation and economic policy.  
e) The parliament is organised to balance the labour burden of MPs, and the standing 
committees are the key units in which the parliament allocates resources. However, 
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the real co-ordinating and poly making process takes place in the party groups, 
instructing the committee delegates in how to vote and decide. Hence, one may 
conclude that the parliament abandons the potentially professional decision making in 
the standing committees to the benefit of general policy making in the party groups. 
As key parties are divided on the economic vrs innovation policy discussion, a 
consensus based redefinition of industrial policy has been difficult.   
f) Without formal strategic decisions for long term resource allocation for R&D and 
innovation, the short term logic of the state budget implies a powerful role for the 
Ministry of Finance. The ministry is in a position to ensure detailed intervention into 
sector ministries priorities during the budgetary process. This may be useful seen from 
the perspective of managing the state budget from one year to the next, but in the case 
of policy areas needing a long term perspective, it seems counter-productive. 
g) The reform of the research council system into one singular council with a strategic 
mandate has not reduced the detailed earmarking practice of ministries funding the 
council. Hence, as mentioned above, the sector principle prevails. But this effectively 
reduces the strategic role of the council which is then not able to counteract the lack of 
strategic decision making in government. The result is that the system overall lack 
significant strategic capability. 
 
The Norwegian system is relatively well equipped with governance capabilities for static 
coherence. Extensive, short term co-ordination is being conducted, operative, ex-ante 
evaluation practices are abundant, and prioritization of long-term investments in the education 
system for human capital conducive to the nation’s need for technology development and 
competence has been a decade long challenge. Further, and in line with this, innovation policy 
has not yet been sufficiently framed in a dynamic setting, where such a broadly based domain 
is seen to play a major role for long term structural change to meet the challenges from a 
reduction in oil and gas production.  
 
A main problem in the Norwegian system is the ideologically based view on a proper 
interface between the state and the market. This is also a mix of fiction and reality, as e.g. the 
current policy principle of industrial neutrality (avoiding selective preferential treatment for 
individual industries or firms) is both enhanced as the leading foundation of industrial policy, 
while at the same time is hollowed out through special treatment of sectors with strong 
corporatist stakeholder involvement like agriculture. Further, the process of globalisation has 
lead to differential regimes for different industries, implying that governments are pushed to 
consider competition based adaptation of support regimes, like for ship-building.  
 
8.2. Recommendations for Norwegian innovation governance 
Some recommendations emerge from the material as the need to improve the governance 
system and policy processes is evident.  
 
First, a government level function that helps increase the strategic, long term capability for 
resource allocation and change of development paths is needed. Often governments look to 
Finland and her Science and Technology Policy Council for a solution. This is not presenting 
itself as the proper solution in Norway as it is likely that an extra-governmental body will not 
function with sufficient legitimacy. Therefore, and given the unbalanced relationship between 
the prime minister’s office and the ministries, it is recommended to strengthen this office with 
both manpower and formal competence to instruct and request sector ministries on issues of 
long term strategy development. In particular, there is a need to improve the cross-ministerial 
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capability for horizontal action, and the best placed body for that function will be the office of 
the prime minister.  
 
Second, more weight should be given to ex-ante policy analysis and evaluation for important 
policy developments like the comprehensive innovation plan. This will help generating a 
common understanding of the challenges ahead prompting new initiatives, improved and joint 
understanding of what innovation policy is, better bases for dialogue in working groups and 
task forces crossing ministries and create a better link between the agenda being set, the 
priorities selected, and the implementation of these priorities.   
 
Third, the ministries’ governance of the RCN needs to be changed with less earmarking and 
more build-up of the council’s strategic competence. Further, the current mandate of RCN to 
perform a R&D advisory policy function vis a vis the government should be reduced and/or 
replaced by a standing, independent commission to give advise to government on long term 
R&D and innovation policy issues. This is currently being implemented as an extension to the 
Government’s Committee on Innovation Policy (RIU), but steps should be taken to ensure its 
legitimacy and that its recommendations are followed up.  A precondition for this is that 
government lends ear to recommendations coming from this body, in particular in terms of 
redefining industrial policy and the choice of larger, integrated projects used as vehicles for 
innovation and change. 
 
Fourth, a renewal of the role of the state in policy is warranted. In particular, there is a need to 
develop pragmatic models of how a “neo-corporatist” state may operate in a globalized 
economy, without entering into the traps of selective support of input factors like in the 60’s 
and 70’s. What is needed is a policy that better exploits the state’s potential as an organising 
vehicle for long term investment, and stimulation of industrial development based on the 
assumption that different industries generate different externalities and thus different 
mechanisms for knowledge creation, flows and use. 
 
Fifth, there is a need to develop what may be termed multi-objective policies through both 
policy co-ordination as well as policy integration. While the former rests on various 
mechanisms through which alignments of policies may be achieved, the latter implies greater 
efforts to building multiple goals into broader, integrated policy domains, in particular 
domains with a great degree of horizontality.    
 
8.3. Generic capabilities for innovation governance 
All countries have their own history, specialisation, culture and institutional trajectory and 
set-up. Hence, lessons and recommendations from and for one country are hardly transferable 
to others. But the following seems to be generic lessons that may have wider relevance. 
 
a) Governments should invest in ex ante policy analysis and evaluation providing a 
platform for dialogue, mutual understanding and strategy across ministries. 
b) A strategic government function should be implemented that transcends tendencies to 
short-term, distributive co-ordination and ensures a more dynamic, long term resource 
allocation to areas that have an investment nature. 
c) Monitoring and learning mechanisms should be given attention to sustain emergent, 
de-centralised and adaptive policy making. 
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d) Explicit identification and formulation of sector policies’ objectives and instruments to 
help integrate policy across ministerial sector and reduce overlap, inconsistencies and 
complexity.  
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Annex 1: Interviewed persons 
 
Marit Halleraker, secretary for the Standing Committee of Trade and Industrial Policy 
 
Svein Erik Høst, Research Council of Norway 
 
Carl Huitfeldt, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
 
Morten A. Meyer, former deputy minister, Ministry of Regional and Municipal Affairs 
 
Tore Olsen, former deputy executive officer, department of research policy, Ministry of 
Science and Education 
 
Trine Paus, Research Council of Norway 
 
Hans Skoie, former director of NIFU, National Institute for Studies of Education and 
Research 
 
Grete Sønsteby, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
 
Kari Balche Øyseth, Ministry of Science and Education 
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Annex 2: Questionnaire 
 
 
1. Bakgrunnsinformasjon 
Spørsmålene er fordelt på 4 seksjoner. Det vil ta ca 4 minutter å besvare undersøkelsen. Du kan navigere fram og 
tilbake i skjemaet ved hjelp av knappene nederst på sidene. 
 
1.1 Kjønn:  
Mann  
< value="1" name="q0101" > 
Kvinne 
< value="2" name="q0101" > 
   
1.2 HØYESTE oppnådde utdanning:   
Tilsvarende videregående skole eller lavere 
< value="4" name="q0102" > 
Høgskole- eller universitetsutdanning, lavere grad (opp til 4 år) 
< value="1" name="q0102" > 
Høgskole- eller universitetsutdanning, høyere grad (mer enn 4 år)
< value="2" name="q0102" > 
Doktorgrad 
< value="3" name="q0102" > 
   
1.3 Arbeidssted:   
Departement 
< value="1" name="q0103" > 
Annet  
< value="2" name="q0103" > 
Antall år du har arbeidet i departementet
eller forvaltningsorganet du nå er ansatt i:   
<1 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0104"
> 
1-5 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0104"
> 
5-10 < 
value="3" 
name="q0104"
>  
>10 < 
value="4" 
name="q0104"
> 
Antall år du har arbeidet i avdelingen du
nå er ansatt i:   
< 
value="1" 
name="q0105"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0105"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0105"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0105"
> 
Antall år du har arbeidet med
innovasjonspolitiske problemstillinger i
organisasjonen du nå er ansatt i:
0 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0106"
> 
<1 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0106"
> 
1-5 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0106"
> 
5-10 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0106"
> 
>10 
< 
value="5" 
name="q0106"
> 
Antall år du har arbeidet med
innovasjonspolitiske problemstillinger i
andre organisasjoner enn der du nå er
ansatt:
< 
value="1" 
name="q0107"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0107"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0107"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0107"
> 
< 
value="5" 
name="q0107"
> 
 
(Med avdeling menes den laveste enheten du hører inn under i organisasjonen, for eksempel seksjon i et departement)
 
2. Utfordringer i innovasjonspolitikken 
I denne delen av spørreskjemaet ønsker vi å få et bilde av hva du anser for å være de sentrale utfordringene i norsk 
innovasjonspolitikk. Med innovasjonspolitikk forstår vi i denne sammenheng politikk som skal bidra til 
kunnskapsutvikling og nyskaping i og for næringslivet. Slike prosesser finner ikke sted i isolasjon, men innenfor større 
systemer - såkalte innovasjonssystemer - der en rekke faktorer spiller inn: for eksempel lover og forskrifter, offentlige 
virkemidler, utdannings- og forskningsinstitusjoner, bedrifter, finansmarkeder, internasjonal konkurranse, etterspørsel 
i markedet osv.   Under har vi listet opp flere mulige problemområder innenfor et lands innovasjonspolitikk. For hvert 
alternativ, ber vi deg vurdere viktigheten av dette problemområdet som et fremtidig satsningsområde for 
innovasjonspolitikken i Norge. Viktigheten vurderer du ut fra en skala fra 1 til 4, hvor 1 står for ikke viktig; 2 for 
lite viktig; 3 for ganske viktig; og 4 for svært viktig.  
   
2.1 Bedriftssystemet 1 2 3 4 
a) Bedrifters tilgang til såkornkapital 
og annen finansiering  < value="1" < value="2" < value="3" < value="4" 
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name="q0201a" > name="q0201a" > name="q0201a" > name="q0201a" >
b) Styrking av FoU-virksomhet i 
bedriftene < value="1" 
name="q0201b" >
< value="2" 
name="q0201b" >
< value="3" 
name="q0201b" > 
< value="4" 
name="q0201b" >
c) Kompetanseutvikling i bedriftene i 
form av kurs, opplæring, videre- og 
etterutdanning, rådgivning, etc. < value="1" name="q0201c" >
< value="2" 
name="q0201c" >
< value="3" 
name="q0201c" > 
< value="4" 
name="q0201c" >
d) Andre viktige satsningsområder innenfor bedriftssystemet: 
name=q0201dtxt row s="3" cols
>
   
2.2 Utdannings- og forskningssystemet 1 2 3 4 
a) Andelen av befolkningen med høyere 
utdanning (på universitets- eller 
høgskolenivå) < value="1" name="q0202a" 
> 
< value="2" 
name="q0202a" 
> 
< value="3" 
name="q0202a" 
> 
< value="4" 
name="q0202a" 
> 
b) Styrking av 
grunnforskningen/universitetsforskningen < value="1" 
name="q0202b" 
> 
< value="2" 
name="q0202b" 
> 
< value="3" 
name="q0202b" 
> 
< value="4" 
name="q0202b" 
> 
c) Styrking av forskningen innenfor 
instituttsektoren < value="1" 
name="q0202c" 
> 
< value="2" 
name="q0202c" 
> 
< value="3" 
name="q0202c" 
> 
< value="4" 
name="q0202c" 
> 
d) Kommersialisering av forskningsresultater 
fra universitets- og høgskolesektoren < value="1" 
name="q0202d" 
> 
< value="2" 
name="q0202d" 
> 
< value="3" 
name="q0202d" 
> 
< value="4" 
name="q0202d" 
> 
e) Tilbudet av etter- og videreutdanning 
< value="1" 
name="q0202e" 
> 
< value="2" 
name="q0202e" 
> 
< value="3" 
name="q0202e" 
> 
< value="4" 
name="q0202e" 
> 
f) Andre viktige satsningsområder innenfor 
utdannings- og forskningssystemet:         
name=q0202ftxt row s="3" cols
>
 
2. Utfordringer i innovasjonspolitikken (forts) 
Under har vi listet opp flere mulige problemområder innenfor et lands innovasjonspolitikk. For hvert alternativ, ber 
vi deg vurdere viktigheten av dette problemområdet som et fremtidig satsningsområde for 
innovasjonspolitikken i Norge. Viktigheten vurderer du ut fra en skala fra 1 til 4, hvor 1 står for ikke viktig; 2 for 
lite viktig; 3 for ganske viktig; og 4 for svært viktig.  
 
2.3 Det politiske systemet 1 2 3 4 
a) Utvikling av kunnskapsgrunnlaget for 
innovasjonspolitikken (herunder forsknings- og 
utredningsprosjekter) < value="1" 
name="q0203a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0203a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0203a"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0203a"
> 
b) Systematisk evaluering og referansetesting av 
innovasjonspolitiske virkemidler, organisasjoner og 
satsninger < value="1" 
name="q0203b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0203b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0203b"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0203b"
> 
c) Læring og kompetanseutvikling i organisasjoner og
avdelinger med direkte eller indirekte ansvar for 
innovasjonspolitikken  < value="1" 
name="q0203c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0203c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0203c"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0203c"
> 
d) Samarbeid og koordinering mellom organisasjoner 
og avdelinger med direkte eller indirekte ansvar for 
innovasjonspolitikken < value="1" 
name="q0203d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0203d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0203d"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0203d"
> 
e) Andre viktige satsningsområder innenfor det politiske systemet: 
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name=q0203etxt row s="3" cols
>
   
2.4 Nettverksbygging 1 2 3 4 
a) Etablering av bedriftsnettverk 
(nasjonalt/regionalt) < 
value="1" 
name="q0204a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204a"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204a"
> 
b) Etablering av nettverk mellom bedrifter, 
utdannings- og forskningsinstitusjoner og 
innovasjonspolitiske aktører < value="1" 
name="q0204b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204b"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204b"
> 
c) Etablering av nettverk mellom norske og 
utenlandske bedrifter < 
value="1" 
name="q0204c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204c"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204c"
> 
d) Etablering av nettverk mellom norske og 
utenlandske forskningsmiljøer < 
value="1" 
name="q0204d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204d"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204d"
> 
e) Etablering av nettverk mellom norske og 
utenlandske innovasjonspolitiske aktører < 
value="1" 
name="q0204e"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204e"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204e"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204e"
> 
f) Etablering av nettverk mellom norske og 
utenlandske forskningsmiljøer < 
value="1" 
name="q0204f" 
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0204f" 
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0204f"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0204f" 
> 
g) Andre viktige satsningsområder når det gjelder nettverksbygging: 
name=q0204gtxt row s="3" cols
>
   
2.5 Generelle rammebetingelser for 
næringslivet 
1 2 3 4 
a) Forenkling av offentlige lover, regler og 
administrative rutiner  < 
value="1" 
name="q0205a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205a"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205a"
> 
b) Skatte- og avgiftspolitikken 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205b"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205b"
> 
c) Den offentlige innkjøpspolitikken  
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205c"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205c"
> 
d) Utbredelse og bruk av informasjons- og 
kommunikasjonsteknologi < 
value="1" 
name="q0205d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205d"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205d"
> 
e) Standardiseringsarbeid 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205e"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205e"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205e"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205e"
> 
f) Lovverk for patenter og immaterielle rettigheter 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205f" 
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205f"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205f" 
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205f"
> 
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g) Lover og regelverk i EU/EØS 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205g"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205g"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205g"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205g"
> 
h) Internasjonale avtaler (for eksempel WTO) 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0205h"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0205h"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0205h"
> 
< 
value="4" 
name="q0205h"
> 
i) Andre viktige satsningsområder når det gjelder generelle rammebetingelser for næringslivet: 
 name=q0205itxt row s="3" cols
>
 
3. Læring i det innovasjonspolitiske systemet 
STEP ønsker i den tredje og fjerde delen av spørreskjemaet å kartlegge din oppfatning av hvordan læring skjer 
innenfor det innovasjonspolitiske systemet, og hvordan innovasjonspolitikken blir koordinert på tvers av institusjonelle 
og organisatoriske skillelinjer.   I spørsmålene som følger mener vi med organisasjon departement eller 
forvaltningsorgan. Med avdeling menes den laveste enheten (for eksempel seksjon i departement) du hører inn under i 
organisasjonen. Vi ber deg først besvare følgende spørsmålene ut fra svarkategoriene ja, nei og vet ikke.    
 
3.1 Kunnskap, kompetanse og læringsprosesser i det 
innovasjonspolitiske systemet Ja Nei Vet ikke 
a) Bærer personsammensetningen i avdelingen du jobber i preg av 
stor faglig bredde? < 
value="1" 
name="q0301a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301a"
> 
b) Opplever du at det er overensstemmelse i forståelsen av hva som 
er en god innovasjonspolitikk innad i din avdeling? < 
value="1" 
name="q0301b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301b"
> 
c) Opplever du at det er overensstemmelse i forståelsen av hva som 
er en god innovasjonspolitikk mellom din avdeling og andre 
avdelinger i samme organisasjon? < value="1" 
name="q0301c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301c"
> 
d) Opplever du at det er overensstemmelse i forståelsen av hva som 
er en god innovasjonspolitikk mellom din organisasjon og andre 
organisasjoner som arbeider med innovasjonspolitiske 
problemstillinger? 
< 
value="1" 
name="q0301d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301d"
> 
e) Opplever du at forståelsen av innovasjonspolitikk i din avdeling 
inspireres av eksterne aktører, så som forskningsmiljøer? < 
value="1" 
name="q0301e"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301e"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301e"
> 
I så fall, hvilke? 
name=q0301etxt row s="3" cols
>
 
f) Gjør din avdeling bevisst bruk av evalueringer, forsknings- og 
utredningsrapporter, eksempler på ”good practices” fra andre land, 
etc. som kilder til læring innenfor området innovasjonspolitikk? < value="1" 
name="q0301f"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301f" 
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301f"
> 
g) Har organisasjonen du jobber i interne fora for læring innenfor 
området innovasjonspolitikk? < 
value="1" 
name="q0301g"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301g"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301g"
> 
h) Har du det siste året deltatt på eksterne seminarer, konferanser, 
workshops eller lignende innenfor området innovasjonspolitikk? < 
value="1" 
name="q0301h"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0301h"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0301h"
> 
 
4. Koordinering i det innovasjonspolitiske systemet 
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4.1 Koordinering av innovasjonspolitikken Ja Nei Vet ikke 
a) Deltar avdelingen din systematisk i fora for koordinering av 
innovasjonspolitikk mellom ulike avdelinger innad i organisasjonen?  < 
value="1" 
name="q0302a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302a"
> 
Hvis ja, hva slags fora er det snakk om? 
name=q0302atxt row s="3" cols
>
 
b) Deltar avdelingen din systematisk i fora for koordinering av 
innovasjonspolitikk mellom ulike organisasjoner i forvaltningen? < 
value="1" 
name="q0302b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302b"
> 
Hvis ja, hva slags fora er det snakk om? 
name=q0302btxt row s="3" cols
>
 
c) Tar du del i uformelle nettverk av personer som jobber med 
innovasjonspolitiske spørsmål i organisasjonen du er ansatt i? < 
value="1" 
name="q0302c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302c"
> 
d) Tar du del i uformelle nettverk av personer som jobber med 
innovasjonspolitiske spørsmål i andre organisasjoner 
(forvaltningsorganer, forskningsmiljøer, etc.)? < value="1" 
name="q0302d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302d"
> 
e) Tar du del i uformelle nettverk av personer som jobber med 
innovasjonspolitiske problemstillinger i andre land? < 
value="1" 
name="q0302e"
> 
 < 
value="2" 
name="q0302e"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302e"
> 
f) Har din avdeling vært involvert i arbeidet med regjeringens plan for
en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk (HIP’en)? < 
value="1" 
name="q0302f" 
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302f"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302f" 
> 
g) Har arbeidet med HIP’en ført til at avdelingen din har styrket 
eksisterende - eller inngått nytt - samarbeid med andre avdelinger 
eller organisasjoner? < value="1" 
name="q0302g"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0302g"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0302g"
> 
 
4.2 Vurdering av det innovasjonspolitiske systemet 
Under finner du en rekke påstander om det norske 
innovasjonspolitiske systemet. Vi ber deg om å vurdere påstandene 
ut fra følgende svaralternativer: galt, riktig, vet ikke. 
  Galt Riktig Vet ikke 
a) Organiseringen av innovasjonspolitikk i ulike departement fører til 
at koordineringen av politikken vanskeliggjøres. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303a"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303a"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303a"
> 
b) Arbeidet med regjeringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk 
(HIP’en) vil føre til en bedre koordinering av innovasjonspolitikken. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303b"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303b"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303b"
> 
c) Opprettelse av et eget innovasjonsdepartement ville ført til en 
bedre innovasjonspolitikk. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303c"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303c"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303c"
> 
d) Departementenes forskningsutvalg spiller en sentral rolle for den 
innovasjonspolitikken som blir utformet. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303d"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303d"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303d"
> 
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e) Regjeringens forskningsutvalg spiller en sentral rolle for den 
innovasjonspolitikken som blir utformet. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303e"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303e"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303e"
> 
f) Omorganiseringen av Norges Forskningsråd vil føre til en bedre 
innovasjonspolitikk. < 
value="1" 
name="q0303f" 
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303f"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303f" 
> 
g) Omorganiseringen av Statens Nærings- og distriktsfond (SND), 
Statens Veiledningskontor for oppfinnere (SVO), Norges Eksportråd 
og Norges Turistråd vil føre til en bedre innovasjonspolitikk. < value="1" 
name="q0303g"
> 
< 
value="2" 
name="q0303g"
> 
< 
value="3" 
name="q0303g"
> 
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Annex 3: Innovation policy measures 2002: Complete list 
 
 Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK) 
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€) 
Description MONIT 
classification 
1 TaxFIND 2002-indefinite 750 mill 91 mill  SkatteFunn is a measure that gives SMEs tax 
allowances for investments in R&D. 18% (or 20 % in 
the case of SMEs) of expenses for R&D projects may 
be deducted. The basis for deduction is R&D 
expenses of up to NOK 4 mill (approximately € 530 
000) for internal projects, and another NOK 4 mill 
for co-operative projects (or NOK 8 mill for co-
operative projects alone). The R&D projects should 
aim at generating new knowledge, information or 
experience which is of value to the development of 
new products, services or production processes. 
Company system 
2 The seed capital 
funds 
1997-indefinite 720 mill* 87 mill*  Company system 
3 User driven 
programmes 
Start date varies 
– no definite 
ending 
App. 650 
mill 
App. 78,8 
mill 
The public ‘user driven’ R&D programmes are based 
on the premise that enterprises wishing to take part in 
publicly funded R&D programmes should have a 
decisive influence on the direction, control, 
management and implementation of the relevant 
programmes and projects. 
Company system  
Education/research 
system 
4 Centres of 
excellence 
2001-2011 155 mill 18,8 mill The instrument Centres of Excellence is to stimulate 
Norwegian research environments to establish centres 
dedicated to long-term, basic research at a high 
international level to raise the quality of Norwegian 
research. 
Education/research 
system 
5 The IFU/OFU 1994-indefinite 112 mill 13,6 mill  The main objective of the IFU programme is to Company system 
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programme  increase the co-operation between SMEs and larger 
firms.  An IFU-contract is an agreement between two 
companies, aimed at developing a product or a 
process needed by one of the companies (the 
customer). One of the two should be an SME. The 
State will support the endeavour financially. In the 
OFU-programme the customer is a public institution. 
6 Programme for 
competence 
development 
2000-2003 (may 
be continued) 
100 mill 12,1 mill The Ministry of Education and Research has 
established a programme for competence 
development that is to contribute to innovation in the 
market for life long learning. Companies, 
municipalities, knowledge institutions, labour 
organisations and others may initiate projects under 
this programme. 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
 
7 Innovation 
scheme 
Includes several 
schemes with 
varying start 
dates – ending 
not decided 
89 mill 10,8 mill 
 
 Company system 
8 The 
entrepreneurship 
grant/the 
business 
establishment 
grant 
1989-indefinite 84,2 mill 10,2 mill The entrepreneurship grant is a scheme for business 
entrepreneurs in all parts of Norway, but with a particular 
emphasis on entrepreneurs in cantonal Norway. The main aim 
of the scheme is to stimulate to increased business 
establishment, to create durable and profitable jobs for both 
women and men.  
Company system 
9 FORNY 1994-2010 59 mill 7,2 mill The FORNY programme is to support the process for 
wealth creation by improving the ability to 
commercialise research-based business concepts or 
ideas conceived at universities, colleges and research 
institutes, professionalize the process of 
commercialisation; turn the commercialisation of 
research-based business concepts into a strategic area 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
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of activity and set up a permanent service of 
commercialisation of research-based business 
concepts through the establishment of a company that 
can deal with all aspects of the commercialisation 
process. 
10 MOBI 
 
Consists of three 
sub-
programmes: 
• TEFT 
• ARENA 
• nHS 
2002-2009 
 
 
 
TEFT: 1994-
2003 
ARENA: 2001-
2005 
nHS: 2002-2004 
52,1 mill 
 
 
 
TEFT: 
20,8 mill 
ARENA: 
2,3 mill 
nHS: 
28,9 mill 
6,3 mill 
 
 
 
TEFT: 2,5 
mill 
ARENA: 
0,3 mill 
nHS: 3,5 
mill 
MOBI (Mobilisation for R&D related innovation) is 
an ‘umbrella’ programme covering several smaller 
programmes. Its main goal is to promote learning, 
innovation and value creation in companies with little 
experience with R&D. In general this means SMEs. 
In many of these companies there are barriers to 
innovation, e.g. high risk associated with innovation 
activities, lack of relevant expertise and of 
knowledge of how to acquire such expertise, and lack 
of capital. MOBI’s ambition is to reduce the number 
and impact of such barriers. The programme also 
aims at increasing the companies’ R&D based 
innovation efforts by stimulating long term co-
operation with other companies, R&D environments 
and actors from innovation policy institutions, 
particularly on a regional basis. 
MOBI is to continue and develop the activities of the 
BRO Programme, and covers the following four sub 
programmes: 
Industry oriented focus on colleges (nHS, 
Næringsrettet høgskolesatsing) – the objective of 
which is to establish competence increasing co-
operation between companies and public university 
colleges 
SME Colleges – which aims at strengthening the 
position of university colleges in regional innovation 
TEFT – which aims at promoting the transfer of 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
Political system 
 
TEFT:  
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
ARENA:   
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
Political system 
nHS: 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
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technology from research institutes to SMEs 
ARENA - Regional innovation pilots – the goal of 
which is to contribute to the development of regional 
innovation systems and industrial clusters 
In addition to stimulating the innovation efforts of 
firms, MOBI’s ambition is to increase industry 
oriented research within R&D environments and to 
improve the institutional framework for innovation. 
The programme will also function as a ‘laboratory’ 
for the development of innovation policy measures, 
where existing measures are to be improved and new 
measures developed and tested.     
11 FRAM 1992-2005 (may 
be continued) 
40 mill 4,9 mill  FRAM supports basic learning within SMEs, 
particularly in the field of leadership and the building 
of company strategies, the goal being to make the 
companies more profitable. 
Company system 
12 KUNI 2002-2007 35 mill 4,2 mill  KUNI is a research programme which aims at 
strengthening the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge base for industrial innovation policies. 
The programme wishes to contribute to the 
development of a clearer appreciation of the factors 
contributing to value creation ; a better decision basis 
for industrial policies at both national and regional 
level ; and prominent research environments that can 
contribute to the international knowledge 
development in the field. 
KUNI focuses on two areas of research: (1) 
Innovation policy and value creation in an open 
economy; and (2) The role of knowledge 
development in innovation. Within the first area, 
there is need for more knowledge about the factors 
influencing innovation ; the factors prompting 
Education/research 
system 
Political system 
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commercial exploitation of innovations ; the areas in 
which returns on innovation differ significantly 
between industry and society at large ; the effect of 
innovation on firm organization ; clusters and cluster 
formation ; the factors that promote and restrain 
innovation ; the relative importance of selective and 
general measures in innovation policy and regional 
policy ; the relative importance of market power and 
competition in promoting innovation based industrial 
development ; and the relationships between 
ownership and innovation. Important issues within 
the second area of research are the value creation 
potential in new forms of knowledge and new 
combinations of knowledge; the facilitation of 
systematic knowledge development; and the 
exploitation of the possibilities offered by ICT. 
The programme encourages research environments to 
develop projects within the two areas of research. 
The programme gives priority to a small number of 
large projects in order to secure quality through 
concentration and long term activity. Some small 
projects will be included, however, to ensure 
flexibility. 
The results of the programme are to be 
communicated continuously through seminars, 
conferences, the internet, mass media and scientific 
journals. 
13 BIT 1989- 
ending not 
decided 
34,1 mill 4,1 mill The BIT Programme is to improve the profitability 
and competitive ability of firms by developing 
common ICT solutions adapted to specific sectors of 
industry. 
Company system 
14 Industrial 1999-ending not 30,6 mill 3,7 mill The objective of the industrial garden programme is to stimulate 
value creation in the regions by creating regional clusters of 
Company system 
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gardens decided SMEs which offer attractive work opportunities for highly 
educated persons.   
An industrial garden is a group of knowledge intensive firms 
gathered under one roof.  The idea is, that by sharing premises 
the firms constitute a professional and social environment which 
stimulates co-operation, exchange of knowledge, and mutual 
skills upgrading. The industrial garden environment is to 
stimulate the starting up of development activities – either 
within the single firm or in co-operation between the firms. In 
addition, the arrangement gives the participating firms the 
opportunity of establishing a cost saving common technical 
infrastructure.  
Each industrial garden is connected to the other industrial 
gardens - i.a. through a common web-site and seminars - and 
should also be linked to wider industrial and competence 
networks. 
As of today, there are 30 industrial gardens in 
Norway. Most of them are specialized within the 
fields of data processing, business services, trade and 
health and social services. 
15 The NT 
programme 
1987-2004 (may 
be continued) 
24 mill 2,9 mill  
 
The programme gives support to innovation in 
Northern Norway, by providing capital and advice 
and by developing networks of companies and 
knowledge institutions. 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
16 Value creation 
2010 
2001-2010 21,3 mill 2,6 mill The main goal of the Value creation 2010 programme 
is to promote in-firm and network based innovation, 
particularly at the regional level. On the one hand the 
programme aims at stimulating broad employee 
participation and co-operation with researchers 
within single firms. On the other hand networks – or 
development coalitions – of firms, research 
institutions and actors from innovation policy 
institutions are to be established. In addition the 
ambitions are to increase scientific knowledge about 
development and innovation processes and to 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
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improve the effects of innovation policy instruments. 
17 Programme for 
incubator 
activities 
2000-2007 20,5 mill 2,5 mill The objective of the programme for incubator 
activities is to stimulate the establishment of new 
firms with growth potential, and thereby to contribute 
to the development of strong regional and local 
environments for value creation. 
An incubator is an environment for the development 
of firms in the start-up phase. The incubator is 
located in an established centre of competence, and 
offers the firms physical premises and a technical 
infrastructure, advice and guidance on all matters 
concerning the start-up, and links to wider networks 
of competence and services, such as research and 
financial institutions.  
Any innovation oriented organizations, such as 
science parks, private firms, and knowledge intensive 
public enterprises (i.e. hospitals), can be hosts for an 
incubator. 
The incubators are open to firms who have a 
considerable growth potential, and who are in an 
early phase when support is crucial and the activity is 
connected with a high risk. The firms are to leave the 
incubator as soon as they have become well 
established and economically viable. 
Company system 
18 International 
technology co-
operation 
1999-ending not 
decided 
20 mill 2,4 mill  The objective of this national scheme is to strengthen 
the international competitiveness of Norwegian 
firms, by stimulating technology transfer from 
abroad; mapping the marketing possibilities for 
technology developed in Norway; and establishing 
networks and alliances between Norwegian and 
foreign firms. The target groups are various public 
institutions, universities and other research 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
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institutions, as well as firms. 
19 Incubator grant 2001-ending not 
decided 
19 mill 2,3 mill The aim of the incubator grant is to stimulate to 
increased establishment of competitive, future-
oriented and innovative businesses contributing to 
innovation and business renewal in general. The 
incubator grant is a scheme for entrepreneurs located 
in an incubator. The grant is designated for start-ups 
with a high knowledge and technology level. 
Company system 
20 The 
entrepreneurship 
programme 
2002 – ending 
not decided 
12 mill 1,5 mill  The programme aims at helping knowledge intensive 
high tech SMEs commercialize their products and 
introduce them in international markets. The 
programme offers assistance in the fields of strategy, 
networking and marketing in the initial phase of 
commercialization and internationalization. 
Company system 
21 Women in focus 2000-indefinite 12 mill 1,5 mill The goal of the measure is to increase the share of 
women in boards and in the management of SMEs, as 
well as to increase the share of women establishing 
their own businesses. The project will make use of 
women’s competences and experiences, especially in 
areas in need of change and innovation.  
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
22 Programme for 
Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation 
in Norway  
2001-2005 8 mill 1 mill  Programme for Entrepreneurship and Innovation in 
Norway (Program for entreprenørskap og nyskaping i 
Norge) was initiated by the organization Young 
Entrepreneurship. The programme is to develop 
methods, material and networks for the establishment 
of closer links between educational institutions and 
industry and the promotion of entrepreneurship in 
education on all levels. The programme will anchor a 
nation wide permanent institution which is to develop 
and implement models and methods for 
entrepreneurship in education and training in schools, 
colleges and universitites 
Company system 
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23 Network 
credit/network 
bank 
1992-indefinite 7,3 mill 0,9 mill  The goal of the measure is to stimulate increased 
entrepreneurship to create new and profitable 
workplaces for entrepreneurs with limited capital 
needs. The measure is in principle sex neutral, but 
has until now mostly been used by women.  
The measure was first put into action by the women’s 
committee of the fishing industry in Norway inspired 
by network banks in Bangladesh. 
Company system 
24 The Norwegian 
school of 
entrepreneurship 
1999-ending not 
decided 
5,8 mill 
(2003) ** 
0,7 mill 
(2003) ** 
The objective of the school is to increase value 
generation from research based start-ups at 
institutions of higher learning. The school offers an 
entrepreneurship education programme aimed at 
creating a culture where entrepreneurship is 
applauded. 
Company system 
Education/research 
system 
25 Venture cup 2000-2004 3 mill 0,4 mill  Venture cup is a competition that rewards good 
business plans. 
Company system 
Education/research 
system  
26 The icebreaking 
measure 
1998-not decided 1 mill 0,1 mill The goal of the measure is to contribute to increased 
use of design as a competitive force in Norwegian 
business life. The goal of the programme is increased 
understanding of the significance of design, and 
coordinate initiatives to increase the use of design in 
Norwegian businesses. 
Company system 
27 Dynamic local 
schools 
 750 000 92 500 The scheme is to stimulate entrepreneurship in order 
to establish new jobs. The programme0 is based on 
cooperation between schools, local authorities and 
local businesses and aims at teaching kids and young 
people industrial creativity and entrepreneurship. 
Company system  
28 Start Norway  150 000 
(2003)***
18 191  
(2003) *** 
The organisation gathers students for meetings where 
they can discuss entrepreneurship and get relevant 
information. The main aim of the organisation is to 
motivate students to innovation and renewal 
Company system 
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activities. 
 
* The number denotes the total available capital base 
**Annual budget for 2002 is not available 
***Annual budget for 2002 is not available 
 
 
 
 
